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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation consists of three essays on merger outcomes.  In the first essay I classify 
mergers as value-increasing, neutral, or value-decreasing by measuring the change in the combined 
wealth of acquiring- and target-firm shareholders at the merger announcement date.  I then test the 
role that strategic objectives and negotiation procedures play in driving value-increasing mergers.  
The results indicate that geographic expansion creates the largest combined increase in wealth.  
One-on-one negotiations correspond to greater increases in combined wealth, when compared to 
mergers that begin with auctions, third-party bids, or mutual discussions.  The results of my study 
support both the strategic-alignment and targeted-synergistic-negotiation hypotheses. 
The second essay contributes to the literature by identifying novel proxies of bargaining 
power, such as the negotiation process and underlying deal motivations cited by management.  By 
identifying five mutually exclusive negotiation procedures used to initiate a merger, I am able to 
simultaneously test theoretical predictions about sales procedure and bidding strategy.  I find 
evidence that a one-on-one negotiation is preferable to an auction in the presence of information 
costs.  Subsequently, I test the bargaining power hypothesis; which states that the strength of the 
acquiring and target managers’ bargaining positions drives the distribution of wealth.  In mergers 
that start as auctions, the winning bidder captures the majority of wealth creation.   I find that 
operational expertise provides a significant bargaining advantage for targets.  However, acquirers 
capture the majority of wealth when merging with targets experiencing financial distress.   
iii 
 
The third essay uses the most recent financial crisis and subsequent recovery provide a 
natural experiment to test hypotheses related to value creation and distribution.  I find three key 
results.  First, the likelihood of a value-increasing merger was not correlated with market valuation, 
such that the proportion of value-increasing mergers did not increase during the Financial Crisis.  
Second, although there is some evidence that the frequency of unrelated mergers increased during 
the Financial Crisis, access to capital was the more critical deal motivation.  Third, my results 
indicate that financially distressed targets had higher debt and lost considerable negotiating 
leverage during the financial crisis.    
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ESSAY 1: DO CORPORATE STRATEGIES AND NEGOTIATING PROCEDURES DRIVE 
VALUE-INCREASING MERGERS? 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Financial research identifies numerous reasons why a takeover announcement might affect 
the stock prices of the acquiring and target firms.1  Key factors include the acquiring-firm 
manager’s strategic objective, the bidding procedure, the number of bidders, the payment method, 
and the existence of a toehold.  When researchers examine potential factors, they often collect data 
about a large sample of acquisitions and measure the stock price reactions of the merging firms.  
Most studies find that acquiring-firm shareholders generally lose wealth at the merger 
announcement date, but target-firm shareholders generally gain wealth.2  However, there are two 
reasons why using the results of studies that examine the average impact of merger announcements 
on either acquiring- or target-firm shareholders’ wealth may not be the best metric for evaluating 
specific mergers.   
First, Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford (2001) suggest that if mergers could be “sorted by 
their true underlying motivations,” then those which do benefit acquirers are undertaken for good 
reasons, “but in the average statistics, they are cancelled out by those with bad reasons.”  As a 
result, what is needed is a study that adds to our understanding of the factors that lead to an increase 
in the combined wealth of acquiring- and target-firm shareholders.  
Second, recent research suggests that analyzing dollar gains rather than stock returns can 
provide a different perspective.  For example, in contrast to the common view that target-firm 
shareholders almost always capture the majority of the merger gain, Ahren (2012) finds that 
                                                          
1 See Bruner (2002) and Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001). 
2 Relevant studies include Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins, 1987, Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1988), Fuller, Netter, and 
Stegemoller, 2002, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2005, and Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn, 2008. 
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acquiring-firm shareholders earn greater dollar gains than target-firm shareholders in more than 
25% of his sample.  However, Ahren (2012) examines only vertically-integrated mergers, so it 
would be interesting to see if his findings apply to a broader sample of mergers with different 
strategic objectives. 
My study examines the relation between the acquiring-firm manager’s strategic objective, 
the negotiation procedure, and the merger outcome.  The term merger outcome refers not only to 
how much wealth a takeover announcement creates, but also to how the acquiring- and target-firm 
managers distribute the gain.  I identify five mutually-exclusive merger outcomes based on the 
dollar change in the market values of the merging firms.  Three categories reflect the change in the 
combined wealth of the acquiring- and target-firm shareholders (value increasing, neutral, and 
value decreasing).  Essay #1 tests strategic objectives and negotiation procedures as determinants 
of value-increasing mergers.1  Essay #2 examines the role of bargaining power in determining how 
the managers distribute the gain in value-increasing mergers.  In that essay I subdivide the value-
increasing category depending on the relative gain that accrues to the acquiring-firm shareholders 
(value capturing, value sharing, or overpaying). 
My study extends the merger literature in two important ways.  First, I identify the 
corporate strategies preferred by acquiring-firm managers, and I test the relation between corporate 
strategy and the change in the combined wealth of the acquiring- and target-firm shareholders.  
Therefore, my study extends Walker (2000), who examines the relation between corporate strategy 
and acquiring-firm stock returns.  However, a study that examines only the change in acquiring-
firm shareholder wealth cannot differentiate between a merger in which the acquiring-firm 
shareholders wealth loss exceeds the target-firm shareholders’ gain (i.e., there is a net loss), and a 
merger in which the acquiring-firm’s shareholders lose wealth but there is a net gain.  The first 
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merger could be driven by industry factors (e.g., overcapacity); the second merger suggests 
overpayment.  Second, my study examines the relation between negotiation procedure and wealth 
creation.  Based on previous financial research, I hypothesize that the synergistic gain should be 
greater when managers initiate a one-on-one negotiation (either acquirer-to-target or target-to-
acquirer) than an auction.  I also identify a negotiation procedure, merger negotiations that begin 
as mutual discussions between the acquiring- and target-firm managers, which previous research 
has not investigated as a standalone category. 
The results of my study show that acquiring-firm managers often merge to broaden the 
company’s product line (32% of the sample mergers), increase market share (21%) or diversify 
(22%).  However, these strategies create less combined wealth than geographic expansion, which 
produces the largest combined gain (the average gain is 6.7% of the merging firms’ combined pre-
merger market capitalization).  However, mergers that expand the acquiring-firm’s operations 
geographically comprise only 12% of my sample mergers.  In addition, I find that one-on-one 
negotiations do lead to larger increases in combined gain than other negotiation procedures 
(auctions, mutual discussions, and third-party initiations).  With regard to mergers that begin with 
mutual discussions, I find that 1) the acquiring- and target-firm managers generally have an 
existing business relationship, and 2) the change in control has a negligible impact on shareholder 
wealth (presumably because the merging-firms’ stock prices already reflect the benefit).       
The remainder of my paper is summarized as follows: Section 2 discusses corporate 
strategy and value creation, Section 3 provides an overview of negotiating procedures, Section 4 
describes my method for calculating wealth creation, Section 5 describes the sample, Section 6 
presents the results, Section 7 discusses several robustness tests to the method, and Section 8 
summarizes my conclusions. 
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2. CORPORATE STRATEGY & VALUE CREATION 
 
Numerous studies examine the wealth effects of corporate mergers.  For example, 
Copeland, Weston, and Shastri (2005) believe that the impact of a corporate takeover 
announcement on the wealth of the acquiring- and target-firm shareholders can be explained by at 
least five hypotheses:  synergy (operating or financial), greater market power, improved efficiency, 
lower agency costs, and asymmetric information.  Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) also 
identify five motivations for acquisitions: economies of scale, market power, market discipline, 
over-expansion by acquiring-firm managers, and diversification.  Grinblatt and Titman (2002) 
view operating synergies as the primary motivation for mergers and acquisitions announced during 
the 1990s.  Finally, Lewellen (1971) classifies merger motivations as being either operational or 
financial.  Operational motivations include achieving economies of scale or improving 
manufacturing efficiency,   improving the sales position or offering a more complete product line, 
acquiring complementary research and / or basic technological expertise, and gaining managerial 
expertise.  Financial considerations include errors in target valuation, increasing the acquiring-
firm’s debt capacity, and   reducing the variability of corporate earnings through diversification.   
My study tests the relation between corporate strategy and the change in the combined 
wealth of the acquiring- and target-firm shareholders.  Based on previous research I expect the 
combined merger gain to be related positively to corporate strategies with greater potential 
synergy. 
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2.1 Diversification Strategies  
The general consensus in the finance literature is that diversification strategies destroy 
value.  Berger and Ofek (1995) suggest that the stocks of diversified firms often trade at a 13% to 
15% discount when compared to more focused firms.  Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) and 
Walker (2000) find that acquirers of public firms have lower abnormal returns in diversifying 
mergers.  However, a few studies find benefits to diversification.  For example, when using a more 
precise measure of firm diversification, Villalonga (2004) finds evidence of a diversification 
premium.  Santalo and Becereea (2008) conclude that the benefits of diversification are related 
negatively to the number of specialized firms in the industry.  With regard to mergers and 
acquisitions, Bruner (2002) summarizes the results of studies that examine the combined returns 
of targets and bidders.  Most studies show that diversification strategies destroy value (particularly 
for conglomerate firms). 3    
 
2.2 Vertical Integration Strategies  
 
Financial theory and research suggest that the potential for creating synergy should drive 
vertical integration strategies.   Ahren (2012) finds that vertical mergers do create value, but he 
also finds significant variation in how managers distribute the gain.  Fich, Nguyen, and Officer 
(2013) find that alliance-based, vertically-integrated mergers create more value than horizontal 
mergers.  Vertical integration strategies can occur between related or unrelated firms.   
 
2.3 Related-Firm Acquisition Strategies  
 
                                                          
3 One notable exception is Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001), who conclude that conglomerate 
acquisitions increase the combined wealth of acquiring- and target-firm shareholders.   
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Researchers often classify a merger as being related if the acquiring and target firms have 
the same, or similar, Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes.  Related acquisition strategies 
include broadening the product line, increasing market share, and expanding geographically.   
Financial theory suggests that the potential for synergistic benefits drives related 
acquisitions.  Hoberg and Phillips (2010) find that mergers between firms with similar product 
descriptions lead to higher operating profitability and sales growth.  Megginson, Morgan, and Nail 
(2004) conclude that focus-increasing mergers lead to better long-term stock price performance 
than focus-decreasing mergers.  The strategic alignment hypothesis suggests: 
H1: The combined gain earned by the acquiring- and target-firm shareholders should be  
       related positively to corporate strategies that offer the greatest potential synergistic  
       benefit. 
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3. NEGOTIATION PROCEDURES & VALUE CREATION 
 
Does value creation in mergers depend on the negotiation procedure?  I identify five 
mutually-exclusive negotiation procedures by reading the merging firms’ SEC filings:  
1) the merger follows mutual discussions between the acquiring- and target-firm managers, 
2) the acquiring-firm managers contact the target-firm managers,  
3) the target-firm managers contact only the acquiring-firm managers,  
4) the target-firm managers initiate an auction, or  
5) a third party makes an offer for the target firm.   
Appendix C provides an example of each of the five different negotiating procedures. 
There are a number of studies that examine the acquiring- or target-firm manager’s choice 
of negotiating procedure.  Bulow and Klemperer (1996) hypothesize that auctions will provide 
greater revenues for the target-firm shareholders than one-on-one negotiations.  French and 
McCormick (1984) predict that the target firm’s size, industry, and affiliation with the acquiring 
firm drive the choice between an auction and a one-on-one negotiation.  Hansen (2001) predicts 
that the trade-off between competition and information costs drives the choice between an auction 
and a negotiation.   
Although Boone and Mulherin (2007) consider the information cost hypothesis, they also 
hypothesize that the target-firm wealth effects for auctions and negotiations could be similar.  
Since the cost of conducting an auction varies across firms, some firms may find that the cost 
outweighs the benefit.  In this case the optimal choice would be to limit competition as part of a 
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controlled sale.  In contrast to a full-scaled auction, a controlled sale arises when the target-firm 
managers approach a select number of potential bidders. 
Fidrmuc, Roosenboom, Paap, and Teunissen (2012) test the relation between buyer type 
(financial or strategic), negotiation procedure, and offer premiums.  They find that private 
negotiations often precede buyer-initiated mergers, and auctions often precede acquisitions by 
financial buyers and target-initiated deals.     
Relatively few studies examine the relation between a merger’s potential synergistic 
benefit and the negotiation procedure.  One exception is Masulis and Simsir (2015), who 
hypothesize that the synergistic benefits will be greater when acquiring-firm managers initiate the 
offer.  They finds evidence that supports their hypothesis: the increase in the combined values of 
the merging firms is larger in buyer-initiated deals (+2.8%) than in seller-initiated deals (+0.3%).   
I extend Masulis and Simsir (2015) by examining a more precise set of negotiation 
procedures, and by controlling for the acquiring-firm managers’ strategic objective.  For example, 
I differentiate between target-to-acquirer deals and auctions (both are seller-initiated), my sample 
includes mergers that begin as mutual discussions and third-party offers, and I exclude tender 
offers (which they include as bidder-initiated deals).4   The targeted-synergistic-merger hypothesis 
suggests:  
H2: The combined gain earned by the merging-firms’ shareholders should be greater for    
one-on-one negotiations (either acquirer-to-target or target-to-acquirer) than auctions. 
 
  
                                                          
4 Previous research indicates that mergers and tender offers often differ in terms of deal motivations and target-firm 
characteristics.     
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4. WEALTH CREATION & DISTRIBUTION 
4.1 Combined Gains from Mergers  
Synergistic theory predicts that the change in the combined wealth of acquiring- and target-
target firm shareholders will be positive.  Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) find positive 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the combined firms in their sample of tender offers.  In 
his analysis of the acquiring-firm's Tobin's Q, Servaes (1991) finds positive combined CARs 
around the announcement date.  Mulherin and Boone (2000) find that the combined target and 
bidder return at the takeover announcement date is 3.56 percent on average for U.S. acquisitions.  
Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) also find that mergers create wealth for the combined 
firms.  However, these studies do not examine the acquiring-firm managers’ strategic objective. 
 
4.2 Advantages of Dollar Gain Relative to CARs  
 
There are several advantages to using dollar gains in order to evaluate wealth creation in 
mergers.  While much of the literature has focused on abnormal percentage returns, Malatesta 
(1983) and Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) explain that doing so does not capture the 
change in wealth.  Ahren and Sosyura (2014) explain that using dollar values, as opposed to 
abnormal returns, controls for the fact that the market value of equity generally is much larger for 
acquiring firms than targets.   
 
4.3 Merger Outcomes   
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 I classify my sample mergers into five mutually exclusive merger outcomes: value 
capturing, value sharing, overpaying, neutral, and signaling.  Each outcome depends on 1) the size 
of the net gain or loss, and 2) how the gain is divided between the acquiring- and target-firm 
shareholders.  Essay #1 examines the frequencies of each outcome and tests the determinants of 
value creation.  Essay #2 extends the analysis of merger outcomes by examining the bargaining 
power of acquiring- and target-firm managers. 
I calculate the gain or loss for each merger by examining the change in acquiring- and 
target-firm shareholder wealth.  I calculate the combined abnormal “dollar” gain (Gaini) by 
summing the abnormal dollar change for the acquiring ( MAViA) and target ( MAViT) firms.  
Superscripts “A” and “T” refer to the acquiring and target firms, respectively. 
Gaini = ΔMAViA +  ΔMAViT , where            (1) 
 
ΔMAViA = the market-adjusted change in the acquiring-firm’s market value of equity over the  
                  period t=-5 days to t=+5 days.  In equation (2) below, day t=0 refers to the  
                  announcement date reported in the SDC database.  
 
 
  Equation (2) 
𝛥𝑀𝐴𝑉𝑖
𝐴 = [ ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡 )
+5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
−5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
−  ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑚𝑡 )
+5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
−5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
]    (𝑃𝑖𝑡=−6 )(𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡=−6 ) 
Pi,t=-6  = the common stock price of acquiring firm i on day t =-6;  
Rit  = the return for acquiring-firm i on day t; 
Rit = the return on the CRSP value-weighted index (NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq) on day t; 
NSit=-6  = the number of common shares outstanding for firm i on day t=-6; and 
 
ΔMAViT = the market-adjusted change in the target-firm’s market value of equity over the period  
                 t = -25 days to t = +5 days (the calculation is similar to equation (2), but I measure the  
                market capitalization on day t = -26). 
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            Equation (3) 
 
𝛥𝑀𝐴𝑉𝑖
𝑇 = [ ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡 )
+5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
−25 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
−   ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑚𝑡 )
+5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
−25 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
]    (𝑃𝑖𝑡=−26 )(𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡=−26 ) 
I calculate the percentage gain (Gaini%) for each acquisition as follows. 
   Gaini% = Gaini / [(MVeq)
A + (MVeq)
T]           (4)                                                                      
I examine several issues related to the calculation of the wealth creation.  For example, 
although the results of my study reflect the use of different event windows for the acquiring and 
target firms, in Section 7 of the paper I examine the impact on Gaini and Gain%i of using the 
same event window [(either (-5, +5) or (-25, +5)].  In addition, I examine whether ΔMAViT might 
be understated if the acquiring firm’s offer follows other takeover-related announcements 
involving the target firm.  This issue is particularly relevant for auctions, since my calculation of 
ΔMAViT reflects only the wealth effect when acquiring-firm managers announce their first offer.  
As a result, Section 7 also examines the wealth effects of target firms during the period 
beginning with the initiation of an auction and ending with the acquiring-firm manager’s first 
offer.  I find that the merger announcement date captures most of the increase in wealth accruing 
to the target-firm’s shareholders.     
I classify an acquisition as value-increasing if Gain% is greater than 4%.  Admittedly, 
4% is a subjective cut-off.  However, my objective in choosing the cutoff is two-fold: 1) to 
provide separation between the value-increasing and value-decreasing categories, and 2) to 
obtain a sufficient number of value-increasing acquisitions so that I can analyze bargaining 
power in Essay #2.  I discuss the impact of using a 3% or 5% cutoff on the size of my 
subsamples in Section 7. 
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Neutral outcomes refer to mergers in which Gain% is between -4% and 4% (-4% < Gain% 
< 4%).  Neutral acquisitions have little effect on the combined wealth of the acquiring- and target-
firm shareholders because the total synergistic gain is negligible.  Value-decreasing acquisitions 
refer to mergers in which Gain% is less than -4% (Gain% < -4%).  Although target-firm 
shareholders generally benefit from the latter transactions, the mergers in this category signal a 
decrease in the value of the acquirer’s assets-in-place because acquiring-firm shareholder losses 
greatly exceed target-firm shareholder gains.  
Note that value-increasing acquisitions can be either value capturing, value sharing, or 
overpaying.  The classification depends on the percentage of the total gain that accrues to 
acquiring-firm shareholders (Acquirer %). 
Acquireri % = ( MAViA  / Gaini) x 100           (5)                                                                               
A merger is value-capturing if the acquiring-firm shareholders receive more that 50% of 
the gain (Acquirer% > 50%) over the eleven-day event window.  An acquisition is value-sharing 
if the acquiring-firm shareholders receive 0% – 50% of the gain (0% < Acquirer%) < 50%).  
Overpaying occurs when the acquiring-firm shareholders lose wealth (i.e.,  MAVA < 0), even 
though the merger is value-increasing.   
 The following merger between two hypothetical firms illustrates the classifications.  
Suppose the expected pre-merger cash flows of an acquiring and target firm are $100 per year and 
$60 per year, respectively.  Both cash flow streams are perpetuities, and the required rate of return 
for each firm is 10%, so the pre-merger equity market values of the standalone companies are 
$1,000 and $600, respectively.  In addition, suppose investors expect the cash flow of the combined 
entity to be $180 per year (i.e., the gain from synergy is $20 per year).  If the required rate of return 
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is 10%, then Gaini is $200 (= V
AT – (VA + VT) = $1,800 – ($1,000 + $600)).  The acquisition is 
value-increasing because the Gain%i is equal to 12.5% (= $200 / $1,600). 
Table 1 (Panel A) illustrates the possible outcomes.  Outcome A is value-capturing because 
the acquiring-firm shareholders receive more than 50% of the gain.  In this example,  MAVA is 
$160 and  MAVT is $40, so Acquirer%i is 80% (= $160 / $200).  Outcome B is value-sharing 
because the acquiring- and target-firm shareholders divide the gain evenly.  Outcome C involves 
over-paying because the acquiring-firm shareholders lose wealth.  In the latter case, the target-firm 
shareholders receive 115% of the total expected gain. 
On the other hand, suppose investors expect the cash flow of the combined entity to 
increase by only $4 per year.  The combined gain is equal to $40, so Gain%i is 2.5% (= $40 / 
$1,600).  I classify this merger as neutral, since the combined gain is negligible (Outcome D).  
Outcome E is value-decreasing because Gaini% is less than -4%.      
Table 1 (Panel B) shows the distribution of merger outcomes for my sample of 705 mergers 
announced between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 2007.  When I use a 4% cutoff, I classify 
44.3% of my sample mergers as value-increasing, 26.0% as neutral, and 29.8% as value-
decreasing.  In addition, 144 mergers (or 46.2% of the 312 value-increasing mergers) are value 
capturing, 37.5% are value sharing, and 15.7% are overpaying.  As a result, I do have a sufficient 
number of outcomes in each of the value-increasing subcategories to analyze bargaining power 
(Essay #2).  
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Panel A. Illustrative Example      
        
Outcome 
(Δ 
MAVA) 
(Δ 
MAVT) 
Gain %Gain Acquirer% Target% Category 
A  $160 $  40 $200 12.5%  80%   20% Capturing 
B  $100 $100 $200 12.5%  50%   50% Value-Sharing 
C -$  30 $230 $200 12.5% -15% 115% Over-Paying 
D  $  20 $  20 $  40   2.5%   Neutral 
        
E -$300 $140 -$160 -10.0%   
Value- 
Decreasing 
Note:  Outcomes A, B, and C are value-increasing because the Gain% is greater than 4.0%.  Outcome D is neutral 
because Gain% is between -4.0% and 4.0%.  Outcome E is value-decreasing because Gain% is less than -4.0%. 
 
Panel B: Definitions  
N = 705, Mergers from January 1st, 1995 through December 31st, 2007.  
%Gain  Δ MAViA  > 0 Δ MAViA  < 0 Total Percent 
  Acquirer%    
 >50% 50% to 0% < 0%   
> 4% Value-Capture 
(n = 144) 
Value-Sharing 
(n = 117) 
Overpaying 
(n = 49) 
312 44.26% 
      
-4% to 4%   Neutral 183 25.96% 
      
< -4%   Value-decreasing 210 29.79% 
      
   N = 705 100.0% 
 
  
Table 1.  Classification of Outcomes 
This table defines five mutually exclusive acquisition outcomes.  The classification depends on 1) the size of the 
announcement period gain or loss (Gain%), and 2) how the Gain% is divided between the acquiring- and target-firm 
shareholders (Acquirer%).  Panel A illustrates each of the five outcomes by examining five possible outcomes for a merger 
between two hypothetical firms.  The variable GAIN is equal to the market-adjusted change in acquiring-firm value ( 
MAVA) plus the market-adjusted change in target-firm value ( MAVT).  The variable Gain% is equal to GAIN divided by the 
sum of the pre-merger equity market values of the acquiring and target firms (MVeqA and MVeqT , respectively).  The variable 
Acquirer % is equal to the change in the market-adjusted value of the acquiring firm ( MAVA) divided by GAIN.    
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5.  DATA 
 
5.1. Sample 
My study examines mergers involving publicly-traded, U. S. companies announced 
between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 2007.  The study period ends at December 2007 
because the number of mergers declined significantly beginning in 2008.  Essay #3 examines how 
the financial crisis affected acquiring-firm managers’ merger strategies, bargaining power, and 
deal motivations. 
I identify my sample mergers by using data from Thomson Financial Securities Data 
Corporations (SDC).  The sample acquisitions satisfy the following criteria. 
1. The acquiring firm owns more than 50% of the target firm's shares at the completion date.  
2. The acquiring firm does not announce another acquisition within two months of the takeover 
announcement data. (This restriction eliminates 77 mergers.) 
 
3. The acquiring firm is not a communications firm, public utility, or financial institution. 
 
4. The relative transaction size is greater than 1%.5 
 
5. Data for the acquiring and target firms are available from CRSP. 
6. The EDGAR database contains company filings related to the acquisition.  Specifically, The 
SEC filings must contain adequate information to identify the negotiation procedure and the 
managers’ deal motivations (i.e., reasons for the merger).    
 
7. I exclude tender offers (i.e., acquisitions in which the EDGAR filings are 14D, SC-TO, or SC-
13D).  The SEC filings pertaining to tender offers generally do not discuss deal motivations, 
which I use in Essay #3 to examine bargaining power.   
 
8. A Wall Street Journal article announces the merger, which I use to help identify the 
acquiring-firm’s strategic objective.  
                                                          
5 Relative transaction size is measured as the target firm's common equity value divided by the acquiring firm's 
common equity value.  
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5.2 Merger Wealth Creation and Selected Firm Characteristics 
 
Table 2 compares selected firm-level characteristics observed in value-increasing mergers 
with those observed in value-decreasing mergers.  I include firm-level characteristics as control 
variables in several multivariate models (discussed in a later section).   
Table 2 (Panel A) reports the results of difference-in-means tests for selected acquiring-
firm characteristics.  Acquiring firms generally have a lower Tobin’s Q ratio in value-increasing 
mergers (1.85) when compared to value-decreasing mergers (3.06).  The -1.20 difference (= 1.85 
– 3.06) is significant at the 5% level (the t-statistic is equal to -2.14).  On the other hand, the results 
indicate that acquiring firms participating in value-increasing mergers often have greater financial 
leverage and more intangible assets when compared to acquiring firms participating in value-
decreasing mergers.  The differences for the Debti and Leveragei ratios are both positive and 
statistically significant.  The intangible asset ratio is 5.4% points higher.   
 Table 2 (Panel B) reports the results for selected target-firm characteristics.  Target firms 
participating in value-increasing mergers have significantly higher P/Ei ratios (21.6 versus 10.8). 
The mean difference in the P/E ratios is 10.9, which is significant at the 10% level.  In addition, 
targets participating in value-increasing mergers have greater intangible asset values, but lower 
leverage ratios.    
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Table 2. Wealth Creation and Firm Characteristics 
Table 2 examines how (if at all) acquiring-firm characteristics (Panel A) and target-firm characteristics 
(Panel B) vary between value-increasing and value-decreasing mergers.  The value-increasing category 
includes acquiring firms in the three subcategories (value capturing, value sharing, and overpaying).  Debt-
Ratioi is total debt divided by total assets.  Leveragei is long-term debt divided by common equity.  M/Bi is 
the market price divided by book value per share.  P/Ei is the price divided by earnings per share. ROAi is 
net income divided by total assets.  ROEi is net income divided by total equity.  Intangiblesi is intangible 
assets divided by total assets.  R&Di Intensity is R&D expenditures divided by total assets.  I report the t-
statistics for difference-in-means tests in parentheses with ***, **, and * denoting statistical significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.   
 
Panel A: Acquirer  Value Value    
  Increase Decrease    
Ratios  Mean Mean Difference t-stat Sig. 2-tail 
Tobin’s Q acq  1.8521 3.0566 -1.2045** -2.142 0.033 
       
P/E acq  33.0742 18.6359 14.4383 0.992 0.321 
       
M/B acq  5.3679 5.6388 -0.2709 -0.210 0.834 
       
Debt Ratio acq  0.2087 0.1771 0.0316* 1.765 0.078 
       
Leverage acq  1.2719 0.2921 0.9798* 1.714 0.087 
       
 Intangibles acq  0.1935 0.1397 0.0537*** 2.686 0.007 
       
R&D acq  0.0719 0.0968 -0.0249 -1.540 0.125 
       
ROA acq  0.1112 0.0568 0.0543 1.467 0.143 
       
ROE acq  0.2803 0.1436 0.1367 1.126 0.261 
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Table 2 (Continued)      
Panel B: Targets  Value Value    
 Increase Decrease    
Ratios Mean Mean Difference t-stat p-value 
Intangibles Tar 0.1538 0.1174 0.0363** 1.867 0.049 
      
R&D Intensity  0.1272 0.1460 -0.0188 -0.637 0.525 
      
R&D Expenditures -0.0019 -0.0004 -0.0015* -0.907 0.074 
      
Debt Ratio tar 0.1943 0.1753 0.0190 0.892 0.373 
      
Tobin’s Q tar 1.4597 1.8452 0.3856 1.282 0.201 
      
M/B tar 3.3564 4.1569 -0.8005 -1.067 0.286 
      
P/E tar 21.6482 10.7670 10.8812* 1.465 0.090 
      
Leverage tar -0.2794 0.6337 -0.9131** -1.552 0.018 
      
ROA tar 0.0577 0.0154 0.0423 1.348 0.179 
      
ROE tar -0.0562 0.1777 -0.2340 -1.020 0.308 
      
P.M. tar 28.4087 -0.0445 28.4532 0.783 0.436 
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6.  RESULTS 
6.1 Corporate Strategies and Merger Outcomes  
I classify the acquiring-firm managers’ acquisition strategy by following Walker (2000), 
who examines six mutually-exclusive strategic objectives: geographic expansion, broaden the 
product line, increase market share, integrate vertically, and diversify with, and without, overlap.  
Due to the small number of mergers involving diversification without overlap, I combine all 
diversification strategies into one group.  
Table 3 (Panel A) shows the relation between the strategic objectives and merger outcomes.  
The most popular acquisition strategies are broadening the product-line (229 mergers, or 32.5% 
of the total sample), increasing market share (21.1%), and diversification (21.8%).  Managers 
adopt geographic expansion (11.6%) and vertical integration (12.9%) strategies less frequently.   
Table 3 (Panel A) also shows the frequencies of each strategy classified by merger 
outcome.  For example, the acquiring-firm managers broadened the product line in 32.5% of the 
sample mergers, but this strategy represents only 22.2% of the value-capturing mergers.  Notably, 
broadening the product line represents 42.9% of the value-decreasing mergers.  Geographic 
expansion comprises 11.6% of the sample mergers, but this category represents 18.8% of the 
value-sharing outcomes.  When I test the null hypothesis that corporate strategy and merger 
outcome are independent by using a chi-square test (Panel B), I can reject the null hypothesis at 
the 1% level of significance (the chi-square statistic is equal to 32.9).  As a result, I conclude that 
strategic objectives do play a role in determining merger outcomes. 
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Table 3. Corporate Strategies and Merger Outcomes 
 
Panel A       
Strategy Total Capture Share Over-pay Neutral Decrease 
Geographic  82 21 22 5 18 16 
   Expansion 11.6% 14.6% 18.8% 9.8% 9.8% 7.6% 
Broaden 229 32 32 19 56 90 
   Product Line 32.5% 22.2% 27.4% 37.3% 30.6% 42.9% 
Increase 149 37 24 13 36 39 
   Market Share 21.1% 25.7% 20.5% 25.5% 19.7% 18.6% 
Vertical 91 20 17 8 23 23 
Integration 12.9% 13.9% 14.5% 15.7% 12.6% 11.0% 
Diversification 154 34 22 6 50 42 
 21.8% 23.6% 18.8% 11.8% 27.3% 20.0% 
Total 705 144 117 51 183 210 
 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
 Panel B: Chi-Sq. Test Value d.f. Asymp. Sig.  
Pearson χ2 32.88 16 0.008  
Likelihood Ratio 32.65 16 0.008  
Linear-by-Linear Assoc. 0.063 1 0.802  
N of Valid Cases 705  (2-sided)  
 
 
Table 4 shows that geographic expansion has the largest combined gain among the 
strategic objectives.  This strategic objective leads to an average increase of 6.7% in the combined, 
pre-merger market capitalizations of the acquiring and target firms.  When the strategic objective 
is to increase market share or integrate vertically, the combined wealth gains are 3.07% and 3.01% 
respectively.  The average Gain% for diversification strategies is about 2%.  Broadening the 
product line produces an average gain of only 0.06%. 
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Table 4 (Panel B) shows the results of a one-way, fixed-effects ANOVA model (Daniel 
and Terrell, 1995).  I reject the null hypothesis that the average Gain%j for each of the five strategic 
objectives are equal [H0: μ1 = μ2 = μ3 = μ4 = μ5].  The F-statistic is equal to 4.4, which significant 
at the 1% level.  The results in Panel C show the results of pairwise comparison tests.  Geographic 
expansion generally creates more wealth than broadening the product line. 
 
Table 4. Gain%i by Strategy      
 
Strategic Objective N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Geographic Expansion 82 6.68% 14.44% -27.21% 79.01% 
Broaden Product Line 229 0.06% 12.67% -33.67% 48.63% 
Increase Market Share 149 3.07% 13.12% -38.33% 41.66% 
Vertical Integration 91 3.01% 10.71% -32.49% 30.94% 
Diversification 154 2.18% 12.44% -30.52% 55.84% 
Full Sample 705 2.31% 12.83% -38.33% 79.01% 
 
Panel B: ANOVA      
%Gain Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 0.286 4 0.071 4.424 0.002 
Within Groups 11.297 700 0.016   
Total 11.583 704    
 
6.2 Negotiation Procedures and Merger Outcomes 
 Table 5 examines the relation between negotiation procedures and merger outcomes.  
Acquirer-to-target negotiations are the most frequent (283 mergers, which represents 40.1% of the 
total sample).  Mutual discussions are the second most frequent negotiation procedure (24.1%), 
whereas mergers that begin with third-party offers are the least frequent (5.2%).   
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Table 5. Negotiation Procedures and Merger Outcomes 
        
Negotiation Total Capture Share Overpay Neutral Decrease 
Acquirer-to-Target 283 49 53 24 83 74 
 40.1% 34.0% 45.3% 47.1% 45.4% 35.2% 
Target-to-Acquirer 115 27 15 12 30 31 
 16.3% 18.8% 12.8% 23.5% 16.4% 14.8% 
Target Auction 100 29 7 3 32 29 
 14.2% 20.1% 6.0% 5.9% 17.5% 13.8% 
Mutual Discussion 170 28 37 10 25 70 
 24.1% 19.4% 31.6% 19.6% 13.7% 33.3% 
Third-Party 37 11 5 2 13 6 
 5.2% 7.6% 4.3% 3.9% 7.1% 2.9% 
Total  705 144 117 51 183 210 
 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
Chi-square Test Value d.f. Asymp. Sig. 
Pearson χ2 47.214 16 <0.001  
Likelihood Ratio 49.643 16 <0.001  
Linear-by-Linear Assoc. 0.02 1 0.889  
N of Valid Cases 705  (2-sided)  
 
 
 When I classify the negotiation procedures by merger outcomes, I find that target-to-
acquirer offers often are value-increasing.  This negotiation procedure, which describes 16.3% of 
the sample mergers, represents 18.8% of the value-capturing outcomes and 23.5% of the 
overpaying outcomes.  I test the null hypothesis that negotiating procedures and merger outcomes 
are independent by using a chi-square test.  The computed chi-squared statistic is 47.2, which is 
significant at the 1% level (Table 5, Panel B).  The results indicate that negotiation procedures do 
drive merger outcomes. 
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Table 6 shows that when target-firm managers initiate merger negotiations, the average 
increase in combined wealth is 3.6%.  Mergers initiated by the acquiring-firm managers have the 
second highest combined gain (3.2%) followed by third-party-initiated mergers (2.5%).  Contrary 
to some theoretical predictions, the average Gain% is only 1.7% when mergers begin with an 
auction.  In contrast to my conjecture that mutual discussions would lead to more synergistic 
mergers, this procedure produced the lowest combined gain (0.3%).  This result suggests that the 
pre-merger stock prices of the acquiring and target firms already reflect the synergistic benefits of 
the business collaboration and transferring control creates little additional value.  
 
Table 6. Negotiation Procedures and Gain%   
The variable Gain% is equal to the combined change in wealth of the acquirer and target 
shareholders, divided by the sum of the combined, pre-merger equity market values of the merging 
firms (MVeqA and MVeqT, respectively).  I identify the negotiating procedure by using the SEC 
filings. 
Negotiating Process N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Acquirer-to-Target 283 0.0318 0.1234 -0.3367 0.5584 
Target-to-Acquirer 115 0.0365 0.1368 -0.2097 0.7901 
Auction 100 0.0170 0.1145 -0.3052 0.3233 
Mutual Discussion 170 0.0028 0.1410 -0.3833 0.4166 
Third-Party 37 0.0248 0.1023 -0.3249 0.2390 
Full Sample 705 0.0231 0.1283 -0.3833 0.7901 
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6.3 Multivariate Analysis 
6.3.1 Control Variables 
In this section I investigate the relation between strategic objectives, negotiation 
procedures, and value creation after controlling for selected firm and deal characteristics.  Previous 
research identifies a number of variables that can affect the wealth of acquiring- and target-firm 
shareholders including payment method (Travlos, 1987), size of the acquirer (Moeller et al. 2004), 
relative size (Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins, 1983), value of the deal (Moeller, Schlingemann, and 
Stulz, 2005), bidding competition (Bradley et al. 1988), bidder’s toehold (Betton and Eckbo, 
2000), and leverage (Harford, 1999).   
Although previous research indicates that acquiring- and target-firm size, as well as their 
relative sizes, are important determinants of wealth gains in mergers, the evidence is mixed. For 
example, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2002) find that the abnormal returns for small 
acquiring firms often exceeds the wealth gain for larger acquiring firms.   On the other hand, in his 
analysis of the cumulative abnormal return of acquirers, Schwert (2000) finds a positive coefficient 
for bidder size.  With regard to the relative size of the merger (target equity divided by acquirer 
equity), Servaes (1991) indicates that the combined return to acquirer and targets is positively 
related to relative size.  Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983) and Moeller, Schlingeman, and Stulz 
(2004) find that acquirer returns increase as the relative size increases, but Travlos (1987) finds 
the opposite result.   
There is also evidence that size plays a role in determining the negotiating procedure.  
Boone and Mulherin (2011) find that the average size of the bidding firm is larger in negotiations 
than auctions.   
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6.3.2 OLS Regression Analysis   
I use the following OLS Regression Model to test the determinants of Gain%. 
 
𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛% = ∝ + 𝑆1 (𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 𝑉𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟)𝑖 +  𝛽1𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑖𝑑(1,0) + 𝛽2𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ(1,0)+ 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
+  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
where Si is a vector of binary variables representing five mutually exclusive strategic objectives, 
and, Ci is a vector of control variables. 
 
The independent variables include the strategic objectives and selected control variables 
(multiple bidder, cash, stock or mixed offers, and the relative sizes of the merging firms). 
Table 7 reports the results for five model specifications.  The interpretation of the constant 
term depends on the model specification.  For example, the constant term for Model 1 indicates 
that Gain% is 2.3% when the acquiring firm adopts a diversification strategy.  This result is 
statistically significant at the 5% level (the t-statistic is 2.39).  The constant term for Model 3 
indicates that Gain% is 3.6% when the acquiring-firm’s managers adopt a diversification strategy 
and make a mixed offer (a combination of cash and stock).  The coefficient of Stock Pay indicates 
that Gain% decreases 2.4% points when the acquiring-firm manager’s make a stock offer.     
The binary variable for geographic expansion is positive and statistically significant for all 
five model specifications.  As a result, geographic expansion leads to greater Gain% than a 
diversification strategy.  The coefficient for broadening product line is negative and statistically 
significant for three of the model specifications.  As a result, there is some evidence that 
broadening the product line creates lower Gain% than diversification.   
I find that Gain% is lower for stock offers than cash or mixed offers.  I also find a positive 
relation between Gain% and the transaction’s relative size.    
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Table 7. Strategic Objectives as Determinants of Gain%   
𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛% = ∝ + 𝑆1 (𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 𝑉𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟)𝑖 +  𝛽1𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑖𝑑(1,0) + 𝛽2𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ(1,0)+ 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions of the percentage change in the combined wealth of acquiring- 
and target-firm shareholders (Gain%) at the merger announcement date.  The strategic objectives are mutually- 
exclusive, binary variables.  The independent variables include the relative size of the transaction (size), and 
binary variables that reflect the payment method (cash or stock) and the presence of multiple bidders.  For 
example, the intercept term for Model 3 reflects a diversification strategy when the payment method is mixed (a 
combination of cash and stock).  I report t-statistics in parentheses with ***, **, and * denoting statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.  All models include year fixed effects. 
 
      Model 1         Model 2         Model 3    Model 4          Model 5 
      
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
  (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) 
(Constant)     2.30%**     2.30%     3.58%**      1.70%      2.72% 
   (2.39)   (1.59)    (2.00)     (1.62)    (1.44) 
 
Geographic Expansion    4.70***     4.70***     5.99***      4.20**      5.67*** 
   (2.79)   (2.78)   (3.37)     (2.45)    (3.17) 
Broaden Product  - 2.40*  - 2.40*  - 1.68    - 2.40*   - 1.54 
  (-1.88)  (-1.87)  (-1.30)   (-1.92)   (-1.19) 
Market Share     1.10     1.10      1.48      1.00      1.41 
    (0.79)    (0.79)    (1.05)     (0.69)     (1.00) 
Vertical Integration     0.00     0.00     0.55    - 0.10      0.58 
 (- 2.60)  (-0.03)   (0.34)   (-0.07)    (0.36) 
 
Multiple Bidders      0.01     - 3.22        
     (0.01)    (-1.57) 
Cash Pay      1.46      2.11 
     (0.80)    (1.14) 
Stock Pay   - 2.44**   - 2.18**   
   (-2.24)   (-1.96) 
Relative Size        1.60*     1.81* 
       (1.73)   (1.76) 
Number of mergers     705     705     705      705      705 
R2      2.7%      2.7%      7.8%       3.1%       8.5% 
Adj. R2      2.2%      2.1%      5.5%       2.5%       5.9% 
F-statistic    4.42***    3.89***    3.39***     4.54***     3.33*** 
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Table 8. Negotiation Procedures as Determinants of Gain%   
𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛% = ∝ + 𝑆1 (𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦)𝑖 +  𝑁2(𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)+  𝛽5𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑖𝑑(1,0) + 𝛽7𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions of the percentage change in the combined wealth of 
acquiring- and target-firm shareholders (Gain%) at the merger announcement date.  The strategic objectives 
and negotiation procedures are mutually- exclusive, binary variables.  The independent variables include the 
transaction’s relative size, and binary variables that reflect the payment method (cash or stock) and the 
presence of multiple bidders.  For example, the intercept for Model 8 reflects a diversification strategy, a 
mixed offer, and mutual discussions.  I report t-statistics in parentheses with ***, **, and * denoting statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.  All models include year fixed effects. 
 
       Model 6 Model 7         Model 8          Model 9          Model 10  
       Coefficient      Coefficient     Coefficient     Coefficient      Coefficient 
      (t-statistic)     (t-statistic)      (t-statistic)     (t-statistic)      (t-statistic) 
(Constant)                    0.63%             0.67%             1.44%           - 0.38%       0.11%           
                                                                                                                                                   
           (0.34)             (0.36) (0.68)        (-0.20)      (0.05) 
Geographic Expansion          5.12***    5.20***          5.94***          4.47***        5.60*** 
                     (3.08)   (3.11)             (3.34)          (2.66)       (3.12) 
 Broaden Product       - 2.30*  - 2.21*            - 1.71         - 2.36*      - 1.57 
         (-1.84) (-1.76)            (-1.32)         (-1.89)      (-1.21) 
 Market Share          1.67      1.70               1.56            1.46         1.48 
          (1.23)   (1.25)              (1.11)          (1.08)        (1.05) 
 Vertical Integration      - 0.04  - 0.02  0.72         - 0.15         0.74 
         (-0.03)  (-0.02)              (0.44)         (-0.10)        (0.45) 
  
Acquirer-to-Target         3.06**     3.06**             2.78**          3.24***          2.98** 
          (2.54)   (2.54)              (2.20)          (2.68)        (2.36) 
 Auction          1.83     1.85               1.79             2.05          2.23  
           (1.15)   (1.16)              (1.08)          (1.29)        (1.34) 
 Target-to-Acquirer         2.84*     2.85*              2.51*            3.12**          2.90* 
           (1.92)   (1.94)             (1.64)          (2.12)         (1.89) 
 Third Party          2.38     2.53               2.07            2.59          2.76 
           (1.10)    (1.16)              (0.90)          (1.20)         (1.20) 
 
Multiple Bidders                   - 1.23                         - 3.32 
       (-0.64)                        (- 1.61) 
 Cash Pay                   1.17                                       1.96 
                   (0.64)           (1.04) 
 Stock Pay                 - 2.33**          - 1.97* 
                  (-2.12)          (-1.75) 
 Relative Size                  2.09**           2.08* 
                  (2.26)          (2.00) 
Number of mergers           705     705                705             705             705 
 R2              7.3%      7.3%  8.5%              7.9%              9.2% 
 Adj. R2              4.9%      4.8%  5.6%              5.4%              6.2% 
 F-statistic           3.02***    2.90***          3.01***           3.14***            3.04*** 
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Table 8 reports the results of regression models that examine both strategic objectives and 
negotiation procedures as determinants of Gain%.  The constant term for Model 6 reflects the 
Gain% for a merger that diversifies the acquiring-firm’s operations and begins as a mutual 
discussion between the acquiring- and target-firm managers.    
The results of Models 6 – 10 show that Gain% is related positively to geographic expansion 
as a strategic objective and one-on-one negotiation procedures (either acquirer-to-target or target-
to-acquirer).  Again, there is some evidence that broadening the product line reduces Gain% by 
about 2% points.  Models 8 – 10 show that Gain% is related positively to the mergers’ relative 
size, and related negatively to stock offers. 
Table 9 reports the results of OLS regressions that include selected acquiring- and target-
firm characteristics.6  Adding the variables that control for firm characteristics does not change the 
results for geographic expansion and acquirer-to-target negotiations (see Models 11 and 12).  The 
coefficient for the acquiring-firm’s market-to-book ratio is negative and statistically significant (t-
statistic is equal to -1.8, which is significant at the 10% level).  This result indicates that Gain% is 
lower when mergers involve target firms with greater M/B ratios. 
  
                                                          
6 Missing data in Compustat reduced the sample sizes for Models 11 and 12 to 344 mergers.  However, I made the 
decision to include the selected firm characteristics after the committee accepted my dissertation proposal.  As a 
result, I plan to complete the data collection by using other sources after I defend my dissertation defense (but before 
submitting the paper to a journal). 
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Table 9. Determinants of Gain%: Full Model Results  
This table presents the results of OLS regressions of the percentage change in the combined wealth of 
acquiring- and target-firm shareholders (Gain%) at the merger announcement date.  The strategic objectives 
and negotiation procedures are mutually- exclusive, binary variables.  The independent variables include the 
transaction’s relative size, binary variables that reflect the payment method (cash or stock) and the presence of 
multiple bidders, and selected acquiring- and target-firm characteristics.  For example, the intercept for Model 
11 reflects a diversification strategy, a mixed offer, and mutual discussions.  I report t-statistics in parentheses 
with ***, **, and * denoting statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.  All models 
include year fixed effects. 
                  Model 11     Model 12 
 Coefficient   (t-stat) Coefficient  (t-stat) 
(Constant)     3.68%   (0.79)             - 2.07% (- 0.38) 
Geographic Expansion       5.41**   (2.03)               5.31**   (2.00) 
Broaden Product line - 1.03 (- 0.55)        - 1.23 (- 0.66) 
Increase Market Share   2.89   (1.31)          3.51   (1.58) 
Vertical Integration   1.65   (0.65)          1.43   (0.57) 
Acquirer-Target         4.17**   (2.33)              4.16**   (2.33) 
Auction    2.62   (1.10)          2.71   (1.15) 
Target-Acquirer   3.12   (1.36)         3.20   (1.40) 
Third-Party  3.80   (1.15)         4.06  (1.24) 
Stock Pay    - 3.34** (-1.96)       - 2.70  (-1.57) 
Cash Pay   1.40  (0.38)         1.75   (0.48) 
Ln (Mkt-Cap (Acq))     - 0.30 (-0.49)         1.16   (1.24) 
Debt Ratio (Acq)   2.81   (0.61)         1.63   (0.35) 
Intangible (Acq) - 3.02 (-0.59)      - 1.93  (-0.38) 
M/B (Acq)   - 0.12* (-1.80)        - 0.12*  (-1.79) 
Debt Ratio (Tar) - 4.59 (-1.28)     - 5.09  (-1.42) 
Intangible (Tar)   1.48  (0.28)        1.09   (0.21) 
M/B (Tar)   0.04  (0.41)       0.03   (0.31) 
Ln (Mkt-Cap (Tar))   0.05  (0.07)    - 1.29 (-1.37) 
Relative Size               5.25**   (2.10) 
Number of mergers         344               344  
R2      13.5%          14.7%  
Adjusted R2        5.2%            6.2%  
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7. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
7.1 Return Calculation Sensitivity Analysis 
 
For those readers interested in comparing my results to previous research, Table 10 (Panel 
A) reports the CMAR’s (cumulative market adjusted returns) and CAR’s (cumulative abnormal 
returns) of the acquiring firms for two event windows.  In general, the magnitude of the abnormal 
returns earned by acquiring- and target-firm shareholders are similar to those found in previous 
research.   
Columns 1 and 2 reflect an 11-day event window, and Columns 3 and 4 reflect a 31-day 
event window.  Holding the event window constant, there is not a significant difference between 
the CMAR’s and the CAR’s.  However there is a difference between the results for the 11-day 
event window [-5, +5] and the 31-day event window [-25, +5].   
Table 10 (Panel B) reports the same return calculations for targets.  Again, there is not a 
significant difference between the returns calculations given a particular event window, but there 
is a difference between the return measures across the two event windows.  The returns are larger 
for the longer time interval. 
 Table 10 (Panel C) shows the acquiring- and target-firm pre-merger, market capitalizations.   
The mean acquirer size is $7.983 billion at day t = -6 and $7.757 billion at day t = -26.  The mean 
target size is $1.171 billion and $1.226 billion at day t = -6 and t = -26, respectively.   
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Table 10. Return Calculation Sensitivity Analysis 
The table reports statistics that show the calculations of returns used in the analysis.  Panel A reports the 
results for the sample of acquirer firms while Panel B shows the statistics for target firms.  There are 705 
acquirer and target observations.  CMAR is the cumulative market-adjusted return. CAR is the cumulative 
abnormal return.  Column [1] shows the CMAR [-5, +5] around the announcement date of the merger (t=0).  
Column [2] reports the CAR [-5, +5] at the announcement date.  Columns [3] and [4] report CMAR and CAR 
statistics for the longer event window [-25, +5]. Panel C reports the market capitalization of acquirers and 
targets measured before the merger announcement. 
(1)                 (2)                          (3)                 (4) 
       
Panel A Acquirer [-5, +5]   [-25, +5]  
       
    CMAR11acq CAR11acq   CMAR31acq CAR11acq 
 Mean -0.01191 -0.00933  0.00994 0.01355 
 Terciles -0.07662 -0.06744  -0.09827 -0.07881 
  -0.01020 -0.00466  -0.00367 0.00733 
  0.04786 0.05028  0.09216 0.09980 
       
Panel B: Target      
  [-5, +5]   [-25, +5]  
    CMAR11tar CAR11tar   CMAR11tar CAR11tar 
 Mean 0.24715 0.23090  0.29485 0.28316 
 Terciles 0.06117 0.07204  0.06746 0.10076 
  0.20855 0.20395  0.24025 0.25487 
  0.38958 0.35631  0.43261 0.42266 
 
Panel C:  Market-Capitalization    
 Acquirer Target 
 [t-6] [t-26] [t-6] [t-26] 
Mean  $          7,983,074.56   $      7,757,552.15   $    1,171,984.71   $    1,126,116.59  
Terciles  $              467,829.88   $         453,052.36   $          68,716.47   $          62,937.65  
  $          1,575,552.75   $      1,548,935.34   $        220,011.00   $        217,353.50  
  $          5,043,294.53   $      5,306,902.99   $        712,950.53   $        706,896.68  
       (Dollars in Thousands) 
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7.2 Sensitivity Analysis for Wealth Creation (Gaini) 
 
Table 11 compares the values of Gaini and Gain%i for different event windows.  Column 
1 shows the mean value of each variable based on the event windows examined by this study: 
ΔMAVacq [-5, +5] and ΔMAVtar [-25, +5].  The average Gaini is equal to $71.4 million (Panel A), 
and the average Gain%i is 3.0% (Panel C).  Columns 2 and 3 show the mean values of each variable 
based on symmetrical windows (either an 11-day or a 31-day period). 
When I compare the results in Columns 1 with the results in Column 3, I find that the 
average Gaini increases from $71.4 million to $313.4 million.  The percentage increase appears 
large, but the increase is relatively small when compared to the average pre-merger, market 
capitalizations of the merging firms (about $14.0 billion) (see Table 11, Panel B).  Panel C reports 
Gaini% for the three windows.  Gaini% [-5. +5] is the smallest at 2.51%. 
Which time period is correct?  The advantage of using a longer event window (i.e., a 31-
day period) is that the researcher is more likely to capture the entire wealth effect caused by the 
event. For example, previous research indicates that target-firm stock prices typically experience 
a price run-up that begins about 25 days before the acquiring-firm’s initial offer.  Thus, the use of 
an 11-day window for the target firms arguably would understate Gaini.  On the other hand, the 
advantage of using a shorter window (i.e., an 11-day event window) is that the researcher is less 
likely to attribute the wealth effects of other events to the merger announcement.  Thus, the use of 
a 31-day window for the acquiring-firms arguably would add noise to the measure of Gaini. 
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Table 11: Event-Window Sensitivity Analysis  
This table reports summary statistics of wealth effects for different event windows.  Panel A shows the results 
for the total combined change in dollar value, Gaini, which is the ΔMAVacq and ΔMAVtar.  ΔMAVacq is the 
acquirer’s CMARi  (market-adjusted return) multiplied by the pre-merger market value of equity.  ΔMAVtar. is 
the target’s CMARi  (market-adjusted return) multiplied by the pre-merger market value of equity.  Panel B 
shows the pre-merger, combined market value of equity.  Panel C reports the Gain%i, which is the combined 
change in market value for both the acquirer and target shareholders.  The sample size is 705 mergers. 
 
(1)             (2)                        (3) 
Acquirer [-5, +5] [-5, +5] [-25, +5] 
Target [-25, +5] [-5, +5] [-25, +5] 
    
Panel A:                                                         
Combined Change 
Value     
ΔMAVacq + ΔMAVtar Gaini Gaini[-5,+5] Gaini[-25,+5] 
Mean $71,397.15 -$38,290.50 $313,351.33 
Terciles -$72,113.10 -$68,842.18 -$111,346.39 
 $31,768.68 $28,644.57 $42,359.27 
 $304,979.12 $302,517.90 $401,158.21 
Panel B:     
Total M.V. of Equity    
MVacq + MVtar MVeqty MVeqty(t-6) MVeqty(t-26) 
Mean $14,275,459.22 $14,261,830.24 $13,946,957.43 
Terciles $847,962.50 $832,132.48 $826,881.44 
 $2,793,873.88 $2,811,887.55 $2,717,908.70 
 $10,707,608.89 $10,648,384.24 $10,264,641.22 
Panel C:     
Percentage Gain    
Gaini / MVeqty Gain% Gain%[-5,+5] Gain%[-25,+5] 
Mean 3.025% 2.510% 4.943% 
Terciles -3.595% -3.929% -4.841% 
 2.738% 1.998% 3.352% 
  9.338% 8.501% 12.964% 
 (Dollars in Thousands)    
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I prefer to use an 11-day window for the acquiring firms, and a 31-day window for the 
targets, for two related reasons.  First, previous research indicates that merger announcements 
typically have a large, positive impact on the target-firm’s stock price.  My study reports target-
firm CAR’s of approximately 24% to 30% (Table 10).  However, there are relatively few events 
(besides corporate takeover announcements) that systematically have wealth effects of this 
magnitude.  As a result, including the wealth effects from contaminating events is less of a concern 
when measuring the impact of a merger announcement on target-firm shareholder wealth.  On the 
other hand, previous research indicates that merger announcements typically have a relatively 
small impact on acquiring-firms’ stock returns.  My study reports CAR’s of approximately -1% to 
+1%.  Clearly, there are many events that have wealth effects of this magnitude.  As a result, the 
presence of contaminating events is a more serious concern when measuring the change in 
acquiring-firm shareholder wealth. 
 
7.3 Cut-Off Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Table 12 shows the change in the number of value-increasing mergers as the cutoff changes 
from 3% to 5%.  If the cutoff is 3%, then I would classify 321 mergers (or 45.5% of the total 705 
mergers examined by my study) as value-increasing.  If the cutoff is 5%, then I would classify 
37.7% as value-increasing.  Although the choice of the cutoff admittedly is subjective, the 4% 
cutoff seems to strike the right balance between 1) providing separation between the value-
increasing and value-decreasing merger outcomes, and 2) providing a sufficient number of value-
increasing mergers so that I can study bargaining power (which is the focus of Essay #2). 
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Table 12.  Cut-Off Sensitivity 
This table shows how the number of value-increasing, neutral, and value-decreasing mergers varies 
with different cutoffs.  For example, the number of value-increasing mergers declines from 312 
mergers to 266 mergers when I change the cutoff for Gain% from 4% to 5%.  Gain% is the combined 
change in the pre-merger, market capitalization of the acquiring and target firms.  Note that the 
sample of value-increasing mergers increases (decreases) as the cutoff for value-increasing mergers 
decreases (increases). 
 
     
     
     
5% Cutoff   N Percent 
 Gain% > 5% Value Increase 266 37.7% 
 5% > Gain% > -5% Neutral 279 39.6% 
 Gain% < -5% Value Decrease 160 22.7% 
   705 100.0% 
4% Cutoff     
 Gain% > 4% Value Increase 312 44.3% 
 4% > Gain% > -4% Neutral 183 26.0% 
 Gain% < -4% Value decrease 210 29.8% 
   705 100.0% 
3% Cutoff     
 Gain% > 3% Value Increase 321 45.5% 
 .03 > Gain% > -3% Neutral 186 26.4% 
 Gain% < -3% Value decrease 198 28.1% 
   705 100.0% 
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7.4 The Calculation of Auction Returns 
 
Readers should recognize that the merger announcement date listed in the SDC database 
generally does not coincide with the date an auction begins.  As a result, I analyze the change in 
the wealth of target-firm shareholders (ΔMAVt ) for different time periods beginning with auction 
initiation and ending at the merger announcement date.7   
Figure 1 illustrates the typical auction process and defines the sub-periods.  Table 13 
presents the results for each sub-period and the total auction period.  The mean change in market 
value during at the engagement of the financial advisor, ΔMAVT(t-3), is -$8.4 million.  During the 
contact period, ΔMAVT(t-2, t-1),  when the financial advisor or representatives of the target are 
contacting potential acquirers, the mean change in wealth is $4.9 million.  Thus, the average wealth 
effect for both the engagement and contact periods is $-3.5 million.  At the announcement of the 
merger, the average change in target market value, ΔMAVT(t=0),  is $28.2 million.  The net change 
in market value represents the combined change in market value for the engagement, contact 
period, and merger announcement.  The mean ΔMAVT(net) is positive, but lower than the 
ΔMAVT(t=0) calculated exclusively at the announcement of the merger (t=0).  Based on my 
findings in Table 13, I conclude that the merger announcement date captures most of the increase 
in target-firm shareholder wealth when managers initiate auctions.  Appendix D describes the 
auction process in greater detail. 
  
                                                          
7 Dollar Gains for Target firms: ΔMAVt = (Mkt-Adj. Returns) x (Pre-Merger Market-Cap) 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
What role (if any) do the acquiring-firm’s strategic objective and the managers’ choice of 
negotiation procedure play in determining wealth creation at the merger announcement date?  I 
answer this question by analyzing the change in the combined wealth of acquiring- and target-firm 
shareholders, and I identify five mutually-exclusive outcomes based on wealth creation and 
distribution.  Finally, I test the determinants of valuing-increasing mergers.       
The results of my study provide support for the strategic alignment hypothesis, particularly 
as it applies to mergers that expand the acquiring-firm’s operations geographically.  Geographic 
expansions create the largest combined gain even after I control for the payment method (cash, 
stock, or mixed).  However, the relative importance of the other strategic objectives declines once 
I control for the payment method.   
The results also support the targeted-synergistic-merger hypothesis.  Mergers that begin 
with one-on-one negotiations (either acquirer-to-target or target-to-acquirer) create larger 
increases in the combined wealth of the merging firms’ shareholders than mergers that begin with 
formal auctions, mutual discussions, or third-party offers.      
After examining the determinants of wealth creation in mergers, the second key issue is to 
examine how the managers distribute the combined gain.  As a result, the ensuing analysis 
examines the determinants of wealth distribution in a multivariate setting.  I address several key 
questions including: How do deal motivations affect the relative bargaining power of acquiring- 
and target-firm managers?  What role does the relative bargaining power of the acquiring- and 
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target-firms’ managers play in determining the negotiation procedure?  Which strategic objectives, 
negotiation procedures and deal motivations are most favorable for acquiring-firm shareholders?    
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Figure 1: Auction Process  
 
 
Table 13.         
Auction Periods      
 Engagement Contact Period Total Auction Announcement Net MAV 
 ΔMAVT(t-3) ΔMAVT(t-2,t-1) ΔMAVT(t-3, t-1) ΔMAVT(t=0) ΔMAVT(t-3,t=0) 
Mean -8.398 4.932 -3.466 28.201 24.735 
Std. Deviation 32.108 45.175 54.751 120.308 126.442 
Minimum -104.258 -113.624 -115.851 -94.108 -126.762 
Maximum 55.860 196.023 236.053 697.497 719.442 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Merger 
Announcement
•t=0
•SDC 
Announcement
Possible 
Bidding Firms 
Respond
•t=-1
•Confidentiality 
Agreement
Financial 
Advisor 
Contacts Firms
•t=-2
•One to two 
Month Window
Target Engages 
Financial 
Advisor
•t=-3
•On a specific 
date
Target's Initial 
Disccusion
•t=-4
•Firm discusses 
"Strategic 
Alternatives"
(t=0)
Auction
Possible Bidders are 
Contacted
Several parties sign 
Confidentiatlity 
Agreement
Target Announces 
Mergers
Target Identifies 
Possible Firms
Target Initiates 
Contact
Negotiation
Public 
Announcement
48 
 
 
Appendix A.  Auction Analysis 
Information Flow in Auctions  
I provide a chronological account of information flow that identifies more granular timing 
in the auction process.   Boone and Mulherin (2007) identify the initiation event (target contacts 
investment bank), rumor date, agreement date, and completion date.  However, they do not 
actually begin calculations at the time of the initiation event.   Despite disclosure guidelines and 
confidentiality agreements, the early stages of an auction are a vital period of information exposure 
for the target firm.  Consequently, it is imperative that this period is considered in analysis of 
wealth effects for target shareholders.   Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of different 
intervals in the auction process.8   
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
 (t = -4, t=-3) Engagement Period: In the engagement period, the target begins discussing strategic 
issues and decides to pursue possible strategic relation.   
𝐴𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑡 = −4, −3): 𝛥𝑀𝐴𝑉𝑖
𝑇 = [ ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡 )
+5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
−25 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
−   ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑚𝑡 )
+5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
−25 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
]    (𝑃𝑖𝑡=−26 )(𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡=−26 ) 
The initial period, defined as (t-4), represents the initial discussion by target firm managers 
disclosed in the SEC filings.   The time in which the target engages a financial advisor is defined 
as (t-3).   Recall that Boone and Mulherin (2007) define initiation as the time when the target 
                                                          
8Table 11 (Auction-ΔMAVT) illustrates the difference in the market value of the target-firm throughout the different 
time periods.  The net ΔMAVT is on average lower higher and there are considerable differences in the wealth effects 
measured when among the different time periods.   
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contacts a financial advisor.  However, there is a distinction between contacting an advisor and a 
formal engagement with an advisor, particularly in regards to the timing.   
(t = -2, t = -1) Contact Period: The contact period encompasses a window, usually one to two 
months, in which the designated financial advisor contacts a number of possible acquiring-firms 
or bidders.  The equation below reflects the entire window of engagement. 
𝐴𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑡 = −2, −1): 𝛥𝑀𝐴𝑉𝑖
𝑇 = [ ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡 )
+5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
−5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
−   ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑚𝑡 )
+5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
−5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
]    (𝑃𝑖𝑡=−5 )(𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡=−5 ) 
where t=-5 is five days before the window identified in the SEC filing and +5 is five days 
after the window.  In other words, if the SEC filing identifies a two month window of the contact 
period, I account for the time before and after the window.  This adjustment is made to the contact 
period calculation because the engagement window routinely coincides with the beginning of 
contact period.   
(t=0) Announcement Period: The announcement period is in-line with the original announcement 
date.   
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝑡 = 0): 𝛥𝑀𝐴𝑉𝑖
𝑇 = [ ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡 )
+5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
−25 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
−  ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑚𝑡 )
+5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
−25 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
]    (𝑃𝑖𝑡=−26 )(𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡=−26 ) 
Examples of Bidding Auctions:  
 Whereas there are differences in the timing of auctions and the corresponding flow of 
information, there are also differences among the level of competition.  The following three 
examples provide insight into the number of potential bidders involved in the typical auction 
process.  Although the purpose of this paper is not to disprove the validity of the SDC data base, 
it is worth noting that our use of the SEC filings allows us to paint a clearer picture of the nature 
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of the bidding process, particularly in regards to the number of parties involved and the exact 
timing of the events.9  One way to quantify the level of competition is to identify the number of 
parties contacted and number of parties that express interest or sign a letter of confidentiality.   
 The following three examples provide insight into the various levels of competition in 
auctions. In a relatively small auction in 2006, Trimble Navigation Ltd acquired @Road (at Road) 
following an auction.  Initially, there were twelve potential acquirers contacted and four parties 
signed letters of confidentiality.   As a result of a large scale auction 2007, Forest Oil Corp. 
acquired Houston Exploration Co.  The financial advisor Houston Exploration Co. contacted 81 
potential acquirers.  Twenty of those parties expressed an interest and eighteen actually attended 
meetings.  In the final example, involving Pogo and Plains Exploration, the financial advisor 
initially contacted 42 companies. According to the background of the merger, three companies 
denoted as Company A, B, and C, all made formal.  However, the SDC database reports two 
bidders.    
  
                                                          
9 In the Boone and Mulherin (2007) example of competition in an Auction, 65 potential bidders are contacted by the 
financial advisor and 28 sign confidentiality agreements. 
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APPENDIX B: PREDICTED SIGN 
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Appendix B: Strategic Objective Hypothesis Overview 
Appendix: Wealth Creation Sign Prior Literature 
Combined Wealth: %Gain    
Diversification with Overlap (-) Walker (2000);  
Diversification w/out Overlap (-) Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny (1990)  
Vertical Integration (+) Ahren (2012)   
Increase Market Share (+) DeLong (2001)  
Geographic Expansion (+/-) DeLong (2001) 
Broaden Product Line (-) Santalo and Becereea (2008) 
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Appendix B: Negotiating Process and predicted sign based on prior literature.  
%Gain Sign  
Target ->Acquirer  Boone and Mulherin (2007): if the information costs hypothesis holds, 
there should not be a difference between the wealth effects of auctions 
and negotiations.   
Target Auction  (+) Bulow and Klemperer (1996): target returns will be greater in an auction 
than in a negotiation.   
Acquirer ->Target   
Mutual Discussion (+) Synergistic Theory predicts that there will be an increase in wealth when 
firms have a pre-existing relation.   
Third-Party (+) Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988): the combined wealth of the post-merger 
firm will be higher in the presence of multiple bidders. 
   
Acquirer% Sign Literature 
Acquirer ->Target (+) Magee, Galinsky, and Gruenfeld (2007): parties with power tend to 
behave more proactively in competitive situations.  
Target ->Acquirer (-) Magee, Galinsky, and Gruenfeld (2007): parties with power tend to 
behave more proactively in competitive situations. 
Target Auction  (-) Bulow and Klemperer (1996): target returns will be greater in an auction 
than in a negotiation.   
Hansen (2001) uses a model that encompasses a potential loss of 
information by the selling firm which predicts that in the presence of 
information costs, auctions are more costly than negotiated deals.       
Mutual Discussion (+/-)  
Third-Party  (-) Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988): targets will gain the “lions share” of 
wealth creation in the presence of multiple bidders. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX C: NEGOTIATION PROCESSES 
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Appendix C (Negotiation Processes):   
 
 
Target-to-Acquirer: Mission Critical Software (Target) contacts NetIQ Corp. (Acquirer) in 2000 
 
BACKGROUND OF THE MERGER 
   In late 1999, MCS management began considering opportunities to further develop its product lines 
through acquisitions of or investments in products, technologies and businesses. In connection with this 
activity, on December 7, 1999, MCS engaged Chase H&Q to act as its financial advisor for selected 
business development opportunities. 
 
   On December 15, 1999, a representative of Chase H&Q telephoned Ching-Fa Hwang, President and 
Chief Executive Officer of NetIQ and expressed an interest in discussing potential business development 
opportunities between MCS and NetIQ, including a possible merger of the two companies. Mr. Hwang 
expressed interest in further discussions regarding potential business development activities with MCS. 
 
   Michael Bennett, President and Chief Executive Officer of MCS, telephoned Mr. Hwang during the 
first week of January 2000 and the two CEOs decided to meet in Phoenix, Arizona the following week. 
    
Acquirer-to-Target: Veeco (Acquirer) initiates discussion with the CVC (Target) 2000 
 
BACKGROUND OF THE MERGER 
    From time to time, Veeco has conducted preliminary discussions with numerous merger and 
acquisition candidates who primarily manufacture high precision process test and measurement 
equipment for the microelectronics industry. Before January 2000, Edward H. Braun, Chairman, Chief 
Executive Officer and President of Veeco, and Christine B. Whitman, Chairman, Chief Executive Officer 
and President of CVC, were familiar with one another and had come into contact with one another at 
industry trade shows, various conventions and in various other circumstances. 
    From time to time on several occasions over the past several years, Mr. Braun and Ms. Whitman had 
discussed the possibility of a business combination or strategic relationship involving Veeco and CVC, 
however, on each occasion, these discussions were terminated and did not result in any further actions 
relating to any such business combination or strategic relationship. Also, from time to time over the past 
several years, industry analysts and other persons familiar with the industry in which Veeco and CVC 
operate have independently suggested to Veeco and CVC that a business combination or other strategic 
relationship between Veeco and CVC would be viewed favorably by customers and the investment 
community. 
56 
 
    On January 21, 2000, Mr. Braun called Ms. Whitman to congratulate her on CVC's public offering 
and the completion of CVC's first quarter as a public company. On January 24, 2000, Mr. Braun and 
Ms. Whitman spoke by telephone and exchanged general information about Veeco's and CVC's 
businesses. Mr. Braun suggested the possibility of a business combination involving Veeco and CVC. 
Ms. Whitman invited Mr. Braun to come to Rochester (the home of CVC's headquarters) to discuss in 
greater detail the possibility of a merger or other business combination transaction involving Veeco and 
CVC. 
 
 
Mutual Discussion:  Quintus and Mustang.com have mutual discussion 
 
BACKGROUND OF THE MERGER 
 
     On January 13, 2000, Quintus' Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Alan K. Anderson and 
Mustang.com's President and Chief Executive Officer, James A. Harrer, had a telephonic conversation 
regarding the possibility of a business combination and agreed to meet in person on January 20, 2000. 
     On January 20, 2000, Messrs. Anderson and Harrer met at the Los Angeles office of Mustang.com 
to discuss a potential merger of the two companies and to determine a preliminary valuation. Messrs. 
Anderson and Harrer had a general discussion regarding valuation and agreed to continue discussions. 
     At a regular meeting of the board of directors of Quintus on January 27, 2000, the board discussed 
general strategic matters, including the possibility of a merger with Mustang.com. 
     On January 28, 2000, the parties executed a confidentiality agreement pursuant to which the 
companies agreed to exchange certain non-public information regarding their businesses. Also on that 
date, Mr. Harrer visited Quintus' corporate headquarters to meet other senior executives of Quintus. 
Over the next few days, Mustang.com and Quintus met with their financial advisors to discuss issues 
that would need to be addressed in a merger transaction. 
 
 
 
 
Auctions:  
 
Large Auction: Houston Exploration Co. (Target) initiates an auction in 2007, Forest Oil Corp. (Acquirer)  
 
Background of the Merger  
        On October 25, 2005, in light of market conditions and recent industry activity, Houston 
Exploration's board of directors met to consider, among other things, a possible corporate restructuring 
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designed to refocus and reposition Houston Exploration for sustainable growth and maximize 
stockholder value. Such restructuring contemplated, among other things, a sale of some or all of 
Houston Exploration's Gulf of Mexico assets, a restructuring of Houston Exploration's existing hedge 
portfolio to improve cash flow and/or repurchases of up to $200 million of Houston Exploration's 
common stock. The board instructed management to develop further the restructuring proposal. 
        On November 4, 2005, Houston Exploration's board received additional input from management 
on the corporate restructuring proposal and decided to proceed with initial steps designed to restructure 
Houston Exploration's business. Specifically, the board authorized Houston Exploration's management 
to commence a sale process with respect to Houston Exploration's Gulf of Mexico assets and to retain 
Wachovia Capital Markets, LLC ("Wachovia") to act as Houston Exploration's financial advisor in 
connection with such sale. The board also approved a discretionary common stock repurchase program 
of up to $200 million to be executed in connection with such sale. Based on the recommendation of 
management, the board determined not to authorize a restructuring of Houston Exploration's hedge 
program at that time.         
        In November 2005, Houston Exploration retained Wachovia to assist it with the sale of its Gulf of 
Mexico assets, and a formal sale process commenced soon thereafter. Between November 2005 and 
January 2006, Wachovia contacted a total of 81 potential acquirors of Houston Exploration's offshore 
assets. Twenty of these parties entered into confidentiality agreements with respect to the process. In 
January and February 2006, 18 parties attended management presentations with respect to the assets. 
Bids were due on February 10, 2006. 
 
 
Small Auction: Washington Homes (Target) and Hovnanian Enterprises (Acquirer) in 2001 
 
   BACKGROUND OF THE TRANSACTION 
    For some time, the management of Washington Homes was disappointed by the fact that, despite 
what it viewed as strong financial performance, the price to earnings multiple at which the 
Washington Home's stock traded in the market was significantly below that at which the stocks of 
other publicly-held companies, outside of the homebuilding industry, traded. Management was also 
aware of the fact that publicly-held companies which are in the small and micro cap categories in 
the homebuilding industry, such as Washington Homes, traded at even lower multiples than publicly-
held companies in the medium cap and large cap categories in that industry. Accordingly, while the 
management of Washington Homes was not yet ready to recommend to its board of directors that a 
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formal process for the sale of Washington Homes be initiated, management, with the concurrence of 
the board, decided to explore various possible alternatives to enhance shareholder value. 
 
    In the Fall of 1998, Washington Homes retained Wasserstein Perella & Co., Inc., which we refer 
to in this document as "Wasserstein Perella," on an exclusive basis, as financial advisor to explore 
various possible financial and strategic alternatives that might be available in order to enhance the 
value of the common stock of Washington Homes. Subsequently, Wasserstein Perella conducted a 
thorough analysis of Washington Homes and its position in the homebuilding industry and discussed 
with management various strategic alternatives, including the sale of Washington Homes to strategic 
buyers in the homebuilding industry, share repurchase programs, dutch auction procedures, a going 
private transaction, acquisition of a smaller homebuilder and other strategic alliances. After being 
approached by several companies, informal discussions regarding a possible sale of Washington 
Homes were held during 1999. No formal process for the sale of Washington Homes was authorized 
or initiated, and no formal discussions pertaining to the sale of Washington Homes were held with 
any prospective purchasers during that period. 
 
    In April 2000, management of Washington Homes, still disappointed by the price levels at which 
its stock traded despite record results, revised its arrangements with Wasserstein Perella to act as 
its financial advisor with respect to a possible strategic transaction which would lead to the merger 
of Washington Homes with, or its acquisition by, one of a short list of approximately a half-dozen 
strategic candidates in the U.S. homebuilding industry, including Hovnanian, which had been 
identified by management of Washington Homes, in consultation with Wasserstein Perella, as being 
a good strategic fit for Washington Homes. Wasserstein Perella was retained to act as exclusive 
agent to attempt to arrange the sale of Washington Homes. Wasserstein Perella had advised 
Washington Homes that the most effective way to initiate serious discussions with prospective 
purchasers pertaining to a strategic transaction would be to make formal overtures to a limited 
number of prospective buyers as part of a formal process. Washington Homes, while it was willing 
to use a formal process as a means of determining whether a transaction with identified strategic 
buyers or merger partners was likely, did not want to put a formal "for sale" sign on Washington 
Homes because of concerns about the impact on and related risks regarding its employees, customers 
and suppliers.  Accordingly, in its role as financial advisor to Washington Homes, Wasserstein 
Perella established a process whereby indications of interest to acquire Washington Homes, and 
ultimately, formal acquisition proposals, were sought from the approximately half-dozen strategic 
buyers which had been previously identified. 
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    At management's request, Wasserstein Perella contacted six potential acquirors, including 
Hovnanian, to determine their interest in Washington Homes. During the first week of June 2000, 
five of the six potential acquirors, including Hovnanian, entered into confidentiality agreements and 
received a confidential information memorandum describing the business and operations of 
Washington Homes. Shortly thereafter, each of the prospective acquirors which had signed a 
confidentiality agreement received a letter from Wasserstein Perella explaining the procedures for 
the forthcoming process pertaining to a possible transaction involving Washington Homes. Each 
was requested to provide a list of dates over the next two week period on which its representatives 
would be available to attend a presentation by the management of Washington Homes. Each was 
also advised in that letter that following the presentations by the management of Washington Homes, 
Wasserstein Perella would request from each of them a non-binding indication of interest that 
included the following information: (a) an indication of the value and the form of consideration 
relating to the proposed transaction and (b) a list of significant issues and assumptions that might 
affect the prospective acquiror's level of interest, including the future role of current management of 
Washington Homes following the consummation of any transaction. In addition, the letter stated that, 
upon receiving the indications of interest, Washington Homes would select a limited number of 
interested parties to visit a data room and pursue further due diligence leading to the submission of 
a definitive offer. 
Each letter further advised that qualified parties as determined by Washington Homes would be 
provided with a form of purchase agreement specifying the terms upon which Washington Homes 
would be willing to enter into a transaction. In addition, each qualified prospective purchaser would 
be asked to submit a written proposal that would specify the amount and form of consideration and 
include the purchase agreement marked to show changes from the form provided. 
 
    Of the five prospective acquirors, four, including Hovnanian, held discussions with the 
management of Washington Homes during the last week of June and the first week of July. On July 
5 and 6, 2000, each of the four prospective acquirors which had held discussions with the 
management of Washington Homes submitted confidential written, non-binding indications of 
interest to acquire Washington Homes. The non-binding indications of interest from the four 
prospective acquirors offered consideration consisting of stock or a mix of cash and stock with values 
denominated by the respective bidders at prices ranging from approximately $7.25 to $9.00 per share 
for Washington Homes common stock, as well as certain other terms and conditions. 
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    Based upon a review of those non-binding indications of interest, three, including Hovnanian, of 
the prospective acquirors were offered access to a data room containing public and non-public 
information pertaining to Washington Homes which had been set up at the Washington, D.C. offices 
of Duane, Morris & Heckscher LLP, counsel to Washington Homes, at its offices in Washington, 
D.C., commencing in mid-July. All three of the prospective acquirors availed themselves of the 
opportunity to review the materials in the data room during the third and fourth weeks of July and, 
in addition, two of the prospective bidders, including Hovnanian, requested and received a tour of 
the operations of Washington Homes in Maryland and Virginia. 
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ESSAY 2: DO NEGOTIATING PROCEDURE AND DEAL MOTIVATIONS DRIVE 
BARGAINING POWER IN MERGERS? 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper I examine the role that negotiating procedure and deal motivations play in 
determining the distribution of wealth created by merger announcements.  Studies historically have 
explained the division of merger gains by examining determinants such as relative firm size 
(Moeller, Schlingeman, and Stulz, 2002), ownership (Stulz, Walkling, and Song, 1990), the 
number of bidders (Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1988), and product market dependence (Ahren, 
2012).10  However, there are inherent limitations to using these proxies to analyze bargaining 
power.  For instance, Boone and Mulherin (2008) argue that the number of bidders is a noisy and 
incomplete measure of competition.  To address this issue, I propose two observable proxies of 
bargaining power: the negotiating procedure that takes place between the firms and the deal 
motivations that the managers of each firm disclose to their respective shareholders.  My approach 
allows for a more comprehensive and meticulous analysis of bargaining power than previous 
research.   
I also examine the determinants of the negotiation process by simultaneously addressing 
the target’s sales procedure and the acquirer’s bidding strategy.  Theoretical models of the target’s 
sales procedure predict that the choice of an auction or a negotiation reflects a trade-off between 
competition and information costs (Hansen, 2001); or, the impact of characteristics such as target 
size, industry structure, and affiliation with the bidding firm (French and McCormick, 1984).  
                                                          
10Relatively few studies examine the bargaining power of acquiring- and target-firm managers.  One exception is 
Peterson and Peterson (1991), who hypothesize that acquirers receive more of the gain 1) following tender offers 
rather than mergers, and 2) following tender offers when the target-firm shareholders are more diffuse.   
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Bidding theory implies that the premium paid for the target is directly related to the acquirer’s 
bidding strategy (e.g. Betton and Eckbo, 2000).  Despite the abundance of literature about either 
sales procedure or bidding strategy, relatively few studies have empirically analyzed both sales 
procedure and contact initiation simultaneously.  In this paper, I identify the party who initiates 
contact in one-on-one negotiations.  I also introduce a previously unidentified form of controlled 
sale, which I refer to as mutual discussion.  In the case of auctions, I analyze the complete 
progression of information flow and the ensuing wealth effects.   
The details provided by the respective firm managers in Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) EDGAR filings provide a thorough description of the merger process.11   I am 
particularly interested in the standard ‘merger background’ section of the S-4 and DEFM filings.  
Given the fiduciary responsibility of managers of publicly traded firms, the filings provide reliable 
details about many facets of the deal.  A thorough chronology of the negotiating procedure is 
provided, along with relevant information about competition from other bidders and the role of 
third-parties.  Additionally, the executives of each firm provide reasons for the merger as a form 
of persuasion for shareholder votes and justification to board members.  The publicly available 
information allows me to use the managers’ wording to categorize deal motivations as opposed to 
pre-specified categories.  This novel approach allows me to closely align this study with the actual 
reasoning behind executive decisions.   
I find evidence that the underlying motivations for a deal do play a significant role in 
determining the negotiating procedure.  For example, target-firm managers are more likely to use 
an auction when their firm is experiencing financial problems, and they are more likely to use a 
                                                          
11Various studies note the insightfulness of SEC filings.  For instance, Boone and Mulherin (2007) use the merger 
background section of the SEC filings to classify the selling procedure as a negotiation or an auction.  I also use the 
filings to evaluate the negotiation process.   
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one-on-one negotiation (which I refer to as target-to-acquirer) when merging for marketing or 
operating reasons.  I also find support for the information cost hypothesis, which states that targets 
are less likely to initiate an auction when there are potential costs associated with the release of 
proprietary information.  In particular, target-firm managers who cite a desire to either gain 
technological expertise, or enhance product development, are less likely to initiate an auction.  On 
the other hand, acquiring-firm managers are less likely to initiate contact (which I refer to as 
acquirer-to-target) when they cite expanding the customer base or acquiring the target-firm’s 
technological expertise as motivations.  Mergers that begin with mutual discussions between the 
acquiring- and target-firm managers generally occur when the firms’ managers have an existing 
business relationship.  
My results also support the bargaining power hypothesis, which states that acquiring- and 
target-firm managers with more negotiating leverage tend to capture more wealth for their firm’s 
shareholders.  The results are consistent with Shalvi, Moran, and Ritov (2010), who find that 
negotiation outcomes often depend on the manager’s locus of control.  I find that a manager who 
cites financial weakness or distress as a deal motivation (i.e., an indicator of an externally-oriented 
manager) has relatively less bargaining power than an internally-oriented manager (i.e., a manager 
who perceives more control over his or her destiny).  I also find that acquiring-firm managers lose 
bargaining power when they cite a desire to increase shareholder liquidity or improve their firm’s 
access to capital.  On the other hand, target-firm managers capture more wealth in operationally-
motivated mergers, specifically those driven by a desire to gain manufacturing expertise.  I also 
find that the winning bidder in auctions generally captures a significant portion of the wealth in 
value-increasing mergers.  Consistent with Stulz, Walking and Song (1990), I find that an increase 
in the relative size of the target to the acquirer increases the target's bargaining power.  Finally, my 
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findings support Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), who find that an increase in the number of 
bidders significantly decreases the acquirer’s ability to capture wealth.  
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 provides an overview of the 
relevant literature.  Section 3 discusses the bargaining power hypothesis with predictions regarding 
the impact of specific deal motivations.  Section 4 explains the sample selection and methodology.  
Section 5 discusses the empirical results and section 6 discusses the conclusions.   
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Negotiating Procedure and Deal Motivations: 
Several theoretical models and empirical studies seek to explain the topic of negotiation in 
mergers.  The majority of relevant theoretical predictions address either the target’s choice of 
selling procedure or the acquirer’s bidding strategy.  In regards to selling procedures, Bulow and 
Klemperer (1996) predict that target returns will be greater in an auction with many bidders 
compared to a negotiation with a single bidder.  French and McCormick (1984) and Hansen (2001) 
predict that target returns will be the same in auctions and negotiations.  In regards to the decision 
to initiate contact in a merger, Masulis and Simsir (2015) find that large, liquid, and high return on 
equity acquirers initiate deals more frequently.  On the other hand, small targets are more likely to 
initiate contact than larger targets.  Nonetheless, competition also plays a major role in the bidding 
processes.  For instance, Betton and Eckbo (2000) predict that toeholds are less likely to receive 
competition from third-party bidders or be challenged by target managers.   Aktas, de Bodt, and 
Roll (2010) suggest that an increase in the number of N-1 rivals increases the initial offer premium.  
By analyzing five mutually exclusive negotiating procedures, I am able to simultaneously test 
theoretical predictions from both streams of literature.   
2.1.1 Target Selling Process  
Theoretical models on the part of the target selling procedure focus on the choice between 
an auction and negotiation.  French and McCormick (1984) predict that the target-firm 
shareholders can reach higher immediate returns in the case of an auction.  Bulow and Klemperer 
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(1996) model an English Auction, where the seller is always better off having one more bidder 
than engaging in a bargaining process with the winning bidder.  Bulow and Klemperer suggest that 
the decision not to use an auction is potentially harmful to target shareholders.  The model of 
Hansen (2001), on the other hand, incorporates the potential loss of information by the selling firm 
in auctions.   Hansen argues that there is a competitive information cost for targets that use an 
auction, because the target risks the release valuable information to other bidders in the process.   
The term target-initiated deal is used in this study to refer to a merger in which the target-
firm managers make a strategic decision to sell the company without prior contact by a bidding 
firm.  Boone and Mulherin (2007) emphasize that targets increasingly initiate takeovers, and 
Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2009) suggest that target-initiated deals often begin as auctions.12  
Nonetheless, Aktas et al. (2009) conclude that auctions are costly and time-consuming.  Boone 
and Mulherin (2007) consider both the agency cost hypothesis, which implies that auctions benefit 
target shareholders, and the information cost hypothesis, which suggests that auctions are costly.  
If the information costs outweigh the agency costs, then target-firm managers would be less likely 
to use an auction.  Information costs could include the potential release of proprietary information 
(e.g., about the target-firm’s technology or manufacturing expertise).   
 Fidrmuc, Roosenboom, Paap, and Teunissen (2012) show that premium determination is 
just one part of a wider and complex selling process that begins with deal initiation.  They suggest 
that the manager’s choice of selling mechanism is not random.  For instance, more profitable firms 
with lower leverage are typically sold in auctions rather than in controlled sales or private 
negotiations.  On the other hand, higher research and development intensity increases the odds of 
                                                          
12Boone and Mulherin (2007) hypothesize the following relation: controlled sale = ƒ {affiliation (+), industry (+), 
target size (-)}. 
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a controlled sale.  They also find that buyer initiated deals are most likely to be private negotiations.  
The agency and information cost hypotheses suggest:  
 H1 (Sales Procedure):  When compared to Target-to-Acquirer negotiations, the likelihood 
of an Auction should be related inversely to the target firm’s information costs. 
 
2.1.2 Initiation: Acquirer-to-Target versus Target-to-Acquirer 
 
The decision to initiate contact in a merger is a major corporate decision.  Undoubtedly, 
the choice reflects a variety of factors such as operating performance, financial stability, and 
growth potential.  Aktas et al. (2009) argue that although bidder-initiated deals are most often 
negotiations, less than 25% of negotiated deals are initiated by the target.  However, relatively few 
studies examine the factors that determine which party will initiate the negotiation.   
Masulis and Simsir (2015) examine the choice to initiate contact in a merger and the 
implications for shareholders.  They explain that the target in buyer initiated deals often represent 
an acquiring-firms optimal takeover candidate.  In contrast, target initiated deals usually reflect a 
set of unfavorable circumstances for the target.  Masulis and Simsir (2015) find that large buyer 
firms are more likely to initiate deals, while small target are more likely to put themselves up for 
sale.  Masulis and Simsir (2015) also find that high return on equity increases an acquirer’s 
likelihood of initiating contact.     
Magee, Galinsky, and Gruenfeld (2007) hypothesize that people who experience more 
power tend to behave more proactively in competitive situations than people who experience less 
power.  Power refers to the capacity to control one’s own, and others’, resources and outcomes.  
Those individuals with high power depend less on the resources of those with low power. 
There are several reasons why acquiring-firm managers might initiate contact (i.e., 
acquirer-to-target). For example, if acquiring-firm managers want to gain access to the target 
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firm’s technological expertise, there might be a significant advantage to initiating the process 
before other firms enter the competition. In the presence of proprietary information such as 
technological expertise, the information costs might include opportunity costs.  Therefore, I posit 
that acquirers have an incentive to contact the target in the presence of information asymmetry. 
H2 (Initiation): Acquirers are more likely to initiate contact when more information costs 
associated with the target.   
2.2 Bargaining Power 
 
Financial theory and previous empirical research identify at least six factors that can proxy 
for the bargaining power of acquiring- and target-firm managers: 1) firm-specific objectives, 2) 
the nature of the bidding process (i.e., identifying the party initiating the merger negotiations), 3) 
the presence of multiple bidders, 4) the composition of target-firm shareholder ownership, and 5) 
the target-firm manager’s resistance (if any), and the relative sizes of the acquiring and target 
firms.13  Agency cost explanations, such as the hubris hypothesis of Roll (1986), imply that 
takeovers neither create nor destroy value, but simply redistribute wealth from overbidding 
acquirers to target shareholders.  In the presence of target management hostility, Schwert (2000) 
suggests that acquirers of public firms have lower cumulative abnormal returns.  Stulz (1988) 
indicates that an acquirer with a greater toehold could have a stronger bargaining position.  While 
it is not the focus of this study, previous support of the importance of a toehold requires me to 
account for ownership in analysis of wealth distribution.14  Betton and Eckbo (2000) examine 
                                                          
13 Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008) find that bidder gains increase with the offer premium and the target-firm’s 
price run-up, suggesting that offer premiums could signal larger combined gains rather than the target-firm managers’ 
bargaining power. 
14 Betton and Eckbo (2000) identify: the initial offer premium (Premium), the initial toehold (Toehold), and three 
dummy variables for zero toehold (zero-toe), cash as payment method (payment), and the presence of a negotiated 
pre-bid tender agreement (Negotiated). 
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bargaining power by examining the initial offer premium, the initial toehold, the method of 
payment, and the presence of a negotiated, pre-bid tender agreement. 
Several studies of bargaining power focus on the number of bidders.  Bradley et al. (1988) 
suggest that the total gains are larger in multiple-bidder acquisitions, but the target-firm 
shareholders generally receive most of the gain.  However, they do not find evidence that the 
fraction of target shares purchased determines the distribution of the gain.   On the other hand, 
Bulow and Klemperer (1996) predict that restricting the number of bidders in an auction process 
can be wealth increasing for target shareholders because an ongoing auction process can reveal 
confidential information.15  While empirical studies such as Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 
(2002) use the number of public bidders to classify the competitiveness of a takeover, Boone and 
Mulherin (2008) suggest that the number of bidders is a poor proxy of competition.16   
Previous research indicates that firm size is an important determinant of bargaining power.  
Stulz, Walkling and Song (1990) suggest that relative firm size is correlated positively with 
bargaining power. Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stultz (2004) show that acquiring firms with larger 
relative size are more likely to over-pay.   In his analysis of vertical mergers, Ahern (2012) finds 
that relatively large targets receive a greater portion of the gain.17   
My study adds to this literature by examining how (if at all) the deal motivations cited by 
the acquiring- and target-firm managers affect bargaining power.  I collect the deal motivations 
from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) EDGAR database.  The company filings 
provide a description of the merger process and the managers’ motivations for completing the 
                                                          
15 Hansen (2001) and French and McCormick (1984) conclude that target firms inevitably choose the number of 
bidders. 
16 Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2002) acknowledge that their measurement of takeover competitive does not 
account for the existence of private competition.   
17 Ahern (2012) indicates that absolute firm size is unrelated to the division of cumulative abnormal returns.  
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merger.18  The managers’ stated motivations provide direct insight about their reasons for engaging 
in the deal.  While many of the deal motivations are symmetric (i.e. both firms cite the same or 
corresponding motivations), others are one-sided and subsequently have a more dramatic impact 
on the relative bargaining power.  Appendix B lists the motivations examined by my study and 
shows the predicted sign of deal motivation coefficients. 
 
2.2.1 Operating Motivations for Mergers 
 
Operating motivations include cost savings, the desire to gain from the other firm’s 
technological expertise, or the desire to add the other firm’s managers to the acquiring-firm’s 
management team.  However, the motivations are neither mutually exclusive, not one-directional.  
For example, if the target-firm managers cite a desire to achieve economies of scale and the 
acquiring-firm managers cite cost savings as motivations, the deal could be advantageous to both 
parties.19    
I hypothesize that some motivations, such as those related to expertise or exclusivity, often 
infer greater information cost and thus should have a greater impact on a manager’s negotiating 
leverage.  For example, Higgins and Rodriquez (2006) argue that acquirers in the pharmaceutical 
industry have greater bargaining power when the exclusivity and patent horizon of their own 
product portfolios and pipelines are strong.   Similarly, if the acquiring-firm managers cite the 
technological expertise of the target firm as a deal motivation, then I expect the acquiring-firm 
managers will lose bargaining power.20  Therefore,  
                                                          
18Various studies note the insightfulness of the SEC filings.  For instance, Boone and Mulherin (2007) use the 
merger background section of the SEC filings to classify the selling procedure as a negotiation or an auction.  I also 
use the filings to evaluate the negotiation process.   
19 Admittedly, the relative bargaining power also could depend on other characteristics, such as industry structure 
(Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996), regulation, and competition (Bradley et al., 1988). 
20 Google’s acquisition of YouTube and a number of Facebook’s acquisitions are notable examples.  
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H3 (Operating Motivations): The acquiring- and target-firm managers’ relative 
bargaining power should depend on the type of operating motivations cited by each party. 
 
2.2.2. Operating Motivations and Rational Over-Payment 
 
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001) believe that technological advancements often trigger 
merger activity in certain industries, particularly those characterized by rapid innovation and 
technological change.  For example, an advance in computer software development could force 
firms to merge to keep pace with their competitors.  If technology-driven mergers are time 
sensitive, then firms may find it in their best interest to pay excessively in order to ensure deal 
completion.  This notion is especially relevant when the acquiring-firm’s managers desire the 
target firm’s expertise or unique product line.  The target-firm’s managers might possess 
considerable bargaining power in these cases.   
Akdogu (2011) predicts that the acquiring-firm managers might knowingly over-bid for a 
target firm, particularly when losing the deal could have negative long-term implications for 
shareholder wealth.  According to this view, the acquiring-firm managers do not want to risk losing 
the target firm to a competitor.  Akdogu (2011) predicts that firms often rationally over-pay when 
purchasing a target’s technological expertise.   
Fidrmuc, Roosenboom, Paap, & Teunissen (2012) suggest that strategic buyers tend to 
value research and development expenses and intangible assets such as growth options.  
Empirically, Higgins and Rodriguez (2005) find that biopharmaceutical companies can 
successfully outsource R&D through acquisitions.  Higgins and Rodriguez (2005) also note the 
difficulty in valuing intangible assets.  Given the high growth opportunities for many smaller firms 
and the difficulty in quantifying their future cash-flows, it is reasonable to assume that the 
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managers of such firms could possess considerable bargaining power.21 I hypothesize that 
acquirers are more likely to over-pay in the presence of information costs.    
H4 (Rational Overpayment): Acquiring-firm managers are more likely to overpay for a target 
firm when the merger involves considerable information and opportunity costs. 
 
2.2.3 Financial Motivations for Mergers 
Lewellen (1971) was one of the first to address the financial benefits of merging firms.  
Lewellen discusses the coinsurance effect and the benefits of corporate diversification.  The benefit 
of diversification stems from the reduction in cash flow volatility.  Accordingly, the merging firms 
realize an increase in debt capacity which leads them to greater access to capital markets.  Greater 
access to capital markets and an increase in shareholder liquidity are the two most frequently cited 
financial motivations cited by both acquirers and targets in this study.   
Shalvi, Moran, and Ritov (2010) hypothesize that bargaining power is related to the 
negotiator’s locus of control.  Shalvi et al.  (2010) predict that initial offers and final outcomes will 
exhibit stronger correlation when negotiators are externally-oriented.  I hypothesize that managers 
who cite financial weakness or distress as a deal motivation are externally-oriented managers (i.e., 
they have less control over the firm’s fate).    
I test whether financial deal motivations serve as an indicator of an internally-oriented 
manager.  For example, I expect the target-firm managers to lose bargaining power if they cite 
severe financial trouble as a deal motivation.  Some deal motivations provide a mixed message.  
For example, a large number of target-firm managers cite access to capital as a deal motivation.  
Intuitively, the target-firm manager’s need to access capital could reflect a loss of bargaining 
                                                          
21 Moeller, Schlinemann, and Stulz (2007) suggest that acquirers with more uncertain growth prospects gain less in 
acquisitions.   
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power.  However, the motivation also could reflect a rapidly-growing firm with substantial growth 
opportunities.  In this case the acquiring-firm managers might be willing to pay a large premium 
to acquire the target firm.22   Therefore, I differentiate between target-firm managers seeking access 
to capital to finance growth opportunities and managers that seek capital as a result of financial 
distress.  
H5 (Financial Motivations): Internally-oriented managers should have greater bargaining 
power than externally-oriented managers (i.e., managers who cite severe financial trouble). 
2.2.4 Marketing Motivations for Mergers 
 Ahren (2012) finds evidence that product market dependence drives the division of gains 
when acquiring firms integrate vertically.  Greater product market dependence implies greater 
bargaining power for the upstream firm.  On the other hand, acquiring-firm managers who want to 
broaden the product line likely will sacrifice bargaining power.  The loss of bargaining power 
should be greater if the acquiring-firm managers cite the target firm’s exclusive product or better 
product line as a deal motivation. 
Marketing motivations include the desire by the acquiring-firm managers to gain access to 
the target firm’s large customer base (a strategy of increasing market share), the desire to increase 
the firm’s size in order to make it more attractive to large customers (such as original equipment 
manufacturers, OEM), and a desire to gain access to a particular customer of the target firm.  Thus, 
H6 (Marketing Motivations): The acquiring- and target-firm managers’ relative bargaining 
power should depend on the number and type of marketing motivations cited by each party.  
                                                          
22 To address this issue I evaluate the strength of the signal using correlation matrices in appendix C.  
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3. DATA 
3.1 Sample Selection  
The sample includes mergers between publicly-traded, U. S. firms announced between 
January 1, 1995 and December 31, 2007.  Given the importance of information disclosure to my 
study, it is necessary that the merger has relevant company filings available in the SEC EDGAR 
database. The SEC filings must contain adequate information to identify the negotiation procedure 
under the ‘background’ section and the deal motivations for each firm under the ‘reasons for the 
merger’ section.  I restrict the sample to mergers with S-4, S-4/A or DEFM filings, and I exclude 
tender offers (EDGAR files 14D or SC-TO). 
I identify the sample mergers using data from Thomson Financial Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC).23  The sample mergers satisfy the following criteria: 1) data for the acquiring 
and target firms are available from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), 2) the Wall 
Street Journal contains an article that describes the acquiring-firm managers’ strategic objective, 
3) the acquiring firm owns more than 50% of the target firm's shares at the completion date, 4) the 
acquiring firm does not announce another acquisition within two months of the takeover 
announcement data (this requirement excludes 26 mergers), 5) the relative transaction size is 
greater than 1%, and 6) the acquiring firm is not a communications firm, public utility, or financial 
institution.  
                                                          
23 I exclude tenders offers because the SEC filings (S-TO and 14A) generally do not include the ‘background’ section 
that I use to identify the negotiating process, nor do they include a ‘reasons for the merger’ section from which I find 
information about the deal motivations. 
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There are 1,602 mergers from January 1st, 1995 to December 31st, 2007, that meet the initial 
sample criteria.  However, only 705 mergers have S-4 and DEFM14A documents for the acquiring 
and target firms.  The sample size is consistent with Boone and Mulherin (2007); Atkas, de Bodt, 
and Roll (2009); and Masulis and Simsir (2015) I classify 312 mergers (or 44.3%) as value-
increasing mergers, which are the primary focus of this study.24  A value-increasing merger refers 
to the merger in which the combined gain earned by the acquiring- and target-firm shareholders is 
greater than 4% (see Section 4). 
 I am particularly interested in the standard ‘merger background’ section of the S-4 and 
DEFM filings, which provide details about the merger transaction.  A thorough chronology of the 
negotiating procedure is provided, along with information about competition from other bidders 
and the role of third-parties.  In addition, the executives of each firm provide their reasons for the 
merger.  The SEC filings allow me to use the managers’ descriptions to categorize the deal 
motivations.  Therefore, my classification scheme should be closely aligned with the actual 
reasoning behind the executives’ decisions. 
3.1.1 Classification of Negotiation Process:  
My search of the SEC filings identifies five mutually exclusive negotiating procedures: 1) 
the acquiring-firm managers begin the process by contacting the target-firm managers (acquirer-
to-target), 2) the target-firm managers begin the process by contacting only the acquiring-firm 
managers (target-to-acquirer), 3) the target-firm managers begin the process by initiating an 
auction, 4) the takeover follows mutual discussions between the acquiring- and target-firm 
                                                          
24 Using similar sample selection criteria, Aktas de Bodt, and Roll (2009) identify 754 mergers announced between 
1994 and 2006 with SEC filings.  However they reduce their sample to 591 mergers when they restrict their sample 
to mergers with sufficient information to determine the initiating party.  
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managers (i.e., it is not clear which party initiated the merger), and 5) a third party begins the 
process by making a bid for the target firm.   
Previous empirical studies, such as Boone and Mulherin (2007), often group target-to-
acquirer, acquirer-to-target, and mutual discussions together as a negotiation or controlled sale.  
The theoretical predictions of Hansen (2001) explain a controlled sale that describes the target-to-
acquirer classification of this study. Masulis and Simisir (2015) note the difficulty in identifying 
the initiating party based on their analysis of SEC filings.  They exclude 504 out of 947 deals 
because there was not sufficient initiation information.25   The portion of their sample would be 
identified as either third-party initiation or mutual discussion in this study.   The more detailed 
identification scheme of my study provides insight into the determinants, and the wealth effects, 
associated with each negotiating procedure.  Mutual discussion is a previously unidentified 
category of negotiating procedure which is unique to this study.    
 
3.2 Results for Negotiation Procedure Hypotheses 
3.2.1 Auctions versus Target-to-Acquirer Negotiations  
My sample contains 59 target firms sold in formal auctions and 129 mergers in which the 
target-firm managers initiate a controlled sale.  Table 1 compares the financial characteristics of 
the target firms involved in these two types of negotiation procedures.  When compared to target 
firms whose managers initiate a target-to-acquirer negotiation, target firms whose managers 
initiate an auction have significantly higher debt ratios (26.0% to 19.5%) and significantly lower 
q-ratios (0.77 versus 2.19).  I can reject the null hypothesis that the two means are equal at 
                                                          
25 Masulis and Simisir (2015) explain that the reason why initiation data cannot be found in deals for which SEC 
documents are available is the complicated nature of the deal.  The most labor intensive aspect of this study was 
identifying the chronological order of the negotiation procedure and specific party that initiated the process.   
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conventional levels (the t-statistics are 1.66 and -2.53, respectively).  However, I find no relation 
between negotiation procedure and the target firm’s level intangible assets.   
 
Table 1: Mean Target Firm Characteristics 
 
Mean Target Firm Characteristics sorted by Sales Procedure 
 
The table presents the means and standard deviations of firm characteristics for subsamples split according to the 
target’s choice of sales procedure, together with t-ratios for the differences between the averages for the two 
categories. Panel A reports results for the sample of auctions, while Panel B shows the summary statistics for the 
sample of target firms that choose a controlled sale and initiate contact with the acquirer.  P/Ei,t is the ratios of 
year-end stock price to earnings per share.  Leveragei,t, is the ratio of long-term debt to equity.  All variables, 
Intangible, RD-Investment is measured as a fraction of the book value of total assets, Debt-Ratio, Tobin’s Q, M/Bi,t, 
P/Ei,t, Leveragei,t, ROAi,t, ROEi,t, represent targets only.  Panel C reports the difference in means while t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses.  ** and * denote significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively.   
 
 
         
Panel A Auction  (N=137)       
         
 Intangible R&D Debt-Ratio Q M/B P/E Leverage ROA 
Mean 0.132 0.136 0.2596 0.770 1.154 10.79 -5.045 0.070 
Std. Dev. 0.179 0.198 0.3263 1.523 34.74 17.28 53.771 0.212 
         
Panel B Target-Acquirer(151)       
Mean 0.126 0.123 0.1945 2.187 4.39 22.62 0.106 0.053 
Std. Dev.  0.187 0.153 0.2261 5.133 6.86 66.05 2.339 0.225 
         
Panel C Difference in Means       
Difference 0.005 0.012 0.0652** -1.417** -3.236 -11.83 -5.15 0.016 
t-statistic (0.197) (0.35) (1.663) (-2.52) (-1.59) (-1.46) (-0.97) (0.43) 
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Table 2 contains parameter estimates for the econometric models concerning the relation 
target deal motivations and the choice of sales procedure.  To test the hypothesis that target 
managers are less likely to use an auction in the presence of information costs, I apply the logit 
model below.  The signs of the estimated coefficients and the relevant p-values should provide 
clear suggestions about the relation between target deal motivations and the likelihood of using an 
auction.  In order to analyze the determinants of a target-firm manager’s sales procedure, I use a 
restricted sample of only those mergers which begin with either an auction or a target-to-acquirer 
initiation. 
Likelihood of Sales Procedure {
𝐴𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 1;
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 = 0
= ∫(𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) 
Target-firm managers are more likely to initiate an auction when the firm has a high debt 
ratio, a large R&D expense, and a high return on equity (ROE).  Target-firm managers are more 
likely to initiate a target-to-acquirer negotiation when the target firm has a high P/E ratio, and the 
target-firm managers cite either access to capital or enhance product development as a deal 
motivation.  The results support the information cost hypothesis (H1), with the exception of the 
coefficient for the R&D expense variable.  My prior expectation is that target firms with a large 
investment in intangible assets would be more likely to initiate a target-to-acquirer negotiation. 
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Table 2: Logistic Regression of Sales Procedure 
 
Logistic Regression – Target auction equals 1, Target-to-acquirer sale = 0 
 
The table reports the results from estimating the following equation. 
 
Likelihood of Sales {
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑒 (𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 − 𝐴𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) = 1;
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑒 (𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟) = 0
= ∫(𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) 
The dependent variable Sales Procedure is an indicator variable capturing the mergers in which acquirers 
initiate contact and zero if the target initiatives contact.  
 
Table 2 provides the results of logistic regressions of the choice of sales procedure.  There are 215 target 
initiated deals, 100 of which are auctions and 115 of which involve one-on-one deals that are initiated by 
the target.   The determinants of sales procedure are deal motivations cited by target firm managers as 
reasons for the merger in SEC filings.  The p-values in brackets are for a two tailed test. 
 
  Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Constant 0.602 [0.627] 2.144 [0.172] 
Debt-Ratio Tar 7.499* [0.084] 8.958* [0.091] 
P/E Tar -0.018 [0.240] -0.020* [0.098] 
M/B Tar -0.219 [0.307] -0.355 [0.160] 
R&D Tar 6.616* [0.058] 9.378* [0.058] 
Intangibles Tar -3.654 [0.345] -5.984 [0.183] 
ROE Tar 3.173* [0.071] 5.030* [0.055] 
Mkt-Cap Tar -0.002 [0.172] -0.002 [0.213] 
TM Access Capital -2.769** [0.029] -2.824** [0.024] 
TM Increase Liquidity 0.045 [0.971] -0.010 [0.994] 
TM Manufacturing 1.113 [0.576] 1.287 [0.524] 
TM Enhance Development -2.061* [0.068] -2.578* [0.058] 
TM Customer-base -0.120 [0.914] 0.152 [0.893] 
TM Economies Scale 1.856 [0.123] 1.988 [0.136] 
     
Pseudo R2 0.451  0.479  
N 294  294  
Target Industry Fixed Effects No  Yes  
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3.2.2 Acquirer-to-Target vs. Target-to-Acquirer 
  My sample contains 283 mergers in which the acquiring-firm managers initiate the 
negotiation, and 115 mergers in which the target-firm managers initiate the negotiation by 
approaching only the acquiring firm (I refer to this negotiation procedure as a controlled sale).  
Table 3 reports the results of difference in means tests for the 398 acquiring and target firms 
involved in one-on-one negotiations.  Panels A, B and C show the results for the acquiring firms.  
When compared to acquiring firms that are approached by the target-firm managers, acquiring 
firms that initiate the negotiation have higher R&D expenses, and lower intangible asset, leverage 
and market-to-book (P/B) ratios.  When compared to target firms that are approached by the 
acquiring-firm managers, target firms that initiate the negotiation have lower q ratios.  These 
preliminary results suggest that acquiring-firm managers who initiate mergers face lower growth 
prospects, but target-firm managers who initiate mergers face higher growth prospects.   
     [Insert Table 3 Initiation Here: Ratios of Acquirer-Target vs. Target-Acquirer] 
In order to tests the initiation hypothesis; I use a Logit model to test the determinants of 
merger initiation.  The model includes the acquiring- and target-firm managers’ deal motivations, 
firm characteristics, and dummy variables to control for industry fixed affects.  The dependent 
variable takes a value of 1 for acquirer-to-target negotiations and 0 for target-to-acquirer 
negotiations.   
Likelihood of Initiation {
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 = 1;
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 = 0
= ∫(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) 
  
Table 4 (Panel A) shows the results two model specifications using only the firm-level 
characteristics.  Model [1] uses only the firm-level characteristics.  Model [2] uses firm-level 
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statistics with both acquirer and target industry fixed effects.  Key determinants of target-to-
acquirer negotiations are a high market-to-book ratio and q-ratio for the acquiring firm, and a high 
P/E ratio for the target firm.  The results suggest that target-firm managers tend to initiate mergers 
when the acquiring and target firms operate in high growth industries. 
Table 4 (Panel B) shows the results when I add the acquiring- and target-firm managers’ 
deal motivations to the model.  When the acquiring-firm managers cite access to capital as a deal 
motivation, the target-firm mangers are more likely to initiate the negotiation.  When the target-
firm managers cite the access to the acquiring-firm’s customer base as a deal motivation, the 
acquiring-firm managers are more likely to initiate the negotiation.  Surprisingly, gaining access 
to the other firm’s technology do not imply a particular negotiation procedure.  These results 
provide some evidence for H2, particularly as the hypothesis relates to target firms with large 
growth opportunities.  
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Table 3: Mean Firm Characteristics sorted by the Choice of Initiation  
The table presents the means and standard deviations of firm characteristics for subsamples split according to 
the initiating party in the negotiation process, together with t-ratios for the differences between the averages 
for the two categories. Panel A reports results for the sample of mergers initiated by the acquirer, while Panel 
B shows the summary statistics for the sample of target firms that choose a controlled sale and initiate contact 
with the acquirer.  All variables, Intangible, R&D-Intensity, Debt-Ratioi,t, Tobin’s ɋ, M/Bi,t, P/Ei,t, Leveragei,t, 
ROAi,t, ROEi,t, have been previously defined.  Panel C reports the difference in means while t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses.  ** and * denote significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively.  Panels D, E, 
and F follow the same format for target firm characteristics.   
Acquirer Ratios Intangible R&D (Acq) ɋ(Acq) M/B(Acq) P/E(Acq) Leverage ROA(Acq) 
Panel A: Acquirer-Target        
Mean 0.154 -0.006 -2.438 4.759 24.5380 0.513 0.1016 
Std. Dev. 0.168 0.026 7.394 8.981 125.4187 1.361 0.2129 
        
Panel B: Target-Acquirer       
Mean 0.178 -0.009 -2.802 6.130 49.6051 0.879 0.1279 
Std. Dev. 0.199 0.037 5.892 13.038 167.5215 2.971 0.1580 
        
Panel C: Difference Test       
Difference -0.024 0.004 0.363 -1.371 -25.0671 -0.365 -0.0262 
t-statistic (-1.02) (0.947) (0.421) (-1.076) (-1.468) (-1.52) (-0.881) 
        
Target Ratios Intangible R&D (Tar) ɋ (Tar) M/B(Tar) P/E(Tar) Leverage ROA(Tar) 
Panel D: Acquirer-Target        
Mean 0.117 -0.001 -1.505 3.5864 16.2763 0.1941 0.0310 
Std. Dev. 0.163 0.008 2.413 8.2796 72.2815 4.2428 0.3131 
        
Panel E: Target-Acquirer       
Mean 0.126 -0.002 -2.187 4.3899 22.6289 0.1066 0.0535 
Std. Dev. 0.187 0.008 5.133 6.8686 66.0543 2.3394 0.2252 
        
Panel F: Difference Test       
Difference -0.009 0.0007 0.6827** -0.8035 -6.3525 0.0875 -0.0224 
t-statistic (-0.431) (0.564) (1.715) (-0.877) (-0.714) (0.198) (-0.552) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
84 
 
Table 4: Logistic Regression of the Choice to Initiate  
Logit Regression – Acquirer-to-target equals 1, Target-to-acquirer sale = 0 
 
The table reports the results from estimating the following equation . 
 
Likelihood of Initiation {
𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡) = 1;
𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟) = 0
= ∫(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠) 
The dependent variable Initiation is an indicator variable capturing the mergers in which 
acquirers initiate contact and zero if the target initiates contact.   There are 398 observations.  
Acquirers initiate contact 283 and targets initiate a controlled sale 115 times.  
 
Panel A: Initiation     
Acquirer to Target     
Target-Acquirer     
  Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Constant 1.650 [0.486] 3.315 [0.335] 
M/B Acq -1.002 [0.057] -1.006 [0.060] 
P/E Acq -0.004 [0.424] -0.005 [0.314] 
Debt-Ratio Acq 9.626 [0.267] 6.978 [0.470] 
ɋ-ratio Acq -1.623 [0.055] -1.644 [0.054] 
ROA Acq -10.222 [0.473] -13.956 [0.341] 
ROE Acq 5.968 [0.465] 9.232 [0.324] 
R&D Acq -9.336 [0.532] -14.185 [0.407] 
Intangibles Acq 3.792 [0.484] 2.676 [0.623] 
M/B Tar -0.159 [0.725] -0.327 [0.537] 
P/E Tar -0.015 [0.082] -0.018 [0.062] 
Debt-Ratio Tar -0.994 [0.846] -0.900 [0.861] 
ɋ-ratio Tar -0.046 [0.940] -0.243 [0.727] 
ROA Tar -0.110 [0.989] 0.366 [0.965] 
ROE Tar -0.192 [0.970] -0.810 [0.879] 
R&D Tar. 7.349 [0.384] 8.818 [0.353] 
Intangibles Tar -0.529 [0.912] -2.432 [0.662] 
N 398  398  
Pseudo R2 0.327  0.301  
Acquirer. Industry F.E. No  Yes  
Target Industry F.E. No  Yes  
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Panel B:  
 
Likelihood of Initiation {
𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡) = 1;
𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟) = 0
= ∫(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠) 
Panel B:        
        
  Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
 Constant 1.455 [0.152] 2.104 [0.070] 1.888 [0.044] 
Acquirer  M/B Acq -0.478 [0.020] -0.519 [0.014] -0.353 [0.020] 
Ratios P/E Acq -0.004 [0.135] -0.005 [0.115] -0.004 [0.122] 
 Debt-Ratio Acq 5.070 [0.101] 5.933 [0.068] 3.747 [0.095] 
 ɋ-ratio Acq -0.818 [0.047] -0.920 [0.033] -0.668 [0.039] 
 ROA Acq 0.176 [0.922] 0.129 [0.943]   
 Intangibles Acq 3.945 [0.202] 4.183 [0.184] -2.209 [0.228] 
Target M/B Tar 0.003 [0.919] 0.009 [0.756] -0.006 [0.854] 
Ratios P/E Tar -0.016 [0.070] -0.017 [0.058] -0.006 [0.041] 
 Debt-Ratio Tar -0.069 [0.973] -0.785 [0.717] -0.704 [0.660] 
 ɋ-ratio Tar 0.217 [0.224] 0.250 [0.200] 0.177 [0.243] 
 ROA Tar -0.749 [0.608] -0.730 [0.619]   
 Intangibles Tar -4.917 [0.033] -5.436 [0.024] -2.209 [0.228] 
Acquirer  AM Access Capital -0.637 [0.459] -0.698 [0.441] -1.043 [0.096] 
Motivations AM Technology 0.156 [0.872] 0.090 [0.927] 0.093 [0.898] 
 AM Customer base -0.353 [0.663] -0.307 [0.714] -0.126 [0.825] 
Target  TM Access Capital -0.109 [0.877] -0.050 [0.944] 0.360 [0.487] 
Motivations TM Technology -0.811 [0.454] -0.784 [0.472] -0.949 [0.221] 
 TM Customer base 2.102 [0.023] 2.196 [0.019] 1.160 [0.059] 
        
 Pseudo R2 0.247  0.259  0.19  
 Industry FE No  Yes  Yes  
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4. WEALTH EFFECTS 
4.1 Value Creation  
In order to be included in the sample, the total gain that accrues to acquiring- and target-
firm shareholders as a result of an acquisition, %Gain, must be value-increasing.  On the other 
hand, %_gain is related negatively to the presence of adverse signaling.  I calculate the expected 
gain or loss (%Gaini) for each acquisition by examining the change in acquiring and target-firm 
shareholder wealth.  I calculate the combined abnormal “dollar” returns (%Gaini), shown in 
Equation 1,  by summing the abnormal dollar change for the acquirer ( MAViA) and the abnormal 
dollar change for the target ( MAViT).  I calculate (Gaini = ΔMAViA +  ΔMAViT ) where 
superscripts “A” and “T” refer to the acquiring and target firms, respectively, where ΔMAViA = the 
market-adjusted change in the acquiring-firm’s value over the period t=-5 days to t=+5 days.  Day 
t=0 refers to the announcement date reported in the SDC database.26   
 
𝛥𝑀𝐴𝑉𝑖
𝐴 = [ ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡 )
+5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
−5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
−  ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑚𝑡 )
+5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
−5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
]    (𝑃𝑖𝑡=−6 )(𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡=−6 ) 
     
                                                          
26 Pi,t=-6 is the common stock price of acquiring firm i on day t =-6; Rit is the return for acquiring-firm i on day t; Rit 
is the return on the CRSP value-weighted index (NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq) on day t; and NSi is the number of common 
shares outstanding for firm i on day t=-6. 
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𝛥𝑀𝐴𝑉𝑖
𝑇 = [ ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡 )
+5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
−25 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
−   ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑚𝑡 )
+5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
−25 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
]    (𝑃𝑖𝑡=−26 )(𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡=−26 ) 
     
   ΔMAViT = the market-adjusted change in the target-firm’s value over the period t = -25 
days to t = +5 days (the calculation is similar to ΔMAViA, but I measure the market capitalization 
on day t = -26).  The estimation of ΔMAViT can be understated if the acquiring firm’s offer follows 
other takeover-related announcements involving the target firm.  I search the Wall Street Journal 
Index to identify disclosures that occur within twelve months of day t=0.  I also analyze the 
negotiating process disclosed in the SEC filings.  I calculate the percentage gain (%Gain) for each 
merger as follows. 
%Gaini = Gaini / [(MVeq)A + (MVeq)T] 
 
4.1.2 Value Distribution 
  
While most merger studies analyze the CAR (cumulative abnormal return), this study analyzes 
dollar gains.  Ahren (2012) explains that making inferences about bargaining power from percentage returns 
and premiums is misleading because acquirers are typically much larger than targets.   I calculate dollar 
gains by multiplying the compounded return by the pre-merger market-capitalization.  In order to analyze 
the acquirer’s portion of the combined gain, I focus the sample on the mergers classified as value-increasing.  
There are 312 mergers in which the combined change in value is greater than 4%.   
Acquirer% = ΔMAViA / Gaini 
Ahren and Sosyura (2014, JF) explain that using dollar values, as opposed to abnormal 
returns, allows us to account for the large difference in the sizes of the market value of equity of 
acquirers and targets that is common in most mergers.  While much of the literature has focused 
on abnormal percentage returns, Malatesta (1983) and Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) 
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explain that doing so does not capture the change in wealth.  Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003) compute 
the bidder’s share of the combined abnormal wealth gain from the takeover to analyze the impact 
of financial advisors.  When the combined wealth gain is positive (i.e. value-increasing), Kale et 
al. (2003) define the abnormal wealth gain to the bidder divided by the combined wealth gain to 
the target and bidder.    
Ahren (2012) explains that only when both acquirer and target gains are positive, can the 
distribution of gains be thought of as “splitting a pie”.   Using this intuition, I examine the 
distribution of wealth in value-increasing mergers.  In this table, value-increasing mergers are 
defined as those in which the combined market value of equity for the acquirer and target are 
positive.  Consequently, I focus one portion of the analysis on mergers in which both parties have 
a positive change in shareholder wealth.   
4.2 Acquirer% in Value-Increasing Mergers 
4.2.1 Acquirer% and Negotiation Procedure  
Based upon the descriptive analysis and theoretical foundations, I believe that the 
distribution of shareholder wealth will be disproportionate among the five negotiating procedures.  
I hypothesize that, ceteris paribus, target-initiated deals are more likely to lead to acquiring-firm 
shareholders gaining a disproportionate share of the combined increase in shareholder value.  On 
the other hand, I predict that target-firm shareholders will capture more of the gain when acquiring 
firms initiate a deal.  
Table 5 examines Acquirer% across the negotiating procedures for the 312 value-
increasing sample mergers.  I find that auctions provide the winning bidder with the greatest share 
of the combined gain.  Acquiring-firm shareholders receive approximately 71.1% of the combined 
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gain on average in auctions.  On the other hand, acquiring-firm shareholders receive only 37.3% 
of the combined gain on average when target-firm managers initiate merger negotiations.  Masulis 
and Simsir (2015) find that when target firms decide to sell themselves without prior solicitation, 
the target shareholders receive significantly lower premiums.  However, the results of table 5 
suggest that the aforementioned finding of Masulis and Simsir (2015) might be driven more by 
auctions, than a controlled sale initiated by the target.  
 
Table 5: Acquirer% and Negotiation Process 
This table summarizes wealth distribution with respect to five negotiating procedures. Acquirer% represents 
the acquirer portion of wealth creation in mergers where the combined increase in wealth is greater than 
four percent.  I use SEC filings to identify five mutually exclusive negotiating procedures: acquirer-to-
target, target-to-acquirer, target-firm managers initiate an auction, mutual discussions between the 
acquiring- and target-firm managers, or a third party begins the process by making a bid for the target firm.  
Each subsample is tested against the null that Acquirer% in that subsample is equal to zero.  t-values are 
reported in parentheses and significance levels are denoted by an asterisk, * for 10%, ** for 5%, and *** 
for 1 %.   
Table 5: Acquirer%   
 
Negotiation N Mean Std. Dev. Median 
Acquirer-to-Target 126 31.52%*** 58.72% 41.75% 
  (7.218)   
Target-to-Acquirer 54 37.28%*** 53.81% 49.31% 
  (5.643)   
Auction 39 71.13%*** 47.21% 77.38% 
  (9.391)   
Mutual Discussion 75 39.96%*** 43.75% 37.64% 
  (7.858)   
Third-Party 18 50.91%*** 57.66% 75.97% 
  (3.355)   
Full Sample 312 40.61%*** 54.29% 45.17% 
  (14.279)   
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Consistent with the predictions; acquirers sacrifice the most wealth when they initiate 
contact in a merger.  Acquiring-firm shareholders receive approximately 31.5% of the division of 
gains.   In support of conjectures about the relation between synergy and mutual discussion, wealth 
is, acquirers are able to capture 39.9% of wealth, when the negotiation begins with mutual 
discussion.  Interestingly, acquirers are able to capture 50.9% of wealth when a third-party initiates 
the merger.   
4.2.2 Acquirer% and Deal Motivations 
Table 6 (Panel A) shows the results of t-tests for the mean difference in Acquirer% 
classified by the acquiring-firm managers’ deal motivations.  When the acquiring-firm managers 
cite the target firm’s manufacturing expertise as a motivation, the acquiring-firm shareholders 
capture 23.2% of the combined gain.  When the acquiring-firm managers do not cite this 
motivation, the acquiring-firm shareholders capture 44.3% of the combined gain.  The mean 
difference is -21.2% (= 23.2% – 44.3%), which is significant at the 1% level (the t-statistic is equal 
to -2.71).  Consistent with the bargaining power hypothesis (H3, H5 and H6), acquiring-firm 
managers lose bargaining power when they cite operating, financing, and marketing motivations 
for merging with the target firm (e.g., cost savings, increasing liquidity, access to capital, and 
combining sales).     
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Table 6: Acquirer% by Deal Motivations  
This table provides the results of differences tests of the means of Acquirer% in mergers that include 
or do not include citations for the relevant deal motivations.  The deal motivations are cited by 
mangers in SEC filings, under reasons for the merger.  Panel A shows the acquirer deal motivations 
and panel B reports the target deal motivations.  The p-values (2-tailed) are for t-statistics of 
differences are based on t-test of the means.     
Table 6: Panel A:      
   Acquirer%   
Acquirer Motivations   N Mean Difference t-stat Sig. (2-tailed) 
       
AM Target Technology 1 134 42.73 5.74 0.896 0.371 
 0 163 36.99    
       
AM Enhance New Product  1 102 40.56 1.52 0.226 0.821 
 0 194 39.04    
       
AM Manufacturing Expertise 1 60 23.18 -21.15 -2.712 0.007 
 0 237 44.32    
       
AM Cost Savings 1 184 33.72 -17.13 -2.653 0.008 
  0 113 50.85    
       
AM Increase Liquidity 1 41 08.36 -36.34 -4.035 <0.001 
 0 256 44.70    
       
AM Access Capital 1 63 20.10 -23.98 -3.161 0.002 
 0 231 44.09    
       
AM Use NOL 1 5 31.06 -8.77 -0.354 0.724 
  0 293 39.83    
       
AM Expand Customer Base 1 148 42.92 6.43 1.012 0.312 
 0 150 36.49    
       
AM Size for Large Customers 1 43 33.36 -7.38 -0.816 0.415 
 0 255 40.75    
       
AM Combine Sales 1 69 26.20 -18.50 -2.520 0.012 
  0 243 44.71    
       
AM Existing Relation 1 37 41.43 1.18 0.122 0.903 
 0 254 40.25    
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Table 6: (cont.) Panel B:      
   Acquirer%   
Target  Motivations   N Mean Difference t-stat Sig. (2-tailed) 
       
TM Technological Expertise  1 94 40.98 1.11 0.162 0.871 
  0 203 39.87    
       
TM Enhance Product Development 1 170 34.13 -14.62 -2.274 0.024 
 0 125 48.75    
       
TM Manufacturing Expertise 1 60 19.43 -26.08 -3.339 0.001 
  0 236 45.50    
       
TM Access to Capital 1 161 39.00 -4.28 -0.668 0.505 
  0 132 43.28    
       
TM Increase Liquidity 1 108 41.27 1.21 0.182 0.856 
  0 186 40.06    
       
TM Low Financial Performance 1 35 42.43 2.20 0.222 0.824 
  0 258 40.23    
       
TM Severe Financial Problems 1 9 79.21 40.06 2.167 0.031 
  0 283 39.15    
       
TM Industry Consolidation 1 105 34.79 -8.87 -1.329 0.185 
  0 188 43.66      
 
 
 
Table 6 (Panel B) shows the results for the merger motivations cited by the target-firm 
managers.  In contrast to the results for acquiring-firm managers, target-firm managers gain 
bargaining power when they cite operating motivations for mergers.  The acquiring-firm 
shareholders receive 34.1% of the combined gain on average when the target-firm managers cite 
enhancing product development as a motivation, but acquiring-firm shareholders receive 48.8% 
of the gain when managers do not cite this motivation.  Target-firm shareholders also capture 
more of the gain, when the target-firm managers cite manufacturing expertise as a motivation.  
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Neither result supports the bargaining power hypothesis (H3 and H6).  However, I do find results 
consistent with H5 (externally-oriented managers lose bargaining power).  Target-firm managers 
lose bargaining power when they cite severe financial problems as a motivation.  Acquiring-firm 
shareholders receive 79.2% of the combined gain on average when target-firm managers cite 
severe financial problems as a motivation.  Acquiring-firm shareholders receive 39.2% of the 
combined gain on average when target-firm managers do not cite this motivation.  However, 
relatively few target-firm managers cite this motivation (9 mergers). 
 
4.3 Merger Outcomes 
 
4.3.1 Outcome Distribution by Deal Motivations 
Table 7 provides a frequency of deal motivations classified by merger outcome.  I classify 
the merger motivations into four categories: operating, marketing, financial, and other.  The 
acquiring-firm deal motivations in are shown in Panel A.  The most frequently cited operational 
motivations for acquirers are attaining the target firm’s technological expertise (336 mergers (out 
of 705 total sample mergers), cost savings (335), enhance product development (250), and 
attaining the target firm’s manufacturing expertise (101).  The most common marketing 
motivations are a desire to expand the customer base (309) and to combine products (235).  The 
desire to access capital (123) and increase shareholder liquidity (85) are the most frequently-cited 
financial motivations.   
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Table 7: Merger Outcomes and Deal Motivations 
This table reports the distribution of deal motivations among the five merger outcomes.  The deal 
motivations are cited by mangers in SEC filings, under reasons for the merger.  Panel A shows the acquirer 
deal motivations and panel B reports the target deal motivations.  The mergers are sorted on the combined 
wealth creation and distribution.  Value-increasing mergers are defined as those with a %Gain > 4%.  The 
three value-increasing merger outcomes are sorted on the distribution of wealth: Capturing 
(Acquirer%>.50), Sharing (.50>Acquirer%>0), Over-paying = (Acquirer%<0), which are reported in 
columns [2], [3], and [4] respectively.   The neutral mergers have a negligible %Gain (4% > %Gain > -4%) 
and merger outcome signal represents value-decreasing mergers where both firms lose wealth (%Gain < -
4%). 
 
Table 7:        
Panel A: Acquirer Motivations       
        
  Acquirer Motivations Tota
l 
Capture Share Overpay Neutral Signal 
Operating       
 Target Technology 336 66 45 23 78 124 
 Cost Savings 335 71 80 33 68 83 
 Enhance New Product 250 48 37 17 64 84 
 Manufacturing Expertise 101 18 28 14 20 21 
 Target Management 74 8 14 6 20 26 
Marketing       
 Expand Customer Base 309 73 54 21 59 102 
 Combine Products 235 55 35 11 57 77 
 Combine Sales/Distribution 172 25 27 17 52 51 
 Size Large Customers 130 17 20 6 40 47 
 Purchasing Power 54 8 12 5 13 16 
 Particular Customer 36 9 9 3 6 9 
 Target’s Better Product 29 2 1 1 11 14 
Financial       
 Access Capital 123 15 33 15 28 32 
 Increase Shareholder 
Liquidity 
85 9 20 12 18 26 
 Target Financial Strength 52 4 12 9 16 11 
 Use Cash 5 0 1 0 2 2 
 Use NOL 7 1 3 1 2 0 
Other       
 Existing Relation 93 17 14 6 33 23 
 International 66 8 12 5 26 15 
 3rd-Party 10 0 0 4 2 4 
 Litigation 10 2 1 2 1 4 
 
 
95 
 
Table 7: (Continued)       
Panel B: Target Motivations       
        
 Target Motivations Total Capture Share Overpay Neutral Signal 
Operating       
 Economies of Scale 344 67 72 31 70 104 
 Technological Expertise 257 45 34 15 68 95 
 Enhance Product Development 237 43 31 19 60 84 
 Industry Consolidation 220 45 42 18 52 63 
 Manufacturing Expertise 106 16 29 15 18 28 
 Acquirer’s Management 88 13 13 6 18 38 
Financial       
 Access to Capital 336 71 65 25 84 91 
 Increase Shareholder Liquidity 245 52 40 16 62 75 
 Lower Financial Performance 70 17 11 7 16 19 
 Cyclicality / Cash-flow volatility 25 4 7 1 6 7 
 Severe Financial Problems 20 7 2 0 4 7 
Marketing       
 Acquirer’s Large Customer-base 249 42 38 17 57 95 
 Distribution Channel 168 17 26 12 56 57 
 Size for Large Customers 152 23 23 7 53 46 
 Purchasing Power 31 3 10 3 8 7 
 Shrinking Market 11 4 4 1 1 1 
Other       
 International Exposure 24 1 2 0 15 6 
 
 
 
Table 7 (Panel B) shows the target-firm managers’ deal motivations.  Typical operating 
motivations include economies of scale or scope (344), technological expertise (257), product 
development (237), and industry consolidation (220).  Among the financial motivations, target-
firm managers cite access to capital (336), a desire to increase target firm's shareholder liquidity 
(245), lower than expected (or weak) financial performance (70), and severe financial problems 
(i.e. default) (20).  Marketing motivations for targets include a desire to access the targets large 
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customer-base (249), the acquirer's sales force and distribution channel (168), and greater size to 
compete for larger customers (70).  
 
4.3.2 Firm-level Characteristics and Merger Outcomes 
 
 Table 8 presents summary statistics (means median, standard deviation, and number of 
observations) for the target and acquirer financial ratios.  Panel A reports the results of acquiring-
firm characteristics classified by merger outcome.  Acquirers who capture wealth have lower levels 
of intangible assets (the mean ratio is 14.8%) than acquirers that overpay (the mean ratio is 21.6%).  
However, acquiring-firm managers that engage in value-capturing mergers have greater leverage 
ratios, market-to-book ratios, and P/E ratios than those that share value or over-pay.     
 Table 8 (Panel B) reports the results of target-firm characteristics classified by merger 
outcome.  There is some evidence that acquiring-firm managers overpay when the target firm has 
a higher intangible asset ratio (the mean is 17.3% for overpaying versus 12.6% for value-
capturing), and a lower P/E ratio (the mean is 4.8 for overpaying versus 13.4 for value-capturing).   
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Table 8: Summary Statistics by wealth distribution categories 
This table presents the means, median, and standard deviation of firm characteristic for the full sample 
and subsamples split according to the division of gains.  The three categories for wealth distribution 
in value-increasing mergers: Capturing (Acq%>.50), Sharing (.50>Acq%>0), Over-paying = 
(Acq%<0).  Panel A shows the acquirer ratios and panel B shows the target ratios.  The firm 
characteristics include ratios: Debt-Ratio is the ratio of debt divided by total assets.  Leverage is long-
term debt divided by total equity.  M/B is the market-to-book ratio.  ROA is the return on assets measure 
by net income divided by total assets.  ROE is the return on assets measure by net income divided by 
total equity.  The Intangible ratio is intangible assets divided by total assets.   
 
Panel A:  Acquirer Ratio       
  Debt-Ratio Leverage M/BAcq P/EAcq ROAAcq Intangible 
Capture (3) Mean 0.203 1.682 6.057 60.952 0.075 0.148 
(n=129) Median 0.197 0.299 3.456 22.740 0.145 0.095 
 Std. Dev 0.183 8.678 15.326 219.414 0.460 0.163 
        
Share (2) Mean 0.231 0.871 4.280 15.565 0.150 0.187 
(n=42) Median 0.149 0.170 2.342 14.047 0.139 0.089 
 Std. Dev 0.230 4.845 8.371 126.334 0.096 0.212 
        
Overpay (1) Mean 0.210 0.776 3.012 23.788 0.104 0.215 
(n=106) Median 0.205 0.336 2.336 16.952 0.149 0.198 
 Std. Dev 0.173 4.034 5.011 76.511 0.197 0.199 
         
Full Sample Mean 0.210 1.211 4.605 39.452 0.096 0.181 
(N=278) Median 0.186 0.298 2.680 17.837 0.147 0.122 
 Std. Dev 0.186 6.687 11.379 164.228 0.347 0.188 
        
Linearity Sig. .749 .297 .042 .081 .568 .011 
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Panel B:  Target Ratios        
 Debt- Ratio Leverage M/B Tar P/ETar ROATar Intangible tar  
Capture (3) Mean 0.201 -2.850 1.565 13.435 -0.019 0.126  
N=129 Median 0.138 0.105 2.053 7.143 0.065 0.057  
 St. Dev. 0.227 41.208 28.180 60.541 0.291 0.167  
         
Share (2) Mean 0.172 -0.162 3.063 23.710 0.112 0.144  
N=42 Median 0.129 0.087 2.139 13.332 0.146 0.059  
 St. Dev. 0.166 4.786 4.703 64.146 0.162 0.209  
         
Overpay (1)  Mean 0.238 -1.383 1.876 4.802 0.112 0.173  
N=106 Median 0.212 0.224 2.236 12.370 0.143 0.096  
 St. Dev. 0.232 11.157 10.550 100.372 0.174 0.199  
          
Full Sample Mean 0.209 -1.852 1.954 12.186 0.048 0.145  
N=278 Median 0.165 0.135 2.149 11.093 0.120 0.068  
 St. Dev. 0.220 28.967 19.930 77.929 0.245 0.187  
         
Linearity Sig. 0.183 0.667 0.886 0.469 (<.001) 0.049  
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4.4 Tests of the Bargaining Power Hypothesis  
 I test the bargaining power hypothesis by constructing a multivariate model.  The 
dependent variable is the percentage of the combined gain that is captured by the acquiring-firm 
shareholders.  The independent variables include the negotiation procedures and firm-level 
characteristics.   Tables 9, 10, and 11 contain the key results of the empirical analysis.  In particular, 
Table 9 depicts the effects of negotiation procedure on the division of gains in value-increasing 
mergers.  The effect of negotiation procedure is investigated in three different models.  The 
estimated coefficients are reported with the respective t-statistics in parentheses.   
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟% =   𝛽
∝
∝ + 𝛽
𝑁
𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽
𝐴𝑀
𝐴𝑀  + 𝛽
𝑇𝑀
𝑇𝑀 + 𝛽
𝐹
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚+ 𝛽
𝐶
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝜀, 
where   N is a vector of five mutually exclusive negotiation variables, 
AM is a vector representing acquirer motivations, 
TM is a vector representing target motivations,  
F is a vector of firm level characteristics, and 
C is a vector of control variables relative to the deal.    
 
Table 9 shows the results for three models.  The estimates for Model 1 indicate that 
acquiring-firm shareholders capture more of the combined gain in acquirer-to-target negotiations 
and less when target-firm managers initiate an auction.  The intercept term reflects a merger that 
begins with mutual discussions between the acquiring- and target-firm managers.  Models 2 and 3 
include firm-level characteristics.  Acquiring-firm shareholders capture more gain in auctions, but 
capture less gain when the acquiring and target firms have high intangible asset ratios.  The models 
have a high R2, but a low adjusted R2 value (which reflects the large number of dependent 
variables). 
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Table 9: Acquirer% by Negotiation and Ratios   
This table presents the estimated coefficients from the following regression.  
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟% =   𝛽
∝
∝ + 𝛽
𝑁
𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽
𝐹
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚+ 𝛽
𝐶
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝜀, 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions with the Acquirer% as the dependent variable.  A vector 
of negotiation procedure variables is included.  Model [2] includes market-cap, the debt-equity ratio D/Ei , 
M/B, and Intangibles for both acquirers and targets.  Model [3] includes a binary variable, Stock, if equity 
was the primary method of payment.   Regression coefficients are reported with t-statistics in parentheses.  
Significance is reported ***, **, and * for significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
Acquirer% Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
  [1] [2] [3] 
(Constant) 36.777 30.219 52.518* 
 (1.218) (1.395) (2.153) 
Acquirer-Target -14.533* 3.881 11.677 
 (-1.700) (0.234) (0.707) 
Target-Acquirer -6.662 21.299 19.395 
 (-0.641) (1.001) (0.879) 
Target-Auction 23.826** 49.834** 50.100** 
 (2.025) (2.245) (2.305) 
Third-Party 6.933 30.610 25.830 
 (0.450) (1.020) (0.896) 
Debt-Ratio Acq  73.408 39.706 
  (1.448) (0.741) 
Intangible Acq  -84.782** -71.178* 
  (-2.227) (-1.852) 
M/B Acq  3.914 3.492 
  (1.474) (1.354) 
Mkt-Cap Acq  0.00582 0.04028 
  (0.916) (-0.985) 
Debt-Ratio Tar  1.842 -4.986 
  (0.048) (-0.137) 
Intangible Tar  -47.197 -83.527* 
  (-1.162) (-1.964) 
M/B Tar  1.404 0.783 
  (1.089) (0.636) 
Mkt-Cap Tar  0.01145 0.00981 
  (-0.467) (1.267) 
Stock (1,0)   -2.328 
   (-0.158) 
N    
Adj. R2 0.044 0.033 0.050 
Acq. Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Tar. Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 10: Sensitivity Analysis of Value-Increasing Classification 
In Panel A, I use 3% as the cut-off for value-increasing mergers and the sample size is 345.  Consistent 
with the previous analysis, I use the 4% cut-off with 327 sample mergers.  In Panel C, I use 5% as the cut-
off for value-increasing mergers and the sample size 290. 
 Panel A: Gain%>3% Panel B: Gain%>4% Panel C: Gain%>5% 
          
 Acquirer% [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
(Constant) 34.*** 35.56*** 45.6*** 39.*** 26.59*** 49.7*** 41.*** 28.68*** 52.6*** 
 (5.575) (3.560) (2.965) (6.563) (2.779) (3.422) (7.514) (3.265) (3.950) 
Acquirer-Target -4.014 -9.017 -9.013 -6.085 -9.325 -9.210 -9.445 -10.366* -10.443* 
 (-0.53) (-1.237) (-1.236) (-0.83) (-1.347) (-1.337) (-1.40) (-1.653) (-1.680) 
Auction 33.1*** 18.676* 18.811** 26.9*** 16.00* 16.333* 24.*** 15.130* 15.614* 
 (3.314) (1.965) (1.978) (2.765) (1.764) (1.809) (2.774) (1.824) (1.897) 
Target-Acquirer -1.334 -5.293 -5.629 -0.631 -7.702 -8.265 6.017 2.792 2.233 
 (-0.14) (-0.598) (-0.635) (-0.07) (-0.908) (-0.979) (0.715) (0.352) (0.284) 
Third-party 16.938 5.240 5.692 7.078 -7.382 -7.128 13.467 -2.260 -2.040 
 (1.277) (0.410) (0.445) (0.540) (-0.589) (-0.571) (1.064) (-0.192) (-0.175) 
Ln(Tar-size)  -19.18*** -16.8***  -20.44*** -15.1***  -18.35*** -12.8*** 
  (-8.04) (-4.719)  (-8.906) (-4.494)  (-8.541) (-4.047) 
Ln(Acq-size)  15.931*** 13.46***  18.151*** 12.51***  16.028*** 10.06*** 
 (6.462) (3.561)  (7.690) (3.512)  (7.238) (3.423) 
Relative-Size  -7.721   -18.041   -18.149 
   (-0.859)   (-2.106)   (-2.375) 
Stock  -3.371 -4.760  1.497 -1.630  3.970 1.003 
  (-0.553) (-0.755)  (0.258) (-0.274)  (0.749) (0.186) 
Cash  -1.761 -3.140  1.496 -1.548  3.077 -0.046 
  (-0.193) (-0.339)  (0.169) (-0.173)  (0.372) (-0.006) 
R2 0.049 0.218 0.219 0.040 0.238 0.249 0.061 0.265 0.280 
Adj. R2 0.039 0.199 0.198 0.029 0.219 0.227 0.049 0.245 0.257 
F-stat 4.788 11.719 10.491 3.609 12.466 11.693 5.033 12.732 12.13 
p-value [.001] [<.001] [<.001] [.001] [<.001] [<.001] [.001] [<.001] [<.001] 
N 345 345 345 327 327 327 290 290 290 
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4.4.1 Sensitivity Analysis  
 I now turn my attention to the sensitivity of Acquirer% to different cut-offs  for identifying 
value-increasing mergers.  Table 10 depicts the results of a sensitivity analysis for different 
definitions of a value-increasing merger.  The results are robust to using 3%, 4%, or 5% as the 
definition of a value-increasing merger.  As the cut-off increases, the impact of using auctions as 
the form of sales procedure decreases.  The acquirer% decreases from 18% at the 3% cut-off, to 
16% at the 4% cut-off, to 15% at the 3% cut-off.     
 According to the estimates of the models using the 5% cut-off, it appears that acquirer-to-
target contact and acquirer% are significantly negatively related.  The result suggests that acquirers 
who contact targets initially sacrifice wealth.  Target size and acquirer size appear to have 
significant impact on the distribution of wealth.  Large acquirers are able to capture more wealth, 
while large targets are able to capture wealth.     
4.4.2 Deal Motivations and Negotiating Procedure 
Table 11 depicts the effects of negotiating procedure and deal motivations on the division 
of gains.  The results of estimated coefficients from OLS regression are reported with the 
respective t-statistics in parentheses.  The model includes binary variables for auctions, acquirer-
to-target contact, target-to-acquirer contact, third-party initiation and the intercept reflects mutual 
discussion.   The model also includes both acquirer and target industry fixed effects.   
According to the estimates of the variables modeled, there is a change in the explanatory 
power of the negotiation variables.  When the deal motivations are included in the regressions, the 
coefficient for acquirer to target initiation becomes significant.  It appears that acquirer initiation 
is significantly negatively related to Acquirer%.   On the other hand, auctions are again shown to 
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be positively linked with the acquirer shareholders’ portion of wealth distribution.    Of the 
acquirer’s deal motivations, a desire to increase liquidity is significantly negatively related to 
Acquirer%.  In regards to the target’s deal motivations, manufacturing expertise is negative and 
significant.   
4.4.3 Acquirer% and Negotiation Procedure  
 Table 12 shows the results for Acquirer% classified by type of negotiation procedure.  For 
example, acquiring-firm shareholders capture a smaller percentage of the gain in auctions when 
the target-firm managers cite increase liquidity and manufacturing expertise as deal motivations.  
Acquiring-firm shareholders also capture a smaller percentage of the gain as the target firm 
increases in size relative to the acquiring firm.  The most consistent explanatory variable is relative 
firm size.     
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Table 11: Acquirer% by Negotiation and Deal Motivations  
This table presents the estimated coefficients from the following regressions: 
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟% =   𝛽
∝
∝ + 𝛽
𝑁
𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒+ 𝛽
𝐴𝑀
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 𝑀𝑜𝑡. + 𝛽
𝑇𝑀
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑡. + 𝛽
𝐶
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝜀, 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions with the Acquirer% as the dependent variable.  The model includes 
binary variables for auctions, acquirer-to-target contact, target-to-acquirer contact, third-party initiation and the 
intercept reflects mutual discussion.  AM and TM represent a vectors of acquirer and target deal motivations, 
respectively.  Cash, is a binary variable if the primary method of payment cash.   Regression coefficients are 
reported with t-statistics in parentheses.  Significance is reported ***, **, and * for significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10%, respectively.  
   
 Acquirer% Coefficient (t-stat) 
(Constant) 66.625** (2.073) 
Acquirer-Target -15.547* (-1.695) 
Target-Acquirer -13.950 (-1.242) 
Auction 20.877* (1.718) 
Third-Party 3.379 (0.213) 
AM Product Development 8.847 (0.906) 
AM Manufacturing Expertise 14.101 (1.101) 
AM Access Capital 5.253 (0.475) 
AM Increase Liquidity -22.747* (-1.870) 
AM Expand Customers 3.433 (0.420) 
AM Large Customers -5.996 (-0.539) 
TM Increase Liquidity -1.392 (-0.170) 
TM Access Capital 2.486 (0.331) 
TM Technology Expertise -4.578 (-0.506) 
TM Manufacturing Expertise -35.184** (-2.605) 
TM Expand Customer base 17.600* (1.925) 
TM Industry Consolidation -10.464 (-1.413) 
Relative Size -32.574*** (-4.068) 
Cash Pay -15.572 (-0.857) 
   
R2 0.475  
Adj. R2 0.218  
Acquirer Industry Fixed Effects Yes  
Target Industry Fixed Effects Yes  
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Table 12: Acquirer% by Negotiation and Ratios   
This table presents the estimated coefficients from the following regressions:  
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟% =   𝛽
∝
∝ + 𝛽
𝐴𝑀
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 𝑀𝑜𝑡. + 𝛽
𝑇𝑀
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑡. + 𝛽
𝐶
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝜀 
where the dependent variable is Acquirer%.  Model [1] includes results of regressions of only Auctions.  Model 
[2] includes acquirer-to-target contact.  Model [3] is for the sample of Target-Acquirer Contact.  Model [4] is 
for Mutual Discussion.  Cash, is a binary variable if the primary method of payment cash.   Regression 
coefficients are reported with t-statistics in parentheses.  Significance is reported ***, **, and * for significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
Acquirer% Auctions Acquirer-Target Target-Acquirer Mutual Discussion 
 n=46  n=150  n=60  N=77  
 [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  
Enhance Product -20.699  3.318  24.502  14.641  
       Development (-0.914)  (0.259)  (1.003)  (1.227)  
AM Manufacture 29.247  -10.893  -8.195  -0.121  
       Expertise (1.185)  (-0.464)  (-0.265)  (-0.008)  
AM Access 22.722  -4.047  30.236  -1.752  
       Capital (0.791)  (-0.253)  (1.254)  (-0.105)  
AM Increase -19.683  -38.613*  -44.039  1.741  
       Liquidity (-0.524)  (-1.905)  (-1.582)  (0.098)  
AM Expand 13.978  -16.568  -43.018**  11.314  
       Customer base (0.844)  (-1.232)  (-2.213)  (0.844)  
AM Size for Large -1.075  -23.399*  69.930  -18.298  
       Customers (-0.055)  (-1.823)  (1.600)  (-1.137)  
TM Increase -38.724**  4.932  42.795**  -8.097  
       Liquidity (-2.297)  (0.397)  (2.190)  (-0.648)  
TM Access  -26.350  -0.010  -27.203  16.611  
       Capital (-1.398)  (-0.001)  (-1.311)  (1.377)  
TM Technological 24.134  12.909  -3.800  -4.860  
       Expertise (1.138)  (0.893)  (-0.169)  (-0.411)  
TM Manufacture -58.636*  -3.975  -52.795  -17.620  
       Expertise (-1.778)  (-0.166)  (-1.661)  (-1.243)  
TM Customer 10.600  18.875  17.498  9.143  
       Expansion (0.432)  (1.337)  (0.887)  (0.747)  
Relative Size -31.770**  -29.741***  -48.500**  -36.086***  
 (-2.304)  (-2.869)  (-2.297  (-3.230)  
Cash Payment -45.228  -2.694  13.382  4.535  
 (-2.236)  (-0.173)  (0.447)  (0.151)  
R2 0.457  0.226  0.459  0.326  
Adj. R2 0.205  0.131  0.224  0.175  
N= 46  150  60  77  
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper extends the literature on wealth distribution in mergers by examining the 
relation between bargaining power, negotiation procedure, and deal motivations.  I find evidence 
to support the bargaining power hypothesis, which states that acquirers are more likely to capture 
wealth in mergers when they possess superior negotiating leverage.  The deal motivations cited by 
both acquiring and target firms provide considerable insight about the division of gains in mergers.  
The negotiation process also plays a vital role in determining wealth distribution.  Consistent with 
earlier studies, I find that larger targets are able to capture more wealth.  
 Testing the relation between deal motivations and the acquirer’s ability to capture wealth, 
I find evidence that informational asymmetry is an important determinant in the division of gains.  
In particular, I find that targets possess superior bargaining power when operating motivations 
such as technological expertise, product development, or manufacturing expertise are the primary 
motivations cited by either the acquirer or target firm’s management for entering the deal.  
Financial motivations are a strong indicator of wealth distribution, but the impact differs among 
acquirers and targets.  When the target firm cites financial distress as a motivation for the merger, 
the acquirer is able to capture wealth.  On the other hand, when the acquiring-firm managers cites 
financial motivations for the merger, such as a desire to increase shareholder liquidity, the 
acquiring-firm shareholders actually sacrifice their portion of gains.  There is also evidence that 
acquirers lose bargaining power when they cite marketing motivations.   
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The negotiation process does play a major role in determining the division of gains in 
mergers.  An insightful finding of this study is that Acquirer% is positively related to auctions.  
This result suggests that the winning bidder in auctions actually captures a substantial portion of 
wealth creation.  In fact, this result is persistent throughout the various analyses and model 
specifications.  There is also evidence that acquirers who initiate contact sacrifice bargaining 
power.  When I use a more stringent cut-off to identify value-increasing mergers, acquirer-to-target 
contact is negative and significant.   
I then relate negotiation procedure to the underlying deal motivations.  By simultaneously 
testing theoretical predictions about sales procedure and bidding strategy, I provide insight into 
the determinants of negotiating procedure in mergers.  I find evidence consistent with the 
information cost hypothesis and predictions of Hansen (2001).  In the presence of information 
costs, a one-on-one negotiation is more likely to be used by the target than a formal auction with 
many bidders.  In particular, when target firms cite technological expertise or a need to enhance 
product development, the target is less likely to use an auction than a controlled sale.   
I conclude that negotiating procedure is a necessary control variable when analyzing the 
division of gains in mergers and managerial deal motivations provide valuable insight about the 
relative bargaining position of firms in a merger.  By analyzing all of the possibilities with which 
merger talks begin, I provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact of negotiating procedure on 
wealth distribution.  Further, I introduce a previously unidentified category of negotiating 
procedure, which I designate as mutual discussion. The novel approach of using managerial is also 
an insightful contribution of this paper.   Based on the results of this analysis, deal motivations 
deserve further attention in studies of bargaining power.   
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My study provides insight into various endogenous and observable aspects of mergers.   
Based on the results of my analysis, acquiring firm managers should be reluctant to engage in 
mergers if the primary motivations for the deal are financially oriented. Acquiring firms should 
also be reluctant to outsource research and development via mergers.  Consistent with rational 
overpayment, the acquirers in my sample sacrifice any wealth creation when seeking to access 
expertise of the target or exclusive products.  Acquiring firms can also benefit from the finding 
that the winning bidder actually captures wealth in value-increasing mergers that begin with a 
target auction.   
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Appendix A: Analysis of Target Sales Procedure:  
 
In order to adequately analyze the choice of sales procedure, it is imperative that I include an 
analysis of target wealth effects.  French and McCormick (1984) and Hansen (2001) predict that target-firm 
shareholders should earn similar returns in auctions and negotiations.  
 
Appendix A: Target Auction compared to Controlled Sale 
 Auction Target-Acquirer    
N=288 n=137 n=151    
 Mean Mean Difference t-stat Sig. 
Target Return [St. Dev.] [St. Dev.]    
CMARt 0.22654 0.29705 -0.07051 -1.503 0.134 
 [0.31382] [0.46042]    
CMAR11tar 0.17818 0.23053 -0.05235 -1.579 0.116 
 [0.24675] [0.27553]    
ΔMAV11tar $56,428.84 $217,675.74 -$161,246.90 -2.740 0.007 
 [$132,104.5] [$621,807.3]    
Mkt-Cap6tar $545,011.62 $1,315,716.91 -$770,705.29 -1.790 0.075 
 [$1,056,692] [$4,553,786]    
CMARtar25 0.22168 0.32092 -0.09924 -1.629 0.089 
 [0.30974] [0.59075]    
ΔMAV26tar $80,093.69 $212,119.19 -$132,025.49 -2.115 0.035 
 [$160,995.2] [$655,546.8]    
MktCap26tar $516,254.56 $1,346,418.25 -$830,163.69 -1.907 0.058 
 [$997,165.7] [$4,616,979]    
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Appendix A (continued): 
Cumulative Market Adjusted Returns (CMAR) for the Target 
CMARt Model [1]  Model [2]  Model [3]  
 Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
(Constant) 0.295*** 18.73 0.359*** 6.593 0.390*** 0.069 
Auction -0.077* -1.861 -0.082* -1.890 -0.076* 0.046 
Target Size     -0.0654 -0.818 -0.0453 0.000 
Stock-Pay     0.026 0.754 0.026 0.038 
Cash-Pay     0.113** 2.002 0.116* 0.065 
Multiple bidders     -0.079* -1.889 -0.091* 0.048 
TM Economies of Scale     -0.010 0.034 
TM Enhance Product Development     0.071* 0.036 
TM Manufacturing Expertise     0.006 0.048 
TM Access Capital     -0.010 0.033 
TM  Increase Liquidity       -0.008 0.035 
TM Low Financial Performance       -0.055 0.055 
TM Expand Customer base       -0.105*** 0.036 
TM Industry Consolidation     0.023 0.036 
Adj. R
2
= 0.009  0.003   0.016  
N = 288  288  288  
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Appendix B: Variable 
Definitions 
  
Variable Description  
Panel A. Dependent Variables   
∆MAVA Change in acquiring-firm shareholder value.  
∆MAVT Change in target-firm shareholder value.  
%Gain The combined change in market value for both 
the acquirer and target shareholders.  
 
Acquirer% The Acquirer’s change in market value, divided 
by the combined change in market value.  
 
Panel B. Negotiation Dummies   
Auction Binary Variable: 1 if the target utilizes an 
auction, 0 otherwise.  
 
Target-to-Acquirer Binary Variable: 1 if the target contacts the 
acquirer, 0 otherwise. 
 
Acquirer-to-Target Binary Variable: 1 if the acquirer initiates 
contact, 0 otherwise. 
 
Third-party Binary Variable: 1 if a third-party initiates 
contact, 0 otherwise. 
 
Mutual Discussion Binary Variable: 1 if the parties begin 
discussions on a mutual platform, 0 otherwise. 
 
Panel C. Strategic Objectives   
 Related mergers have the same 2-digit SIC code  
 Geographic Expansion Related 
 Broaden Product Line Related 
 Increase Market Share Related 
 Vertical Integration Both 
 Diversification Unrelated 
Panel D. Deal Motivations   
 Acquirer Motivations  
 Target Motivations  
Panel E. Main Control Variables   
Target Size Market Capitalization of the Target (at t-26)  
Acquirer Size Market Capitalization of the Target (at t-5)  
Relative Size Target Market-Cap/ Acquirer Market-Cap  
Tobin’s q Ratio Market value of assets over book value:  
(item6 – item60 + item25* item199) / item6 
 
Debt Ratio (Long-term Debt + Current Liabilities) /  
Total Assets 
 
Leverage (Long-term Debt / Total Asset)  
Market to Book The market value of equity divided by the book 
value of equity.   
 
Panel F. Deal Characteristics    
Cash Dummy Variable: 1 for purely cash-financed 
deals, 0 otherwise. 
 
Stock Dummy Variable: 1 for purely stock-financed 
deals, 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix B.2 Distribution of Gains  
   
Acquiring-Firm Managers Cite: Deal Motivations Predicted 
Sign 
Operating Motivations   
 Cost Savings: Economies of Scale (+/-) 
 Better Product (-) 
 Technological Expertise or  (-) 
 New Product Development (+/-) 
 Manufacturing Capability or Expertise  (-) 
 Seasoned Management  
Marketing Motivations   
 Greater Size to Compete for Larger Customers (+/-) 
 Expand Customer-base (+/-) 
 Relationship with Specific Customer (-) 
 International Sales (+/-) 
Financial Motivations   
 Access to Capital (-) 
 Greater Liquidity (-) 
 Quicker use of NOL (+) 
 Use Excess Cash (+) 
   
Target Firm Managers Cite  Predicted 
Sign  
Operating Motivations   
 Cost Savings: Economies of Scale (+/-) 
 Technological Expertise  (-) 
 New Product Development (-) 
 Manufacturing Capability or Expertise  (+) 
 Seasoned Management (+/-) 
Marketing Motivations   
 Greater Size to Compete for Larger Customers (+/-) 
 Expand Customer-base (+/-) 
 Relationship with Specific Customer (+) 
 International Sales (+/-) 
Financial Motivations   
 Access to Capital (+/-) 
 Greater Liquidity (+) 
 Weak Financial Performance (low earnings) (+) 
 Severe Financial Problems (i.e. default) (+) 
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Appendix C: (Panel A) Examples of Operating Motivations for Acquisitions 
1.  Cost savings and / or the opportunity to realize economies of scale. 
 Typical of acquisitions that cite this reason is Fritz Companies’ acquisition of Intertrans 
Corporation.  The Fritz Board believes that the merger not only enhances “Fritz’s position as a 
freight consolidator through economies of scale in consolidating shipments,” but also presents 
“opportunities for further operating leverage by recognizing economies of scale in operating 
costs, thereby presenting opportunities for increased operating margins.”#A (ID #1166) 
2.  Acquiring (or target) firm has a better product 
 When Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) acquired NexGen, the acquiring-firm managers 
indicated that “NexGen’s advanced state of development of its sixth generation (microprocessor) 
design enables AMD to cease activity on its own sixth generation design project and redirect 
those resources to future microprocessor generations.” #C (ID #1426) 
3.  Add acquiring (or target) firm’s seasoned management team to resolve management 
succession. 
 Typical of acquisitions that cite this motivation is Safeway’s acquisition of Vons 
Companies.  The Vons Board noted that “absent the proposed Merger with Safeway, the Vons 
Board would have to resolve plans for senior management succession since Vons’ Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer was scheduled to retire in April 1997, which was the same time Vons’ 
Chief Operating Officer’s employment agreement expired.” #B (ID #1841) 
4.  Acquiring (or target) firm’s technological expertise and / or the opportunity to enhance new 
product  
     development 
Typical of mergers that cite this reason is Tracor’s acquisition of AEL Industries. #D (ID 
# 1403) 
5.  Acquiring (or target) firm’s manufacturing capability 
 Typical of acquisitions that cite this reason is Watson Pharmaceutical’s acquisition of 
Circa Pharmaceuticals.  Watson’s Board notes that “Circa currently has excess production, 
research and distribution facilities, which could be advantageous to the combined company.” #E 
(ID #1215) 
6. Resolve actual or potential litigation. 
 Typical of acquisitions that cite this reason is Boston Scientific Corporation’s acquisition 
of Target Therapeutics.  At the time of the takeover announcement, Boston Scientific was 
fighting a patent infringement lawsuit filed by Target Therapeutics. #F (ID #1937) 
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Appendix C: (Panel B) Examples of Marketing Motivations for Mergers 
1.  Acquiring (or target) firm’s relationship with a particular customer 
 When 3Com Corporation acquired Chipcom Corporation, the acquiring-firm managers 
cited the opportunity “to significantly expand 3Com’s relationship with IBM by improving and 
leveraging the existing Chipcom / IBM strategic relationship.” Note G (ID #1331)  
2.  Greater size to compete for larger customers 
Typical of acquisitions that cite this reason is Collins and Aikman’s acquisition of 
Larizza Industries.  Larizza’s Board cites the preference of automotive original equipment 
manufacturers for suppliers that can “meet increasingly stringent standards for quality, cost and 
full-service capabilities, including design, engineering, product management support and the 
ability to provide complete systems, rather than individual components.  The automotive original 
equipment manufacturers have also begun to prefer suppliers that are able to supply them 
globally.” Note H (ID #1400) 
3. Broaden the acquiring (or target) firm’s customer base  
 Typical of acquisitions that cite this reason is HBO & Company’s (HBOC) acquisition of 
CliniCom Incorporated.  CliniCom’s Board notes that “after entering into the HBOC Agreement 
in December 1993, 29% of CliniCom’s total revenues in 1994 were received through HBOC, and 
revenues from HBOC have represented more than 50% of CliniCom’s revenues in 1995.”  
CliniCom’s Board states that HBOC’s “larger customer base and marketing organization offers 
opportunities for wider distribution of the CliniCom system.”  Note I (ID # 1321) 
4. Gain access to worldwide distribution system 
 Typical of acquisitions that cite this reason is Acclaim Entertainment’s acquisition of 
Lazer-Tron Corporation.  Among other benefits, Lazer-Tron’s Board cites “the potential ability 
to increase international revenues through Acclaim’s broad international distribution and 
marketing network.” 
Note J (ID # 1185)   
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Appendix C (Panel C):  Examples of Financial Motivations for Mergers  
1.  Larger firms have greater access to capital. 
 When Kuhlman Corporation acquired Schwitzer Inc., Kuhlman’s Board anticipated that 
the “combined companies will be able to capitalize on the opportunities available to a much 
larger company in the capital markets.”  Note K (ID # 1179) 
2. Acquiring (or target) firm’s financial strength  
Typical of acquisitions that cite this reason is Richfood Holding’s acquisition of Super 
Rite Corp.  Super Rite’s Board cites “the strong balance sheet and significant cash flow of the 
combined entity, which among other things would enhance the ability of the combined entity to 
fund additional expansion, both of the wholesale business and of the retail business.” Note L (ID 
# 1300) 
3. Target has severe financial problems (e.g., the firm either is currently not in compliance with 
its loan covenants, or is likely to default on its debt obligations in the absence of a merger). 
 Typical of acquisitions that cite this reason is Federated Department Stores’ acquisition 
of Broadway Stores.  Broadway’s Board of Directors considered “the significant risk that, in 
light of limitations on Broadway’s working capital financing and the general weakness in its 
operating results, significant vendors might refuse to ship merchandise for the Fall and Christmas 
seasons and that Broadway might have no recourse to obtain additional working capital 
financing other than in the context of reorganization proceedings under the United States 
Bankruptcy Code.” Note M (ID #1345)   
4. Increase shareholder liquidity 
 Typical of acquisitions that cite this reason is Tidewater’s acquisition of Hornbeck 
Offshore Services.  Hornbeck’s Board suggests that Hornbeck shareholders will benefit as a 
result of the stock swap because of “the greater liquidity provided by Tidewater Common Stock 
with over 60 million shares outstanding following the Merger, compared to over 13 million 
shares outstanding for Hornbeck before the Merger, together with expanded analyst coverage 
and potentially greater investor interest.” Note N (ID #1468) 
5.  Quicker use of NOL 
 Ceridian Corporation’s acquisition of Comdata Holdings illustrates this reason. Note O 
(ID #1361)  
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ESSAY 3: MERGER OUTCOMES AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: DOES BARGAINING 
POWER CHANGE IN THE PRESENCE OF CAPITAL CONSTRAINTS?  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Mis-valuation theory suggests that the over-estimation of synergies by managers and 
investors can drive merger waves.  For example, Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) and 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that merger activity is related positively to stock market 
valuations, and Harford (2005) suggests that merger activity is correlated negatively with changes 
in interest rates.  Eisfeld and Rampini (2003) show that variation in capital liquidity strongly 
impacts the degree of total capital reallocation in the economy.  However, despite the evidence 
about the relation between capital market conditions and the level of merger activity, relatively 
few studies examine how merger waves affect value creation (i.e., the combined gain earned by 
acquiring- and target-firm shareholders) and value distribution (i.e., how managers distribute the 
combined gain between acquiring- and target-firm shareholders).  The recent financial crisis 
(2008-2010) and subsequent recovery (2011-2013) provide a natural experiment for examining 
these issues.  
My study contributes to the literature in three ways.  First, I test whether mergers 
announced during the financial crisis produced larger combined gains for acquiring- and target-
firm shareholders than mergers announced during the pre- or post-crisis periods.  Bouwman, 
Fuller, and Nain (2009) conclude that more disciplined firms make better acquisition decisions 
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during periods of low valuation.  Consistent with their results, I show that the relative percentage 
of value-increasing mergers is correlated negatively with merger activity.27   
Second, I examine how the merging managers’ strategic objectives and deal motivations 
changed as a result of the financial crisis.  I find that the frequency of target firms citing severe 
financial problems is linked to the level of financial market stress.  I also find that, while it is 
difficult for firms to raise external capital, the relative frequency of financial motivations increases 
when compared to operating and marketing motivations.  Third, I test the relation between capital 
availability and the relative bargaining power of the acquiring- and target-firm managers.  I find 
that acquiring-firm managers sacrifice a larger percentage of the combined gain when capital 
market conditions deteriorate.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the hypothesis 
development.  Section 3 describes the sample and method.  Section 4 discusses my results, and 
Section 5 summarizes my conclusions. 
  
                                                          
27 A value-increasing merger refers to a merger that increases the wealth of the acquiring- and target-firm shareholders 
by more than 4% of the combined, pre-merger market capitalizations of the merging firms.  A value-decreasing merger 
refers to a combined loss less than -4%.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Explanations of Merger Waves 
 
The finance literature identifies two primary schools of thought regarding the determinants 
of merger waves: mis-valuation and industry shocks.  The mis-valuation theory suggests that 
managers and investors tend to overestimate the synergies from mergers and acquisitions.  
Consistent with this hypothesis, Nelson (1959) suggests that increases in merger activity are not 
only a phenomenon of prosperity, but also closely related to the state of the capital market.   
Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2009) find that there are about three times as many acquisitions 
during high-valuation markets than during low-valuation markets. 
On the other hand, the neo-classical view suggests that merger waves occur as a result of 
industry restructurings driven by regulatory, technological, and economic shocks.  For example, 
Jovanovic and Rousseau (working paper, 2001) conclude that mergers are explained by changes 
in technology as opposed to changes in anti-trust or regulatory policy.28 
Harford (2005) combines the two views.  He finds that economic, regulatory, and 
technological shocks can drive industry merger waves, but he concludes that capital market 
conditions also play a role.  Whether a particular shock leads to a merger wave depends on capital 
liquidity.  He suggests that high capital market liquidity along with lower financing constraints 
often produce ideal conditions for industry shocks to become merger waves.  The more recent 
theoretical model of Martos-Vila, Rhodes-Kropf, and Harford (2014) suggest that debt mis-
                                                          
28 Other relevant studies include Harford (2005), Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Mitchell and Mulherin (1996). 
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valuation can not only increase merger activity, but also impact the relative frequencies of financial 
and strategic buyers. 
 
2.2 Value Creation and Merger Activity  
 
Rhodes-Kropf and Vishnawanathan (2004) propose a theory that explains why merger 
waves occur during valuation waves.  Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) model both firm-
specific and market-wide components of stock prices, and show that mis-valuation leads to ex post 
mistakes that are correlated with market valuation.  The model suggests that in high valuation 
periods, merger offers appear more attractive so that target-firm managers are more likely to accept 
an offer.  On the other hand, in low valuation periods, targets will accept bids only if the expected 
synergistic benefit is greater than the target-firm’s relatively lower standalone value.  The basic 
intuition is that the best deals from the acquiring-firm shareholders’ perspective are initiated when 
the stock market is depressed, while the worst deals are initiated when the stock market is booming. 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) create a model based on stock market mis-valuation that 
explains the decision to acquire, the choice of payment method, the valuation consequences of 
mergers, and merger waves.  They suggest that bidders succeed at cashing in on the temporary 
market overvaluation of their stocks because target-firm shareholders have a short time horizon.   
 Prior empirical evidence suggests that value creation changes depending on the state of the 
financial markets.  In their analysis of different valuation periods, Bouwman et al. (2009) find that 
regardless of the payment method, acquisitions by low-valuation acquirers outperform those made 
by high-valuation acquirers.  Thus, I expect the proportion of value-increasing mergers will 
increase as merger activity decreases. 
H1 (Value-Creation Hypothesis):  The prevalence of value-increasing mergers is negatively 
correlated with merger activity. 
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2.3 Corporate Strategy 
Previous research suggests that changes in economic conditions can affect acquiring-firm 
managers’ strategic objectives.  For example, Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) suggest that 
there was less hostility in the 1990s and an increase in related acquisitions (same 2-digit SIC).  On 
the other hand, the co-insurance effect introduced by Lewellen (1971) implies that there are 
benefits to a diversification strategy.  By combining uncorrelated activities, a merged firm can 
reduce cash-flow volatility, reduce the risk of default, and also increase the firm’s debt capacity.29   
Consistent with Lewellen’s hypothesis, Gosh and Jain (2000) suggest that merging firms 
can increase their financial leverage as a result of an increase in debt capacity.  Dimitrov and Tice 
(2006) find that diversified firms performed better than focused firms during weak economic 
conditions.  Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2010) also suggest that diversification creates value in 
the presence of a financial crisis because of financing advantages.  Specifically, diversified 
companies’ access to internal capital markets is more valuable with the existence of external capital 
market constraints.  As a result, I hypothesize that the frequency of diversifying mergers should 
increase during the financial crisis.  
H2 (Corporate Strategy Hypothesis): The frequency of un-related (diversifying) mergers 
will increase during the financial crisis. 
 
 
2.4 Deal Motivations 
 
                                                          
29 The merger between Energy Transfer Partners (ETP) and Sunoco illustrates the benefits of diversification as 
perceived by the companies’ managers.  According to the S-4 filing, “ETP believes the merger will diversify its cash 
flow, as the combined company will derive a significant and growing portion of its cash flow from serving the crude 
oil, refined products and NGL markets. Sunoco’s retail business and iconic brand will add another source of stable 
cash flow to ETP’s portfolio.” 
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In order to better understand bargaining power, it is important to identify the underlying 
motivations for the deal.30  As economic conditions change, I expect the distribution of deal 
motivations to change.  Many firms experienced poor performance or even the threat of bankruptcy 
as the economy deteriorated.  Difficult economic conditions reduced firm liquidity and limited 
managers’ ability to raise capital. 
While financial constraints will likely impact the decision to engage in mergers, the periods 
of historically low interest rates following the financial crisis should have the opposite effect.  
Easier access to capital leads to increased liquidity which can reduce transaction costs.  Lipson 
and Mortal (2007) examine the relation between liquidity changes and changes in firm 
characteristics around mergers and acquisitions.  I test whether the financial motivations for 
mergers changed during the financial crisis.   
H3 (Financial Motivations Hypothesis): The prevalence of financially-motivated mergers  
is directly related to capital market cycles.   
 
2.5 Bargaining Power 
 
A number of studies indicate that stock market valuation impacts not only the volume of 
acquisitions (Ang and Cheng, 2006 and Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh, 2006), but also 
the behavior of the participants.  Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) indicate that leverage and hostility 
were high during the 1980s, but decreased during the 1990s.   Officer (2007) finds that acquisition 
discounts are significantly greater when debt capital is relatively more expensive to obtain.  In 
addition, he suggests that acquiring-firm managers often sell overpriced stock to less overpriced 
targets.   
                                                          
30 Leland (2007) suggests that financial synergies by themselves are insufficient to justify mergers, but they can be 
important in special circumstances. 
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I test whether the bargaining power of both acquiring- and target-firm managers changes 
depending on the availability of capital, the level merger activity, and broader economic 
conditions.  I hypothesize that capital market constraints will increase the bargaining power of 
acquiring-firm managers.  However, valuation waves and capital market cycles can affect 
managerial bargaining power in two ways.  First, economic conditions can affect the number of 
competing bidders as only acquirers with a distinct bargaining advantage will choose to engage in 
a merger during periods of low valuation.  The decrease in competition (or perceived competition) 
from other bidders may decrease the target-firm managers’ bargaining power.  Second, the target-
firm managers will have limited bargaining power due to the difficulty they face in raising external 
capital (e.g. Officer, 2007).  Using this intuition, I test the bargaining power hypothesis that the 
acquirer’s negotiating leverage is negatively related to both merger activity and the availability of 
capital.   
H4 (Bargaining Power Hypothesis): The acquiring-firm managers’ bargaining power will be 
related positively with the level of financial stress in the economy.   
 
Similarly, I hypothesize that target-firm managers will lose bargaining power if their firm 
is facing financial distress.  As a result, I propose the access to capital hypothesis, which suggests 
that target-firm managers will have low bargaining power when capital market conditions are weak 
and the managers cite access to capital as a deal motivation.   
H5 (Access to Capital Hypothesis): The target-firm managers’ bargaining power is related 
inversely to financially-motivated deals. 
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3. DATA AND METHOD 
 
3.1 Sample Selection  
The sample consists of 209 mergers announced between January 1st 2004 and December 
31st 2013.  The sample mergers involve publicly-traded, U.S. domiciled firms.  I exclude financial 
institutions and utilities, which eliminates 144 mergers from the sample.  I exclude mergers if 
either the target or the acquirer was involved in another deal within a two-month window of the 
SDC announcement date.  This requirement eliminates 49 deals from the sample.  I exclude 
mergers that lack adequate disclosure in the SEC filings.31 
I use the merger background section of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
EDGAR system to classify the deal motivations of the two parties.  Following studies such as 
Boone and Mulherin (2007), I obtain information on the details of the negotiation procedure for 
each merger by reading the background section of DEFM14A and S-4 filings.   My sample contains 
215 mergers with S-4 filings and 71 mergers with DEFM14A filings, but the Center for Research 
in Securities Prices (CRSP) contains information only for both firms involved in 209 mergers. 
  
3.2 Identification of Valuation Waves & Capital Constraints  
Previous studies have used different methods for defining the financial crisis period.  The 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) considers December 2007 to be the peak period 
prior to the structural break in the economic cycle.32   The trough of the cycle occurred eighteen 
                                                          
31 I exclude all tender offers due to this requirement. 
32Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2010) use the NBER recession to define the financial crisis.   
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months later in June 2009.  Gurtler, Hibbeln, and Winkelvos (2014) use the 4th quarter of 2008 to 
examine the impact of the financial crisis on catastrophe bonds.  Friewald, Jankowitsch, and Subra 
(2012), who analyze the subprime crisis, utilize dummy variables to identify liquidity constraints 
during the Financial Crisis.  Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) find that there was a 79% decrease of 
new loans to large borrowers from the credit boom in 2nd quarter of 2007 to the 4th quarter of 2008.    
My study uses both a periodic analysis and a dynamic approach.  Following Harford 
(2005), I use structural breaks to identify different periods of M&A activity.  Figure 1 shows the 
annual merger and acquisition (M&A) value for U.S. domestic deals during the sample period.  
There is a substantial decrease in merger activity during the Financial Crisis.  Total M & A activity 
of U.S. domiciled firms declined from $1,510 billion in 2007 to $826.4 billion in 2008, a decrease 
of 45.3%.  Similarly, my sample contains 19 mergers in 2007 and 9 mergers in 2008.  As a result, 
I use January 2008 as the beginning of the Financial Crisis.   I also use the St. Louis Fed Financial 
Stress Index (STLFSI) to control for continuous fluctuations in capital market conditions during 
the financial crisis. 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
Figures 1 also shows the increase in merger activity during the recovery period.  For 
example, my sample contains 32 mergers announced during 2012.     
 
3.3 Method 
 I calculate the market-adjusted return for both acquirers and targets.   I calculate the dollar 
change in wealth of the acquiring-firm’s shareholders, ΔMAViA, by computing the market-
adjusted change in the acquiring-firm’s market value of equity over the period t=-5 days to t=+5 
days.  Day t=0 refers to the announcement date reported in the SDC database.  
           Equation (1) 
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𝛥𝑀𝐴𝑉𝑖
𝐴 = [ ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡 )
+5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
−5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
−  ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑚𝑡 )
+5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
−5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
]    (𝑃𝑖𝑡=−6 )(𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡=−6 ) 
 
Pi,t=-6  = the common stock price of acquiring firm i on day t =-6;  
Rit  = the return for acquiring-firm i on day t; 
Rit = the return on the CRSP value-weighted index (NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq) on day t; 
NSit=-6  = the number of common shares outstanding for firm i on day t=-6; and 
ΔMAViT = the market-adjusted change in the target-firm’s equity value over the period t = -25 
days to t = +5 days (the calculation is similar to Equation 1, but I measure the market 
capitalization on day t = -26). 
           
 
          Equation (2) 
 
𝛥𝑀𝐴𝑉𝑖
𝑇 = [ ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡 )
+5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
−25 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
−   ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑚𝑡 )
+5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
−25 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
]    (𝑃𝑖𝑡=−26 )(𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡=−26 ) 
 Table 1 shows the change in performance during the Financial Crisis and the subsequent 
recovery period.  Panel A reports the results for the acquiring firms.  The CMARs of the acquiring 
firms is on average negative and significantly lower during the Financial Crisis.33  For example, 
the mean CMARacq for the 11-day interval [-5, +5] around the announcement date is -4.7% for the 
26 sample mergers announced during the Financial Crisis (2008 – 2010).  The average CMARacq 
is +4.2% for the 57 mergers announced during the post-crisis period (2011 – 2013).  Table 1 also 
reports average firm size (market capitalization) and the dollar changes in wealth.    
 
                                                          
33 In order to analyze the difference in cumulative abnormal returns and cumulative market-adjusted returns, I 
calculate both measures.  Appendix 1 provides descriptive statistics for CMAR acq, CAR acq, CMAR tar , and CAR tar.   
The results and conclusions of my study are not sensitive to the use of either CMAR or CAR. 
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Table 1: Market Adjusted Returns and Dollar Change in Value 
Panel A reports the results for the sample of acquirer firms while Panel B shows the statistics for target firms.  There 
are 209 acquirer and target observations.  Column [1] shows the full sample, column [2] the Financial Crisis period, 
and column [3] the recovery.  The CMAR [-5, +5] and CMAR [-25, +5] represents cumulative market adjusted return 
around the announcement date of the merger (t=0).  
  Full Sample Financial Crisis Post-Crisis    
   (2008-2010) (2011-2013)   
  N=209 n=26 n=57 [2] – [3]   
Panel A: Acquirer Mean Mean Mean Difference t-stat p-value 
Return CMARAcq -0.00689 -0.04703 0.04172 -0.0887 -3.09 0.003 
 [-5, +5]       
 CMARAcq 0.00944 -0.03261 0.05988 -0.0925 -2.27 0.026 
 [-25, +5]       
Size Mkt-CapAcq $17,920,912 $27,774,546 $32,216,487 -$4,441,941 -0.22 0.826 
 [-6]       
 Mkt-CapAcq $17,539,607 $27,341,495  $31,270,748 -$3,929,254 -0.20 0.840 
 [-26]       
Dollar ΔMAVAcq -$451,816 - $1,918,318 - $72,686 -$1,845,632 -2.04 0.044 
 [-5, +5]       
 ΔMAVAcq -$295,654 - $2,067,448       $483,015 -$2,550,463 -2.37 0.020 
 [-25, +5]       
 Sig. (2-tailed) 
Dollars in Thousands 
 
     
 
 
 
Table 1 (Panel B) shows the results for target firms.  Target-firm shareholders earn similar 
CMAR’s during the Financial Crisis (the mean is 29.3% for the 31-day event window [-26, +5]) 
when compared to the post-crisis period (34.7%).  A difference in means test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis that the two means are equal (the p-value is 42.8%).  Although the market capitalization 
of the sample target firms is significantly greater during the Financial Crisis, I do not find a 
significant difference in the average dollar change in target-firm shareholder wealth across the two 
time periods. 
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Table 1: Continued 
  Full Sample Financial Crisis Post-Crisis    
  (2004-2013) (2008-2010) (2011-2013)   
  N=209 n=26 n=57 [2] – [3]   
        
Panel B:  Target Mean Mean Mean Difference t-stat p-value 
Return CMARTar 0.23735 0.23249 0.32317 -0.0906 -1.64 0.104 
 [-5, +5]       
 CMARTar 0.26567 0.29316 0.34691 -0.0537 -0.79 0.428 
 [-25, +5]       
Size MktCap6tar $2,394,462 $4,281,713 $1,420,937 $2,860,775 2.01 0.047 
 [-6]       
 MktCap26tar $2,369,628 $4,196,714 $1,420,589 $2,776,124 2.01 0.047 
 [-26]       
Dollar ΔMAV11tar $351,682 $620,606 $333,270 $287,336 1.27 0.205 
Change [-5, +5]       
 ΔMAV26tar $356,362 $785,427 $327,489 $457,938 1.23 0.221 
 [-25, +5]            
 Sig. (2-tailed) 
Dollars in Thousands 
 
     
 
 
3.3.1 Combined Synergistic Gains (Losses):  
I classify merger outcomes by considering both wealth creation and distribution.  The 
combined gain, Gaini, is equal to the sum of the market-adjusted change in the dollar values of the 
acquiring and target firms.  I calculate the percentage gain (Gain%) for each completed deal by 
dividing Gaini by the combined pre-merger market values of the acquiring and target firms.   
Gain%i = Gaini / [(MVeq)
A + (MVeq)
T] 
Table 2 shows the number of sample mergers per year and the annual mean and median 
Gain%.  For example, the mean Gain% for 2007 is 5.3% when using the 31-day event window [-
25, +5].  The mean Gain% declines to 1.1% in 2008 before increasing to 13.8% during 2012 (the 
recovery period). 
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Table 2: Annual Distribution of the Combined Change in Shareholder Value 
The table reports results of merger characteristics before and after the financial crisis.   Gain represents the combined 
dollar change in value for acquirers and targets (ΔMAVacq + ΔMAVtar).  The variable %Gain is equal to the 
combined change in wealth of the acquirer and target shareholders, divided by the sum of the pre-merger equity market 
value of the firms (MVeqA and MVeqT, respectively).  In the first and second set of results, both firms are measured at 
the [-5, +5] and [-25, +5] windows, respectively.  In the third set of results, the acquirer is measured at the [-5, +5] 
window, while the target is measured at the [-25, +5] window.    
  Gain%   Gain%   Gain%   
  [-5, +5]   [-25, +5]      
Year N Mean Median St. Dev. Mean Median St. Dev. Mean Median St. Dev. 
           
2004 26 1.34% 1.23% 8.61% 5.08% 3.30% 13.1% 1.72% 3.42% 9.81% 
           
2005 35 2.34% 2.20% 8.35% 3.53% 3.19% 12.8% 2.61% 3.07% 9.21% 
           
2006 27 2.80% -0.22% 9.69% 4.95% 3.79% 12.8% 2.76% -0.23% 10.9% 
           
2007 20 5.22% 3.82% 11.2% 5.33% 7.81% 12.7% 5.85% 4.36% 11.3% 
           
2008 9 -0.20% -1.04% 9.07% 1.11% -0.10% 23.8% -0.37% -1.59%  
           
2009 12 1.60% -0.39% 9.35% 4.44% 2.15% 15.6% 2.58% -0.16% 9.99% 
           
2010 5 -1.55% 1.19% 6.48% -0.71% -1.56% 11.3% -0.89% 2.95% 6.46% 
           
2011 12 3.89% 1.19% 15.6% 2.25% -2.40% 15.5% 1.98% -1.07% 16.4% 
           
2012 31 10.61% 6.87% 12.9% 13.80% 12.1% 17.7% 11.40% 6.92% 13.4% 
           
2013 14 6.89% 6.08% 9.80% 6.98% 5.27% 13.9% 6.83% 5.74% 9.51% 
           
All 209 3.94% 2.29% 10.7% 5.75% 3.81% 14.8% 4.27% 3.18% 11.6% 
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3.3.2 Division of Gains (Losses):  
  In order to analyze the distribution of gains in merger, I focus on value-increasing mergers.  
A merger is classified as value increasing if the Gain% is greater than 4%.34  However, the 
classification of value-increasing mergers also depends on the percentage of the total gain that 
accrues to acquiring-firm shareholders (Acquirer %). 
Acquireri % = ( MAViA  / Gaini) x 100 
A merger is value-capturing if the acquiring-firm shareholders receive more that 50% of 
the gain (Acquirer% > 50%) over the eleven-day event window.  An acquisition is value-sharing 
if the acquiring-firm shareholders receive 0% – 50% of the gain (0% < Acquirer%) < 50%).  
Overpaying occurs when the acquiring-firm shareholders lose wealth (i.e.,  MAVA < 0), even 
though the merger is value-increasing.   
3.3.3 Wealth Creation and Distribution during the Financial Crisis 
Table 3 reports statistics of wealth creation during the Financial Crisis and recovery period.  
The combined dollar gain, Gaini, is significantly lower during the Financial Crisis when measured 
by using either the 11- or 31-day event windows.  A difference in means test rejects the null 
hypothesis at the 5% level (the t-statistic is equal to -1.94 when Gain reflects a 31-day event 
window).  Gain% also declines significantly (the mean difference is -7.4% when measured using 
the 31-day event window).  The p-value is 7.1%.   
Table 3 also examines how the managers distribute the combined gain.  However, 
bargaining power (as measured by Acquirer%i) does not change significantly across the two 
periods.  Acquiring-firm shareholders capture about 10.4% of the gain on average before the 
                                                          
34 I use 4% as a subjective cut-off to provide separation between the number of value-increasing and value-
decreasing acquisitions.   
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Financial Crisis (2005 – 2007) and receive 9.1% of the gain on average during the Financial Crisis 
(2008 – 2010).  The mean difference is 1.3%, which is not statistically significant at conventional 
levels (p-value is 0.84). 
 
Table 3: Merger Characteristics  
The table reports results of merger characteristics before and after the financial crisis.   Gain represents the 
combined dollar change in value for acquirers and targets (ΔMAVacq + ΔMAVtar).  The variable %Gain is 
equal to the combined change in wealth of the acquirer and target shareholders, divided by the sum of the 
pre-merger equity market value of the firms (MVeqA and MVeqT, respectively).  The variable Acquirer% 
represents the acquirer portion of wealth creation in mergers where the combined increase in wealth is greater 
than four percent.  The p-values (2-tailed) are for t-statistics of differences are based on t-test of the means.     
 Full Sample Pre-Lehman Post-Lehman    
 (2004-2013) (2005-2007) (2008-2010)    
 N=209 n=91 n=96 [2]-[3]   
 Mean Mean Mean Difference t-stat p-value 
Gaini (dollar) -$108,377 -$1,297,711 $278,901 -$1,576,612 -2.045 0.044 
[-5,+ 5] 
      
Gaini (dollar) $51,260 -$1,282,020 $845,034 -$2,127,054 -1.94 0.056 
[-26, +5] 
      
MVeqA + MVeqT $21,037,579 $32,056,259 $33,455,575 -$1,399,315 -0.068 0.946 
[-6] 
      
MVeqA + MVeqT $20,614,443 $31,538,209 $32,507,249 -$969,040 -0.049 0.961 
[-26] 
      
Gain%i 0.03936 0.00370 0.08282 -0.07913 -2.841 0.006 
[-5,+ 5] 
      
Gain%i 0.05748 0.02299 0.09696 -0.07397 -1.828 0.071 
[-26, +5] 
      
Acquirer% -0.00467 0.03946 0.07472 -0.03526 -3.041 0.003 
[-5,+ 5] 
      
Acquirer% 0.00785 0.10395 0.09135 0.01260 -2.247 0.027 
[-26, +5]  
          
Sig. (2-tailed)       
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3.4 Outcome Distribution  
Table 4 shows the annual distribution of merger outcomes during the study period.  
Although the sample size is relatively small, I do not find strong evidence to support H1 (the value-
creation hypothesis).  I classify 42.9% of my sample mergers as value-increasing in 2006 – 2007, 
and 42.3% of my sample mergers as value-increasing in 2008 – 2009 (the Financial Crisis period).  
I find the largest percentage of value-increasing mergers (61.5%) during the recovery period (2012 
– 2013).  On the other hand, I do find a disproportionately large number of value-decreasing 
mergers during the 2008 – 2011 period.  This category increases from about 18% during 2004 – 
2007 to 26% during 2008 – 2011.  I use a chi-square test of independence to test the null hypothesis 
that merger outcomes are independent of time period.  I reject the null hypothesis at the 0.08 level 
(the chi-square statistic is equal to 26.9). 
Table 4 (Panel B) shows the distribution of wealth for my subsample of 94 value-increasing 
mergers.  My sample contains only 10 value-increasing mergers during 2008 – 2011, so it is 
difficult to draw strong conclusions.  However, I do test the null hypothesis that the distribution of 
the gain captured by acquiring-firm shareholders (Acquirer%i) is independent of the time period.  
The chi-square statistic is 9.5, which is not significant at conventional levels.  As a result, the 
results in Table 4 do not support the H4 (the Bargaining Power Hypothesis). 
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Table 4: Annual Distribution of Merger Outcomes  
Gain represents the combined dollar change in value for acquirers and targets (ΔMAVacq + ΔMAVtar).  In 
Panel A, the variable %Gain is equal to the combined change in wealth of the acquirer and target 
shareholders, divided by the sum of the pre-merger equity market value of the firms (MVeqA and MVeqT, 
respectively).  In Panel B, the variable Acquirer% represents the acquirer portion of wealth creation in 
mergers where the combined increase in wealth is greater than four percent.  Percentages are for rows. 
Panel A: Value Creation (Gain%) 
 Total Increase  Neutral  Decrease  
 Year N N % N % N % 
2004-2005 62 28 45.2% 22 35.5% 12 19.3% 
2006-2007 42 18 42.9% 17 40.5% 7 16.6% 
2008-2009 26 11 42.3% 8 30.8% 7 26.9% 
2010-2011 27 7 25.9% 13 48.2% 7 25.9% 
2012-2013 52 32 61.5% 17 32.7% 3 5.8% 
Full Sample 209 96 45.9% 77 36.8% 36 17.3% 
 
 Chi-Square Tests Value df Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 26.947a 18 0.080 
Likelihood Ratio 29.866 18 0.039 
Linear-by-Linear Assoc. 4.691 1 0.030 
N of Valid Cases 202   
 
Panel B: Distribution (Acquirer%) 
Panel B:  Total Capture  Share  Overpay  
Year N N % N % N % 
2004-2005 33 7 21.3% 17 51.2% 9 27.5% 
2006-2007 21 7 33.3% 8 38.1% 6 28.6% 
2008-2009 7 3 42.9% 3 42.9% 1 14.2% 
2010-2011 3 0 N/A 2 66.7% 1 33.3% 
2012-2013 30 16 53.3% 9 30.0% 5 16.7% 
Full Sample 94 33 40.5% 39 36.9% 22 22.6% 
 
Chi-Square Tests Value df Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.527a 8 0.300 
Likelihood Ratio 10.521 8 0.230 
Linear-by-Linear Assoc. 4.611 1 0.032 
N of Valid Cases 94   
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4. RESULTS 
4.1 Periodic Frequency of Strategic Objective:  
 Table 5 (Panel A) shows how the acquiring-firm managers’ strategic objectives changed 
during the study period.  The percentage of mergers with diversification as the strategic objective 
did increase from 12.5% in 2006 – 2007 to 22.7% in 2008 – 2009, but the highest percentage of 
diversification mergers  (31.4%) was observed during 2012 – 2013 (the recovery period).  
Although the sample size admittedly is small, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that corporate 
strategy and time period are independent (the chi-square statistic is equal to 20.5, which is not 
significant at conventional levels).  The results in Table 5 do not support H2 (the Corporate 
Strategy Hypothesis).    
Table 5 (Panel B) focuses on the relative frequencies of related and un-related mergers.  
A related merger refers to a merger in which the acquiring and target firms have the same 2-digit 
SIC code or the same Fama - French industry classification.  Fama and French identify 48 
industry classifications.  The results in Table B indicate that the proportion of related and 
unrelated mergers does vary by time period.  However, I observe the largest frequency of 
unrelated mergers during the recovery period (2012 – 2013).  The χ2 test is significant for each of 
three specifications of relatedness.  
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Table 5: Annual Distribution of Strategic Objectives 
Panel A:        
Strategy         
  Broaden Increase Geographic Vertical Diversification Full 
Years  Product line Market Share Expansion Integration   Sample 
2004-2005 N 21 19 10 11 14 75 
  %  28.0% 25.3% 13.3% 14.7% 18.7% 100% 
2006-2007 N 19 11 8 11 7 56 
  %  33.9% 19.6% 14.3% 19.6% 12.5% 100% 
2008-2009 N 4 6 2 5 5 22 
  %  18.2% 27.3% 9.1% 22.7% 22.7% 100% 
2010-2011 N 5 4 7 1 1 18 
  % 27.8% 22.2% 38.9% 5.6% 5.6% 100% 
2012-2013 N 11 11 6 7 16 51 
  %  21.6% 21.6% 11.8% 13.7% 31.4% 100% 
Total N 60 51 33 35 43 222 
 % 27.0% 23.0% 14.9% 15.8% 19.4% 100% 
 
Chi-Square Tests Value df Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson χ2 20.507a 16 0.198 
Likelihood Ratio 19.068 16 0.265 
Linear-by-Linear Assoc. 2.053 1 0.152 
N of Valid Cases 222   
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Panel B: Related Mergers 
 2-digit SIC   Un-Related Related Total 
2004-2005 Count 17 58 75 
 % row 22.7% 77.3% 100.0% 
2006-2007 Count 12 44 56 
 % row 21.4% 78.6% 100.0% 
2008-2009 Count 7 15 22 
 % row 31.8% 68.2% 100.0% 
2010-2011 Count 2 16 18 
 % row 11.1% 88.9% 100.0% 
2012-2013 Count 22 29 51 
  % row 43.1% 56.9% 100.0% 
Full Count 60 162 222 
Sample % row 27.0% 73.0% 100.0% 
 
   
Chi-Square Tests Value df Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson χ2 10.892a 4 0.028 
Likelihood Ratio 10.794 4 0.029 
Linear-by-Linear Assoc. 5.006 1 0.025 
N of Valid Cases 222   
 
 
 
FF-48  mismo48ff Total 
  Un-related Related Total 
2004-2005 Count 15 58 73 
 % row 20.5% 79.5% 100.0% 
2006-2007 Count 10 42 52 
 % row 19.2% 80.8% 100.0% 
2008-2009 Count 7 14 21 
 % row 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
2010-2011 Count 2 15 17 
 % row 11.8% 88.2% 100.0% 
2012-2013 Count 21 29 50 
  % row 42.0% 58.0% 100.0% 
Full Count 55 158 213 
Sample % row 25.8% 74.2% 100.0% 
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Chi-Square Tests Value df Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson χ2 11.444a 4 0.022 
Likelihood Ratio 11.178 4 0.025 
Linear-by-Linear Assoc. 6.084 1 0.014 
N of Valid Cases 213   
 
 
3-digit SIC  mismo3sic Total 
    Un-related Related  Total 
2004-2005 Count 24 51 75 
 % row 32.0% 68.0% 100.0% 
2006-2007 Count 18 38 56 
 % row 32.1% 67.9% 100.0% 
2008-2009 Count 10 12 22 
 % row 45.5% 54.5% 100.0% 
2010-2011 Count 6 12 18 
 % row 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
2012-2013 Count 31 20 51 
  % row 60.8% 39.2% 100.0% 
Full Count 89 133 222 
Sample % row 40.1% 59.9% 100.0% 
 
 Value df Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson χ2 13.216a 4 0.010 
Likelihood Ratio 13.078 4 0.011 
Linear-by-Linear Assoc. 10.125 1 0.001 
N of Valid Cases 222   
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4.2 Financial Motivations for Mergers 
In order to analyze the role that financial motivations play in bargaining power during the 
Financial Crisis, I examine the deal motivations cited by managers in the SEC filings.  I also 
incorporate firm-characteristics routinely associated with a firm’s financial standing.  In addition, 
I provide an analysis of the target-firm characteristics when managers cite financial motivations 
as a reason for merger.   
4.2.1 Deal Motivations 
 Table 6 (Table A) shows the frequencies of selected deal motivations cited by the target-
firm managers.  For example, the sample contains 21 mergers announced during 2008 and 2009 
(see Table 2).  The managers of 12 target firms (or 57% of the 21 total sample mergers) cited 
access to capital as a deal motivation.  Similarly, the sample contains 17 mergers announced during 
2008 and 2009.  The managers of 5 target firms (29.4%) cited reducing cash-flow volatility as a 
motivation for the merger.  Note that the percentages do not add to 100% because managers can 
cite multiple motivations for each merger.  For my sample of 209 mergers, 86 (or 41.1%) of the 
target-firm managers cited access to capital as a deal motivation.  Increasing liquidity was the 
second most frequently cited motivation (61 managers or 29.2% of the sample mergers. 
 Table 6 (Panel B) shows the frequencies of selected deal motivations cited by the 
acquiring-firm managers.  The most frequently cited motivation was access to capital (cited in 46 
(or 22%) of the 209 sample mergers).  Acquiring-firm managers were least likely to cite the use of 
tax credits from net operating losses (4.3%) or the use of excess cash (0.5%) as deal motivations. 
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Table 6: Annual Distribution of Deal Motivations  
Panel A: Target Financial Deal Motivations  
 Access  Increase  Low Financial Severe Financial 
 Capital  Liquidity  Performance Problems 
Years N % N % N % N % 
2004-2005 31 50.82% 20 32.79% 3 4.92% 1 1.64% 
2006-2007 20 42.55% 14 29.79% 7 14.89% 1 2.13% 
2008-2009 12 57.14% 8 38.10% 2 9.52% 2 9.52% 
2010-2011 11 64.71% 9 52.94% 2 11.76% 1 5.88% 
2012-2013 12 26.67% 10 22.22% 11 24.44% 4 8.89% 
Total 86  61  25  9  
 
 Panel B: Acquirer Motivations 
 Access   Increase   Target's  Use Net  
 Capital  Liquidity  Financial Strength Operating Loss 
 Years N % N % N % N % 
2004-2005 16 29.6% 10 18.5% 6 11.1% 3 5.6% 
2006-2007 16 40.0% 8 20.0% 3 7.5% 2 5.0% 
2008-2009 7 35.0% 4 20.0% 0 0.0% 1 5.0% 
2010-2011 4 26.7% 3 20.0% 4 26.7% 2 13.3% 
2012-2013 3 6.0% 2 4.0% 6 12.0% 1 2.0% 
 46  27  19  9  
 
 
4.2.2 Firm Characteristics 
There are several firm and deal characteristics that will impact bargaining power.  The firm 
characteristics most relevant to this study involve financial performance and debt capacity.35  For 
example, Gort (1969) finds that the average P/E ratio was higher for acquirers than their targets.  
In order to proxy for eagerness on the part of the target, Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2010) use the 
debt-ratio.  The intuition is that the target-firm shareholders’ eagerness to sell could be related 
positively to the debt ratio. 
                                                          
35 Appendix B provides an overview of Variable Descriptions. 
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Table 7: Firm Characteristics  
The table reports the mean firm characteristics before and after the financial crisis with t-tests for the 
difference in means.  I use quarter 4, 2008 as the break.  D/E is the debt-to-equity ratio.  M/B is the market-
to-book ratio.  P/E is price divided by earnings per share.  Leverage is long-term debt divided by total assets.  
The Intangible ratio is intangible assets divided by total assets.   
       
Panel A: Acquirer Ratios       
 Full Pre-Lehman Post-Lehman    
 Sample (2005-2007) (2008-2010)    
Acquirer Statistics N=209 n=61 n=20 [2]-[3]   
  Mean Mean Mean Difference t-stat p-value 
       
Market/Booki 6.075 6.3353 10.0425 -3.7072 -0.567 0.572 
       
P/Ei 18.659 27.7149 15.4133 12.3016 1.744 0.085 
       
Debt-Ratioi 0.2354 0.2095 0.2188 -0.0093 -0.158 0.874 
       
Leverage 2.995 1.4490 3.9902 -2.5412 -0.898 0.372 
       
Intangible 0.2431 0.2491 0.2343 0.0149 0.260 0.796 
Sig. (2-tailed)       
 
Panel B: Target Ratios       
 Full Pre-Lehman Post-Lehman    
 Sample (2005-2007) (2008-2010)    
Target Statistics N=209 n=61 n=20 [2]-[3]   
  Mean Mean Mean Difference t-stat p-value 
       
Market/Booki 2.128 3.6785 3.4036 0.2748 0.281 0.780 
       
Debt-Ratio 0.2262 0.1385 0.1905 -0.0520 -1.106 0.273 
       
Intangible 0.2205 0.2159 0.2236 -0.0077 -0.117 0.907 
       
Leverage 0.2905 0.5274 1.3233 0.7959 1.100 0.274 
Sig. (2-tailed)       
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 Table 7 provides an overview of the firm characteristics examined by my study.  In order 
to compare the changes in firm characteristics, I analyze firm financial ratios in the three years 
preceding (2005-2007) and during the financial crisis (2008-2010).  Table 7 shows that acquirers 
had average P/E ratios of 27.72 before the financial crisis, which were significantly higher than 
the average P/E ratios of 15.41 during the financial crisis.36   However, I did not find a significant 
difference between the means observed before and during the Financial Crisis for the other 
variables.  The latter statement also holds for target firms (see Panel B).  
4.2.3 Deal Motivations and Financial Ratios 
In order to understand the bargaining power of firms, I compare the deal motivation of 
target-firm managers to selected target-firm financial ratios.  Table 8 shows the results of 
difference tests of the means of the financial ratios and target deal motivations.  Target-firm 
managers who cite a desire to ‘access capital’ via the merger have significantly higher debt ratios, 
0.2353, when compared to target-firm managers who do not cite this objective (the mean debt ratio 
is 0.1820).   
The deal motivation designated as ‘low financial performance’ applies when the target-
firm managers cite consecutive quarters of missed earnings announcement predictions.   However, 
this deal motivation does not imply specific financial characteristics regarding the debt or market-
to-book ratios.   
The deal motivation designated as ‘severe financial problems’ applies when the target-firm 
managers cite either a default on loan payments, or a ratings down-grade that leaves the firm with 
an inability to raise external capital.  Targets that cite severe financial problems have debt ratios 
                                                          
36 Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009) look at the acquirer’s M/B, but identify valuation periods with P/E ratios. 
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of 0.4082, which is significantly higher than other targets (the mean debt ratio for the latter group 
is 0.1990).  The results of Table 8 provide support for using financial deal motivations in the 
subsequent analysis.   
 
Table 8: Deal Motivations and Financial Ratios 
This table reports firm level statistics by each of the three categories for wealth distribution in value-increasing 
mergers.  The Debt-Ratio is total debt divided by total assets. M/B is the market-to-book ratio.  Leverage is 
long-term debt divided by total equity.  
Table 8: Target Debt Ratios  
Target Deal Motivations 
    
Access Capital (1,0)    
 Mean difference Sig. t-stat 
Debt Ratio  0.2353 0.0533 0.097 1.338 
 0.1820    
M/B 3.2673 1.3131 0.670 1.549 
 1.9543    
Leverage 0.0408 1.1073 0.500 0.567 
 -1.0665    
     
Low Fin. Performance (1,0)   
 Mean difference Sig. t-stat 
Debt Ratio 0.2090 0.0051 0.920 0.087 
 0.2039    
M/B 2.6371 0.1354 0.653 0.106 
 2.5018    
Leverage 0.8962 1.8007 0.487 0.691 
 -0.9045    
     
Severe Fin. Problems (1,0)    
 Mean difference Sig. t-stat 
Debt Ratio 0.4082 0.2092 0.016 1.852 
 0.1990    
M/B 1.0321 -1.5403 0.513 -0.626 
 2.5723    
Leverage -0.0780 0.5368 0.749 0.114 
 -0.6149    
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4.3 Wealth Creation  
 
 There are considerable changes in corporate strategy throughout the financial crisis and 
subsequent recovery.  To better understand the role that corporate strategy plays in wealth creation 
during different periods, I analyze the combined gain in a multi-variate setting.37  Table 9 examines 
the determinants of value-creation.  The primary variables of interest are the binary variables 
representing different time periods.   The intercept reflects a diversification strategy in each of the 
models and a merger involving a mixed payment (Models [2] and [4]). 
In Model [1] the variable for post Lehman Brothers is positive and significant, which 
suggests that the combined change in value was 2.652% greater after the fall of Lehman Brothers.  
The intercept term is significant and positive, which implies that a diversification strategy is value-
increasing throughout the sample period.  The binary variable geographic expansion is positive 
and significant in each of the four model specifications.  This result provides evidence that a 
corporate strategy involving geographic expansion was value-creating throughout the sample 
period.  Models [3] and [4] utilize Pre-Crisis and Financial-Crisis binary variables, which represent 
the two years before and during the crisis, respectively.  The coefficient for the crisis period is 
negative and significant in model [4], which suggests that value creation decreased during the 
period of 2008 and 2009. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
37 Gain = f (Strategy | Capital Availability) 
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Table 9: Determinants of Value Creation  
The results of this table are of OLS regressions of the model below.   
𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛% = ∝ + 𝑆1 (𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 𝑉𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟)𝑖 +  𝛽1𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑖𝑑(1,0) + 𝛽2𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ(1,0)+ 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
The sample consists of 209 mergers from January 1st, 2004 to December 31st, 2013. The dependent variable 
Gain% is equal to Gaini divided by the sum of the pre-merger equity market values of the acquiring and target 
firms (MVeqA and MVeqT , respectively).  The variable of interest represent different time intervals associated 
with the Financial Crisis.  Consistent with Furtler, Hibbeln, and Winkelvos (2014), I use the 4th quarter of 2008 
as a structural break.  Models [3] and [4] include binary variables for Pre-Crisis and Post-Crisis.   Where S1 is a 
vector of binary variables representing five mutually exclusive strategic objectives.  I report t-statistics in 
parentheses with ***, **, and * denoting statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.   
 
DV: Gain%     
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
(Constant) 3.695* 6.603 6.116*** 10.841** 
 (1.900) (1.508) (3.193) (2.272) 
Lehman (1,0) 2.652* 3.389   
    (Post=1, Pre=0) (1.681) (1.527)   
Pre-Crisis   -1.361 -1.454 
    (2005-2007)   (-0.814) (-0.652) 
Crisis-period   -4.101 -11.249* 
    (2008-2009)   (-1.641) (-1.867) 
Geographic 5.467** 10.260*** 4.940* 9.350** 
    Expansion (2.007) (2.702) (1.808) (2.409) 
Broaden -3.472 -1.690 -3.873* -2.998 
    Product-line (-1.505) (-0.573) (-1.682) (-1.024) 
Increase 0.855 1.940 0.586 0.922 
    Market Share (0.360) (0.637) (0.247) (0.303) 
Vertical -3.282 -0.497 -3.325 -1.274 
    Integration (-1.257) (-0.159) (-1.270) (-0.412) 
Stock (1,0)  -5.428  -6.751** 
  (-1.659)  (-2.039) 
Cash (1,0)  -2.687  -3.750 
  (-0.818)  (-1.106) 
Multi-Bidders -0.995  0.431 
    (-0.765)   (-0.790) 
N=209 N=209 N=209 N=209 N=209 
R2 0.085 0.149 0.084 0.158 
Adj. R2 0.062 0.091 0.058 0.093 
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Table 10: Determinants of Value Creation by Period 
The results of this table are of OLS regressions of the model below.   
𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛% = ∝ + 𝑆1 (𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 𝑉𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟)𝑖 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
The sample consists of 209 mergers from January 1st, 2004 to December 31st, 2013. The dependent variable Gain% 
is equal to Gaini divided by the sum of the pre-merger equity market values of the acquiring and target firms (MVeqA 
and MVeqT , respectively).  The variable of interest represent different time intervals associated with the Financial 
Crisis and Sample. S1 is a vector of binary variables representing five mutually exclusive strategic objectives.  I report 
t-statistics in parentheses with ***, **, and * denoting statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively.   
 
 [1]  [2]  [3]  
   Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
 (Constant) 2.20 (1.563) 2.60 (1.103) 4.60** (2.204) 
Strategy Geographic Expansion   5.90** (2.037) 4.10 (1.407) 
 Broaden Product line   -3.10 (-1.258) -4.30* (-1.714) 
 Increase Market Share   1.00 (0.398) -0.10 (-0.021) 
 Vertical Integration   -2.70 (-0.924) -3.20 (-1.076) 
Period Pre-Crisis (2006-2007) 2.40 (1.066) 2.60 (1.144)   
 Crisis (2008-2009 0.80 (0.321) -0.60 (-0.207)   
 Recovery (2010-2011) -0.20 (-0.093) -2.70 (-0.860)   
 Post (2012-2013) 7.70*** (3.648) 7.60*** (3.451)   
 St. Louis Fed Index     -2.00* (-1.688) 
 N 209  209  209  
 R2 0.074  0.146  0.077  
 Adj. R2 0.056  0.108  0.051  
 F-stat 4.105  3.823  3.272  
 p-value .003  <.001  <.001  
 
 
 
4.3.1 Wealth Creation during Valuation Waves and Financial Market Stress: 
 Table 10 shows the combined gain based upon different valuation periods and the level of 
financial market stress.38  The results of Models [1] and [2] indicate that there was not a significant 
change in value creation throughout the sample period with the exception of 2012-2013.  Model 
                                                          
38 Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2009) identify three valuation periods (high, neutral, and low).  They classify overall 
stock market valuation for a month based on the de-trended P/E ratio of the S&P 500 index. 
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[2] also shows that geographic expansion was a value-creating corporate strategy for acquirers, 
even after controlling for the different time periods of the sample period. 
Model [3] substitutes the St. Louis Federal Reserve Financial Stress Index (STLFSI) for 
the time period indicator variables.39  The coefficient for the St. Louis Fed Index is negative and 
statistically significant.40  As the stress index increases indicating lower capital availability, Gain% 
increases.  This result does support H1 (the value creation hypothesis).  Merger gains are larger 
during difficult economic conditions.  This finding also is consistent with the predictions of 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan.  With regard to corporate strategy, the results in Table 10 indicate 
that the combined value (Gain%) is lower when the acquiring-firm’s corporate strategy is 
broadening product line. 
4.4 Division of Gain  
4.4.1 Bargaining Power Model  
 The distribution of wealth in mergers should depend on the relative bargaining power of a 
firm and the manager’s ability to finance daily operations.   In order to test the bargaining power 
hypothesis, I analyze the acquirer’s ability to capture wealth given the availability of capital and 
total merger activity.  Whenever I use Acquirer% as the dependent variable, the sample is reduced 
to the 96 mergers that were value-creating. 
Acquirer% = ƒ (Motivations, Bargaining Power | Cost of Capital, M&A Activity) 
Table 11 analyzes the acquiring-firms’ bargaining power given the level of systemic stress 
in financial markets.  To control for financial market stress, I use the St. Louis Fed Stress Index.  
                                                          
39 See AppendixAfor a full description of the St. Louis Fed Stress Index. 
40Harford (2005) estimates capital market liquidity by calculating the spread between the average business loan rate 
and the Federal Funds Rate.   
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Negative index values indicate below-average financial market stress, and positive values indicate 
above-average financial market stress. In each of the six model specifications, the coefficient for 
the St. Louis Fed Index is negative and highly significant.  In contrast to H4 (the Bargaining Power 
Hypothesis), acquiring-firm shareholders capture less gain when external capital is more difficult 
to attain (i.e., the index value is higher). 
The primary variables of interest are indicators of the target firms’ financial reasons for 
merger.  In Models [1], [2], and [3], the variable target-financial-problems takes a value of 1 if the 
target-firm managers cite either ‘low financial performance’ or ‘severe financial problems’ as a 
deal motivation.  When targets cite financial problems, the percentage of the gain captured by the 
acquirer increases by 48% points.  Consistent with the predictions of H5 (Access to Capital 
Hypothesis), acquirers gain considerable bargaining power when the target is experiencing 
financial distress. 
In Models [4], [5], and [6], I include an acquiring- and target-firm financial motivation 
index.  Each index measures the number of financial motivations cited by either the acquiring- or 
target-firm managers.  The acquirer motivation index has a possible range of one to four 
motivations, and the target motivation index has a possible range of one to five motivations.  
Higher index values imply greater financial motivation for completing the merger (and lower 
bargaining power by the firm’s managers).  The coefficient for the target financial motivation 
index is positive and significant.  The result implies that acquirers are able to capture more wealth 
the greater the target-firm managers’ financial motivation for completing the merger.  Similarly, 
the acquiring-firm managers’ capture a lower percent of the value created, when acquiring-firm 
managers’ cite financial motivations for completing the merger.  These results do support H4 and 
H5.   
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Table 11: Bargaining Power in the Presence of Financial Distress 
Target Distress and Financial Stress 
The table reports results of OLS regression with the Acquirer% as the dependent variable.  The variables St. Louis 
Fed Index represents the systemic level of stress from various benchmarks such as the Fed Funds Rate, Aaa rated 
securities. LIBOR, and Euro-Dollar.  In models [1], [2], and [3]; the primary variables of interest are the Target 
Financial Problems, which is a binary variable representing 1 if the target cites financial distress in the form of 
bankruptcy or consecutive and continued quarters of under-performance.   In the models [4], [5], and [6], I use the 
deal motivations indices for both acquirers and targets.  I report t-statistics in parentheses with ***, **, and * 
denoting statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.   
      
Acquirer% [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
(Constant) -32.930* -44.244 -52.478 -36.389* -33.587 -36.899 
 (-1.862) (-1.489) (-1.669) (-1.744) (-1.078 -1.123 
St. Louis Fed -31.829** -43.202*** -42.048*** -34.015** -47.362*** -46.785*** 
    Stress Index (-2.624) (-2.966) (-2.862) (-2.642) (-3.023 -2.935 
Target Financial 47.966*** 48.481*** 48.598***    
     Problems (2.874) (2.861) (2.856)    
Target  Financial   20.240 19.950* 19.208* 
    Motivation Index    (2.049) (1.945 1.814 
Acquirer Financial    -7.342 -4.981 -5.544 
    Motivation Index    (-0.557) (-0.363 -0.397 
Stock Pay 44.044** 41.226** 38.961* 38.348** 32.872 32.264 
 (2.462) (2.124) (1.979) (1.954) (1.503 1.453 
Mkt-Cap Acq .00305** .00262 .00342* .00325* .00327* .003635* 
 (2.119) (1.681) (1.860) (2.108) (1.954 1.844 
Mkt-Cap Tar -.0100 -.00973 -.0138 .01025** .009158 .01121 
 (-1.567) (-1.409) (-1.625) (-1.497) (-1.221 -1.177 
Multi-Bid  1.934 1.531  -6.827 -6.768 
  (0.153) (0.120)  (-0.501 -0.49 
Relative Size  26.956   12.931 
      (0.829)   0.358 
N= 98 98 98 98 98 98 
R2 0.396 0.426 .437 0.342 0.367 0.369 
Adj. R2 0.320 0.333 .328 0.241 0.243 0.225 
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Table 12: Bargaining Power and Motivation Indices 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions.  The Debt-Ratioi,t,, M/Bi,t, and Market-capitalization have been 
previously defined for both acquirers and targets.  The variable of interest represent different time intervals associated 
with the Financial Crisis.    Each model includes a vector of binary variables representing the six deal motivation 
indexes.  Models [3] and [4] include binary variables for Pre-Crisis and Post-Crisis.  I report t-statistics in parentheses 
with ***, **, and * denoting statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.   
Acquirer%   Lehman Pre-Crisis 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
(Constant) 12.104 -27.680 16.259 8.004 
 (0.526) (-0.707) (0.463) (0.338) 
Debt-Ratio Acq 101.78* 111.562* 103.336 96.876 
 (1.768) (1.857) (1.728) (1.662) 
M/B Acq -0.866 -1.173 -0.888 -0.772 
 (-0.668) (-0.842) (-0.665) (-0.589) 
Mkt-Cap Acq 0.000** 0.000* 0.000** 0.000** 
 (2.267) (2.065) (2.215) (2.171) 
Debt-Ratio Tar -134.292** -155.382 -132.53** -149.15** 
 (-2.327) (-2.009) (-2.202) (-2.452) 
M/B Tar -1.929 -2.196 -1.893 -2.158 
 (-1.665) (-1.606) (-1.565) (-1.799) 
Mkt-Cap Tar 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000 
 (-1.772) (-1.061) (-1.735) (-1.614) 
Target Financial  21.391** 26.711** 21.463*** 21.84*** 
Motivation Index (3.021) (2.913) (2.950) (3.052) 
Tar. Operating Index 3.722 1.410 3.032 5.075 
Motivation Index (0.381) (0.107) (0.278) (0.508) 
Tar. Marketing Index -1.419 3.535 -1.485 0.032 
Motivation Index (-0.173) (0.381) (-0.177) (0.004) 
Acq. Financial Index -7.621 -7.807 -8.149 -4.094 
Motivation Index (-0.616) (-0.480) (-0.622) (-0.311) 
Acq. Operating Index -3.730 3.266 -4.028 -1.322 
Motivation Index (-0.450) (0.356) (-0.463) (-0.150) 
Acq. Marketing. Index 35.518** 42.127** 34.610* 40.140** 
Motivation Index (2.454) (2.461) (2.178) (2.572) 
Lehman0pre1post   -3.403  
    (Pre=1, Post=0)   (-0.160)  
Pre-Crisis    -18.268 
     (2005-2007)      (-0.832) 
R2 0.666 0.768 0.667 0.678 
Adjusted R2 0.466 0.471 0.439 0.458 
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No No 
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4.4.2 Wealth Distribution given firm characteristics and motivations:  
Table 12 also reports the results of OLS regressions when the acquirer’s portion of the gain 
is the dependent variable.  Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006) differentiate between 
the mis-valuation hypothesis and the financing constraint / debt capacity hypothesis by including 
leverage as a control variable.   Therefore, I include firm-specific characteristics such as the debt-
ratio.  The coefficient for both the target financial motivations is positive and significant.  The 
coefficients imply that the acquirer’s ability to capture more of the wealth created is related 
positively to the financial motivations cited by target-firm managers.  The coefficient of the target 
firm’s debt ratio is significant and negative in all Model specifications.  This result implies that 
targets with more debt maintain  bargaining power in mergers.  The coefficient of the acquiring 
firm’s debt ratio is significant and positive in Model specifications [1] and [2].   
Columns [3] and [4] include binary variables for the different periods of the financial crisis.  
Again, the coefficient the target financial motivation index is positive and significant.  This result 
provides further evidence that the acquiring firm gains bargaining power when the target cites 
financial motivations for entering the merger.  Note that Model specification [2] uses year fixed 
effects, while the other models do not.   
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
  In this study I examine wealth creation and the division of gains during the Financial Crisis 
and subsequent recovery.  I test five hypotheses related to value creation (H1), corporate strategy 
(H2), changes in deal motivations (H3), and bargaining power (H4 and H5).  I find limited support 
for H1 (the Value Creation Hypothesis, when I use a chi-square test of independence between 
value creation and the time period.  I observe the highest percentage of value-increasing mergers 
during the recovery period (2012 – 2013).  I obtain similar results when I test H1 by using a 
multivariate approach.   Therefore, I find no evidence that mergers announced during the Financial 
Crisis (2008 – 2009) created more combined wealth than mergers announced during the pre- and 
post- crisis periods. 
I find weak support for H2 (the Corporate Strategy Hypothesis).  I cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that corporate strategy and time period are independent by using a chi-square test when 
I examine all five corporate strategies separately.  However, I can reject the null hypothesis when 
I differentiate only between related and unrelated mergers.  The frequency of unrelated mergers 
increased from 21.4% in 2006 – 2007 to 31.8% in 2008 – 2009.  Even so, the highest frequency of 
unrelated mergers occurred during 2012 – 2013 (43.1%).  
I find stronger results when I examine the frequency of mergers driven by financial 
considerations, particularly for target firms.  The percentage of target-firm managers citing access 
to capital increased from 42.6% in 2006 – 2007 to 64.7% in 2010 – 2011.  The desire to increase 
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liquidity also increased during this period.  These results support H3 (the Financial Motivations 
Hypothesis). 
Finally, I find support for the Bargaining Power (H4) and Access to Capital (H5) 
hypotheses.  Acquiring-firm managers captured a larger percentage of the combined wealth gain 
when 1) the economic conditions deteriorated (as measured by the level of the St. Louis Federal 
Reserve Stress Index), and 2) when the target-firm managers cited financial motivations for 
merger.   However, the number of mergers declined significantly during the Financial Crisis, so 
acquiring-firm managers do not appear to have been able to take advantage of their increased 
bargaining power on a relatively large scale.    
 
Final Thoughts of Dissertation: How does Essay 3 fit in?   
In Essays 1 and 2, I identify the determinants of wealth creation and wealth distribution in 
mergers.  The results in Essay #1 provide insight into the relation between corporate strategy, 
negotiation procedure, and value creation.  In Essay #2 I construct models to test the determinants 
of negotiating procedure and bargaining power.  The logical extension is to test the results in a 
different economic environment.  In particular, does bargaining power change with the level of 
financial market stress and merger activity?  As a result, Essay 3 uses the same outcome 
classification scheme while introducing the element of variability in capital markets.   
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Figure 1: Annual U.S. Domestic M&A Deal Value41 
 
 
Annual           
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Total Value  $792 $1,095 $1,511 $1,510 $826 $763 $802 $898 $973 $964 
($ billion)           
           
Sample Deals 26 36 23 19 9 17 11 16 32 20 
 
  
                                                          
41 Mergermarket in association with Merrill datasite, Deal Drivers: the Comprehensive Review of 
Mergers and Acquisitions in the EMEA Region (London: Remark, February 2010).  
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Appendix A: All Deal Motivations cited by Acquirers and Targets 
 
     
Acquirer Motivations   Target Motivations  
 N    N 
AM Cost Savings 110  TM Scale/Scope 108 
AM Target Technology 101  TM Access Capital 86 
AM Expand Customer Base 79  TM Acquirer’s Tech 73 
AM Combine Distribution Channel 70  TM Capital for Growth 37 
AM Enhance New Prod 67  TM Enhance Product Development 62 
AM International 50  TM Industry Consolidation 59 
AM Access Cap 44  Economic Cycle Cash-flow volatility 41 
AM Manufacturing Expertise 41  TM Increase Shareholder Liquidity 57 
AM Combine Products 35  TM Distribution Channel 56 
AM Existing Relation 33  TM Acquirer’s Customer base 53 
AM Size Big Customer 32  TM Needs Size 43 
AM Purchasing Power 28  TM Acquirer’s Manufacturing 37 
AM Liquidity 27  International 20 
AM Target’s Better Product 21  TM Low Fin Performance 22 
AM Tar Management 21  Cash Offer -> Value Liquidity 17 
AM Tar Fin Strong 18  TM Purchasing Power 17 
Cash-flow Volatility & Economy 12  TM Acquirer’s Management 14 
AM Use NOL 9  TM Severe Financial Problems 7 
AM Target’s Particular Customer 6  TM Shrink Mkt 5 
AM Litigation 1  Regulation 5 
AM Use Cash 1     
AM 3rdParty 1     
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Appendix B: Table of Return Calculations 
The table reports statistics that show the calculations of returns used in the analysis.  Panel A reports the 
results for the sample of acquirer firms while Panel B shows the statistics for target firms.  There are 209 
acquirer and target observations.  CMAR is the cumulative market-adjusted return. CAR is the 
cumulative abnormal return.  Column [1] shows the CMAR [-5, +5] around the announcement date of the 
merger (t=0).  Column [2] reports the CAR [-5, +5] also around the announcement.  Columns [3] and [4] 
report CMAR and CAR statistics for the longer event window [-25, +5].  
 
Panel A: Target       
Market Adjusted Return     
 Holding Period Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Return [-5,+ 5] CMARtar 0.3700 0.26000 -0.29584 0.97854 
 [-26, +5] CMARtar 0.3860 0.28076 -0.32022 0.99163 
       
Dollar [-5,+ 5] ΔMAVtar $282,793.5 $399,851.2 -$629,950.0 1804075.0 
 [-26, +5] ΔMAVtar $305,697.5 $460,785.7 -$544,117.8 2649432.0 
       
Cumulative Abnormal Return          
 Holding Period Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Return [-5,+ 5] CARtar 0.3673 0.25039 -0.07835 1.35198 
 [-26, +5] CARtar 0.3848 0.25100 -0.27058 1.05862 
       
Dollar [-5,+ 5] ΔMAV(car)tar $282,793.5 $399,851.2 -$629,950.4 1804,074.7 
 [-26, +5] ΔMAV(car)tar $652,771.3 2,287,705.8 -4630,195.9 15849,844.7 
       
Market Capitalization      
 day    Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
 [-5] Target-Size $1020,298.6 $1,363,924.6 $10,809.4 $8,571,323.7 
 [-26] Target-Size $996,788.8 $1,347,311.2 11,079.3 8,752,026.1 
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Panel B: Acquirer       
Market Adjusted Return     
 Holding Period Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Return [-5,+ 5] CMARacq 0.02830 0.10976 -0.23912 0.50683 
 [-26, +5] CMARacq 0.04000 0.15400 -0.38485 0.48980 
       
Dollar [-5,+ 5] ΔMAVacq $106,160.1 $1,472,725.6 -6,377,246.5 7,131,459.6 
 [-26, +5] ΔMAVacq $767,712.7 $2,785,245.2 -4,336,465.0 20.809,609.0 
       
      
Cumulative Abnormal Return      
 Holding Period Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Return [-5,+ 5] CARacq 0.02645 0.10581 -0.27245 0.45187 
 [-26, +5] CARacq 0.03491 0.13082 -0.38379 0.45497 
       
Dollar [-5,+ 5] ΔMAV(car)acq $119,084.4 $1,463,277.9 -6,457,088.7 7,188,722.1 
 [-26, +5] ΔMAV(car)acq $652,771.3 $228,7705.8 -4,630,195.9 15,849,844.7 
       
Market-Cap       
 day  Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
 [-5] Acquirer-Size $26048837 $74725405 37968.0 575867260 
 [-26] Acquirer-Size $24820024 $71100490 40474.0 547704177 
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Appendix C: St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index  
The STLFSI measures the degree of financial stress in the markets.  The average value of the index is 
designed to be zero, which represents normal financial market conditions.  Values below (above) zero 
imply below (above) average financial market stress.  The index is constructed from seven interest rates 
series, six yield spreads, and five other indicators discussed below.   
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Appendix C (Continued) St. Louis Federal Reserve Financial Stress Index 
The St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index (STLFSI) is appropriate for the analysis of this 
study.  The STLFSI includes seven interest rate series; (federal Funds Rate, 2-yr., 10-yr., and 30yr. 
treasury bonds, Baa-rated corporate bonds, Merrill Lynch High-Yield Index & BBB-rated), six 
yield spreads; (yield Curve: 10-yr. Treasury minus 3-month treasury, LIBOR 3-month and 3-mong 
Eurodollar spread), five other indicators; (S&P 500 Financials Index, CBOE VIX, J.P. Morgan 
Emerging Market Bond Index, Merrill Lynch Bond Market Index, 10 yr. nominal treasury minus 
ten year TIPS).  The index is relatively simple to interpret.  The average value of the index, which 
begins in late 1993, is designed to be zero. Thus, zero is viewed as representing normal financial 
market conditions. Values below zero suggest below-average financial market stress, while values 
above zero suggest above-average financial market stress. 
 
To control for broader capital market characteristics I follow the methodology of Aktas, de 
Bodt, and Roll (2010) who identify the following ex ante competition proxies: wave, predicted 
wave, deal frequency previous quarter, deal frequency previous semester, buyout activities, and 
NBER recession.   Other determinants of merger waves include the C&I Loan Rate Spread, an 
economic shock index, and a metric for tight capital.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
175 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX D: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
  
       
176 
 
 
  
Appendix B: Variable    
Variable Definitions Description  
Panel A. Dependent Variables   
%Gain The combined change in market value for both the 
acquirer and target shareholders.  
 
Acquirer% The Acquirer’s portion of value created from value-
increasing mergers.  
 
Panel B. Negotiation Dummies   
Auction Binary Variable: 1 if the target utilizes an auction as 
the form of sales procedure, 0 otherwise.  
 
Target-to-Acquirer Binary Variable: 1 if the target contacts the acquirer as 
the form of sales procedure, 0 otherwise. 
 
Acquirer-to-Target Binary Variable: 1 if the acquirer initiates contact, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Third-party Binary Variable: 1 if a third-party initiates contact, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Mutual Discussion Binary Variable: 1 if the parties begin discussions on a 
mutual platform, 0 otherwise. 
 
Panel C. Strategic Objectives   
 Geographic Expansion Related 
 Broaden Product Line Relate 
 Increase Market Share Related 
 Vertical Integration  
 Diversification No 
Panel D. Deal Motivations   
 Acquirer Motivations  
 Target Motivations  
Panel E. Main Control Variables   
Target Size Market Capitalization of the Target  
Acquirer Size Market Capitalization of the Target  
Relative Size Target Market-Cap/ Acquirer Market-Cap  
Tobin’s q Ratio Market value of assets over book value of assets: 
(item6 – item60 + item25* item199) / item6 
 
Debt Ratio (Long-term Debt + Current Liabilities) / Total Assets  
Leverage (Long-term Debt / Total Asset)  
Market to Book The market value of equity divided by the book value 
of equity.   
 
Panel F. Deal Characteristics    
Cash Dummy Variable: 1 for purely cash-financed deals, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Stock Dummy Variable: 1 for purely stock-financed deals, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Panel G.    
NBER Recession Dummy Variable: 1 if the merger occurred during a 
recession period, 0 otherwise. 
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